

FIRST EDITION

DEMOCRACY
BEYOND
THE
BALLOT
BOX

Open Government Partnership Global Report

VOLUME I

Open
Government
Partnership



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With generous support of

International Development Research Council, Canada

Department for International Development, United Kingdom

Other OGP donors and contributing members

Special thanks

- Joseph Powell
- Tonusree Basu
- Stefano Pizzicannella, Government of Italy
- Government of Canada
- Government of Argentina
- Reviewers (internal and external)

- The governance data producers, without whom none of this would be possible:
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 - Tax Justice Network, Financial Transparency Index Team
 - Open Data Barometer
 - Freedom House
 - Centre for Law and Democracy
 - Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Institute
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Additional thanks

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- Peter Chapman, Carole Excell, Jan Gondol, Florencia Guerzovich
- Michael Jarvis, Transparency and Accountability Initiative
- Ruth Levine and Alfonsina Peñalosa, Hewlett Foundation
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CEO's foreword

The Open Government Partnership (OGP) was grounded in the belief that the exercise of democracy must not be limited to the ballot box, but rather practiced everyday by citizens shaping and overseeing the policies that impact their lives.

To that essential end, the Partnership empowers champions of citizens' interests—notably, government and civil society—to co-create action plans, where governments publicly commit to concrete reforms that make government more open, participatory, and responsive to citizens, while citizens and civil society engage to shape and oversee governments between and beyond elections. And there is accountability by OGP's Independent Reporting Mechanism publicly assessing whether the government implemented open government actions as promised.

In this way the OGP platform has provided new tools for democracies to become more open and citizen-centric. In just over seven years, OGP has become a movement of cutting-edge, open government reformers. Today, 79 countries and a growing number of local governments—representing more than two billion people—have joined OGP, along with leaders across civil society.

The OGP Global Report: Democracy Beyond the Ballot Box captures both the individual and collective work of this truly unique network of citizen champions. This report—the first of its kind—provides an honest assessment of nearly a decade of open government data and strategy.

Importantly, the lessons in the pages that follow serve as a critical resource for any reformer or activist seeking to advance the frontiers of open government. Future efforts will be built as much on ongoing areas for growth and improvement as they will be on best practices.

The next steps of the Partnership are critical. From Hungary to Tanzania, Turkey and Russia and beyond—including in many established democracies—new attacks on oversight institutions, the media, and civil society, as well as emerging digital threats spreading disinformation and manipulating public opinion, are eroding traditional checks and balances.

The challenges we face are daunting, but our course is clear. The vision and tireless work presented in these pages provide a guidepost for reformers everywhere to follow.

We've learned that success in democratic governance must be defined differently. It will mean looking beyond the ballot box. And, importantly, it will mean moving from shared intent to ensuring that the promise of democracy, as well as the many bold efforts to strengthen and advance it, become the norm.




Sanjay Pradhan

Chief Executive Officer
Open Government Partnership



OGP Global Report

Executive Summary



The promise of democracy is often defined by the ballot box, where citizens determine who will represent their interests in government. That promise, however, too often fails to translate to the reality of people's daily lives. In far too many countries, citizens perceive their elected governments to be disconnected and unresponsive to their needs, or corrupt and captured by special interests.

In this context, authoritarianism is on the rise again. The current wave, is different—it is more gradual and less direct than in past eras. Today, challenges to democracy come less frequently from vote theft or military coups; they come from persistent threats to activists and journalists, the media, and the rule of law.

The threats to democracy are coming from outside of the electoral process and our response must be found there too. Both the problem and the solution lie “beyond the ballot box.”

This is the unique mission of the Open Government Partnership (OGP)—a simple, yet strategic way for civil society and reformers in governments to join forces, commit to reforms to open up government, and together ensure that our public institutions work for citizens, and not for themselves.

In the eight years since OGP's founding, 79 countries and a growing number of local governments—representing more than two billion people—along with thousands of civil society organizations have joined the Partnership. Collectively, they have made more than 3,800 reform commitments in more than 100 biennial action plans.

But questions remain: Are these commitments impactful? Do they target our society's most pressing challenges? Are they resulting in a more collaborative, accountable way of governing? And, importantly, are they helping to protect democracy between elections?



The state of open government

To address these questions, OGP is releasing its first comprehensive assessment of the state of open government. This report provides a thorough and honest review of progress made by OGP member countries in the first seven years of the partnership.

In determining its findings, the report examines a vast amount of the world's governance data, across multiple dimensions of democracy and openness, specifically looking at three areas of progress and next steps:

- 1. Collective results:** OGP countries' progress as a collective based on aggregate indicators of openness
- 2. Priority policy areas:** OGP countries' progress in three key areas: civic space as a crucial underpinning, anti-corruption initiatives, and public service delivery
- 3. Member pages:** Stories of individual member countries' progress across their OGP action plans and against key indicators of openness, as measured by third-party indicators

"Citizens of Madrid vote on city budget through Decide Madrid initiative." Photo by OGP



"James Otto from Sustainable Development Institute (SDI) teaches members of the Jobbahn Clan about land rights." Photo by OGP

Collective results: impact evidence

Providing important context for these assessments, the report reviews evidence on the impact of open government to determine whether openness leads to better socio-economic outcomes.

Research focused on the economic impact of transparency indicates steady progress. There is evidence that improved transparency in relevant policies is strongly correlated with better economic results. This includes higher foreign direct investment, greater volume of bilateral trade, and improved credit ratings. Open data helped to generate more than €52 billion for the European Union 28 in 2018. Additionally, nearly 75,000 jobs are estimated to have been created as a result of the re-use of open data in 2016; and a study of G20 countries found that the global economic value-add of open data is US\$2.6 trillion.

Moreover, research conducted as part of this report on the long-term impact of free association, free and independent media, and government engagement with citizens—referred to as “diagonal accountability”—finds that they are also associated with improved socio-economic outcomes, including: infant mortality, life expectancy, years of education, economic growth (when elections are also strong), and less inequality.

Notably, the evidence shows that openness works best when it is part of a broader ecosystem of accountability and government capacity, and even

better when there are stronger elections and checks-and-balances. Democratic institutions are mutually reinforcing. Where electoral systems are stronger, civil society and a free press are more effective at informing voters. In turn, voters are more likely to increase pressure on elected officials for results. Additionally, openness has a stronger effect in middle- and higher-income countries, and when the civil service is competent and impartial.

Bringing citizens into decisions: intentional accountability

Open government is about much more than transparency. Transparent information needs to be useful, usable, and used for it to change government performance. An overall finding of this report is that many commitments, especially in public services, assume that information disclosure will result in improved performance, responsiveness, or accountability. More than two-thirds of OGP commitments include some elements of transparency. Less than a third mention accountability. Of those, nearly half do not describe the actual means of achieving accountability—whether through citizen participation in oversight, the courts, audits, or complaint mechanisms.

These commitments are, in essence, “black box” accountability commitments where there are inputs (in

this case information), some unspecified process, and, shortly thereafter, accountability. By contrast, there are “glass box” accountability reforms, wherein information is disclosed and members of the public have a clear channel (or channels) to inform, persuade, or otherwise convince the government to act.

By better clarifying who will be more accountable to whom and how—through which channels—OGP commitments and open government reforms will have greater impact. Specifically, transparency commitments should lay out the use cases for newly disclosed information: who will be accountable to whom if the information is released? Where possible, those commitments should articulate a theory of the channels through which transparency will take place: The market? Participatory opportunities? The courts? During electoral campaigns? And, where possible, does the enabling environment exist in which people can safely use the information to criticize officials or change service providers?

OGP works

The most profound transformations that openness brings to governments are often measured in decades, rather than months or years. Nonetheless, we are able to look at early results using the data assembled for this report. Reflecting a database of dozens of indicators from third-party sources across five policy dimensions (civic space, anti-corruption initiatives, open policy-making, access to information, and fiscal openness), this report compared the 42 countries that have been in OGP for more than five years to non-OGP countries. In each of the five policy domains and all 12 subdomains, OGP countries earned higher scores than non-OGP countries.

In addition, a comparison of eligibility requirements of countries that have been in OGP for more than five years with non-OGP countries shows:

- OGP countries started and finished with high scores in the four eligibility areas to join the partnership: fiscal openness, access to information, asset disclosure, and civic participation.
- There was global convergence around passing access to information laws and asset disclosure.

- There was global divergence around the open budget requirements. While almost all OGP countries earned perfect scores in this area between 2017 and 2018, many other countries around the world regressed.
- A troubling parallel downturn in civil liberties exists among both OGP and non-OGP countries. As a percentage change, OGP countries have declined less in relative terms than the non-OGP average, and may be “outperforming a bear market” for openness. However, the backsliding still represents a fundamental threat to open government, which OGP countries must proactively tackle through their action plans.





"Principal of Mongolian school talks with student and her mother." Photo by OGP

Priority policy areas

The report takes deep dives into selected thematic areas. For this first global report, the selected themes are: (i) civic space, which constitutes a vital priority for OGP countries amid the backsliding noted above; (ii) anti-corruption, where open contracting and beneficial ownership transparency are emerging areas in which OGP countries can advance from innovation to norms (as has been the case regarding access to information, asset disclosure, and open budgeting); and (iii) public service delivery, especially, education, water and sanitation, and health, which can deliver tangible impact in the lives of citizens, but also constitute emerging areas to continue to be nurtured and deepened.

Civic space: erosion at the foundations of open government

Civic space is the fundamental underpinning for open government and OGP. Yet, as the report documents, civil liberties (the core of civic space) continue to experience a steady erosion, even in OGP countries. A 2018 OGP report found that nearly half of OGP countries had problems in each of the basic freedoms of assembly, association, and expression, as well as the fundamental rights that make transparency, participation, and accountability work. At the same time, very few of those countries were using their OGP action plans to address these issues.

The report takes a detailed look at three specific aspects of civic space: free association, free assembly, and defending activists and journalists.

- **Freedom of association:** While most OGP countries have strong legal and practical support for freedom of association, 40% experience noteworthy challenges. There has been a trend of restrictions placed on civil society organizations, including restrictive laws, regulations and practices, as well as barriers to access, funding, and funding cuts. Commitments in OGP countries address barriers to entry (El Salvador), operational ease (Canada), and access to funding (Ukraine, Bulgaria, and Latvia). Overall, however, only five countries with freedom of association challenges have adopted ambitious commitments as assessed by the OGP's Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM). The report outlines an agenda moving forward, including: laws and practices to limit or eliminate legal and de facto restrictions; facilitating operations; and promoting mechanisms and funding for sustainability.
- **Freedom of assembly:** Free assembly is a bedrock of democracy, allowing people to collaborate, bring attention to issues, and get answers. About half of OGP countries have challenges in this area, but lack any commitments in assembly. Independently produced data consistently shows that between a third and half of OGP countries experience notable

interference with the right to peaceful assembly. At the same time, roughly a third to half of OGP countries perform consistently well. This area is, however, the area with the least commitments in all of OGP. This suggests that there is considerable room for leadership, political participation, and a healthy civil society ecosystem. OGP members could advance applicable policies and practices in five areas: (i) notification and permits, (ii) police force, (iii) criminalization and penalties, (iv) digital and online activities, and (v) non-state actors.

- **Defending activists and journalists (freedom of expression):** Without activists and journalists, the potential for transparency and participation to result in accountability is severely weakened. Activists around the world continue to face harassment, stigmatization, detention, and violence. In four out of five OGP countries, journalists report harassment. In 50 OGP countries, there is inadequate investigation and prosecution for crimes against activists and journalists. While most OGP countries are relatively strong on issues of free expression for civil society organizations and individuals, there remain notable constraints to freedom of expression in over 40% of OGP countries. Ninety percent of countries with problems in these areas lack relevant commitments in their action plans aimed at defending expression. OGP members can use their action plans to improve the operating environment for activists and journalists by abstaining from harmful practices, setting limits and accountability measures on officials that might abuse power, and strengthening investigative and prosecutorial bodies. Eleven countries have made commitments to strengthen human rights institutions, monitor and comply with recommendations from international human rights conventions, and protect activists, journalists, and human rights defenders from harassment. Seven of these have commitments that are considered “ambitious” as assessed by the IRM (e.g., Colombia, Norway, Croatia). The report outlines an action agenda ahead in this area.

Fighting corruption: emerging global norms

The report focuses specifically on two emerging areas for tackling grand corruption and improving government

efficiency: open contracting and beneficial ownership transparency. OGP members were the earliest adoptees of beneficial ownership policies and open contracting standards, helping to begin an early wave of innovation. While these two practices are not yet global norms, they are reflected in a growing number of OGP action plans and promise transformative impact.

In analyzing reforms and interviewing reformers working in this area, there are a number of cross-cutting issues. First, implementers do better when they: involve users from the start, identify means by which people can register complaints or raise suspicious activity, improve data quality (including regularity and recency), and implement open data standards and ensure interoperability with other datasets.

- **Open Contracting:** Corruption in public procurement can reduce the value of contracts by up to 15 percent (depending on estimates). Open contracting—combining disclosure of contracts with participation, monitoring, and oversight—has been shown to yield fiscal savings, reduce corruption, and increase participation of businesses, including small and medium-enterprises (e.g., Ukraine). Forty-six OGP governments have made commitments in open contracting. However, to achieve impact and results, open contracting requires adopting a problem-driven sectoral approach, engaging citizens for impact, improving data quality (open, accessible, timely, machine-readable, gender disaggregating data and using open contracting data standards), and empowering women through open contracting.
- **Beneficial ownership transparency:** Beneficial ownership transparency has emerged as an essential means for combating corruption, stemming illicit financial flows, and fighting tax evasion. In response, governments as diverse as Denmark, Kenya, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom have committed to publish beneficial ownership information. Sixteen OGP governments have committed to beneficial ownership transparency. To heighten impact, the report outlines four key issues to be addressed: (i) strengthening the collection of beneficial ownership information, including on trusts; (ii) improving the interoperability of the information; (iii) verifying registered information; and (iv) engaging citizens in monitoring and accountability.

Continued on page 10



Innovations in open government by section

POLICY AREA FIND OUT HOW

CIVIC SPACE

Freedom of Association	Latvia is building up its civil society organizations over multiple decades and OGP action plans
	Serbia is making sure funding for civil society organizations is sustainable and, where state funding is involved, free of bias
	Ukraine is using red-tape reduction and anti-corruption are affecting the health of civil society in Ukraine
	European lobbying laws are balancing the right to participate in policy making with freedom of association
	Ugandan and Nigerian civil society organizations are working to ensure that anti-terrorist finance laws do not close down civil society
	Restrictions on freedom of association are making treating HIV/AIDs more difficult in East Africa
Freedom of Assembly	Governments can improve freedom of assembly through a checklist developed by the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association
	Citizen involvement in establishing routes for public parades in Northern Ireland, UK, tries to provide for public safety while protecting freedom of assembly
	Civil society organizations in Uganda have developed a response fund to protect demonstrators who have been arrested while protesting
	Civil society organizations have used freedom of information laws to obtain and evaluate police protocols in seven Central and Eastern European Countries
	International organizations, including private sector associations, are developing standards to better protect peaceful assembly
Defending Activists and Journalists	Advocates are working to prevent harassment against journalists and activists (SLAPPs)
	Ireland took steps in its action plan to protect whistleblowers
	Colombia opened up its records on past human rights abuses
	Mexico opened up records of detentions
	Serbia began investigating the murder of journalists, which inspired nearby Montenegro to take similar actions

ANTI-CORRUPTION INITIATIVES

Open Contracting	Colombia saved money on school meals through open contracting
	Nigeria is adopting the open contracting data standard
	Honduras and Malawi are using open contracting in infrastructure to get better value for money
	Ukraine involved users of contracting data to make it easier to access and leverage
	Albania used open contracting for women-owned businesses
Beneficial Ownership	Why companies (and which ones) are lining up to support beneficial ownership
	The extractives industry is adopting beneficial ownership
	Ukraine's national ownership register is beginning to cover more than just Ukrainian companies
	Nigeria is tying beneficial ownership to more effective procurement
	Slovak civil society used beneficial ownership data to find a politician who was self-dealing with major construction contracts
	The UK companies register is engaging with civil society to discover corruption

PUBLIC SERVICES

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene	Uruguay used a participatory approach to water planning, bringing in people and companies from all around the country
	La Libertad, Peru, worked through the challenge of mapping water sources, when data was not open
	Local governments in the Netherlands used open data on water project spending to improve infrastructure
	Different governments are developing and mainstreaming processes to get citizen engagement on water and sanitation policy and implementation
Health	The United Kingdom dealt with the promise and peril of releasing health data, and how privacy protection institutions point the way to the next steps
	Latin American countries are doing in establishing and monitoring budgets on reproductive health
	OGP countries are doing in program-based budget transparency and outcome tracking
	African countries are doing in publishing subnational health expenditure data
Education	Citizen engagement plays a major role in school performance in South Africa
	Colombia engaged youth and marginalized communities to identify next steps in education policy
	Armenia, Brazil, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Mongolia and Tbilisi (Georgia) engaged citizens in school oversight to improve performance and efficiency



Public service delivery: accountability and engagement matter

Open government can improve people's lives on a daily basis. To this important end, the report examines three key sectors: water and sanitation, health, and education, and uses available data to identify potential areas of work for future action plans. The areas examined include: availability of sufficiently disaggregated data for decision making, disclosure of decision-making plans and policies to the public, and priorities for participation and accountability, including inclusion of vulnerable or historically excluded groups. The report further looks at how citizen feedback can greatly improve public services, but also how a lack of data, which is practically useful for decisions, may hinder future progress.

- **Water, sanitation, and hygiene:** The dividends from investing in open government in water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) are significant. WASH is one of the less explored areas in OGP action plans with only nine countries currently implementing relevant commitments. Based on OGP analysis of third-party data, OGP members can continue to advance this work through commitments focused on improving four areas:

Data for governance: Most OGP members collect and publish point-of-service and household data. However, this data is not available at lower administrative levels, is not interoperable, and often has restrictive licensing, creating a mosaic of data that can be difficult to integrate and act upon.¹

Data on governance: While most OGP countries have reporting plans in place for sanitation and drinking water, financial expenditure data and monitoring systems are not in place.

Participation and accountability: While most OGP countries have participation and accountability efforts in place across WASH subsectors, very few have robust participation and less than half report having accessible complaint mechanisms for the sub-sectors.

Spending on vulnerable populations: Most OGP countries have plans to address access for vul-

nerable populations, but very little money is spent or tracked to reach these populations relative to their size.

- **Health:** Addressing health issues is key to driving development outcomes, including more inclusive, sustainable growth across all economies. Opening government provides an important means of tackling the complexity of today's global health challenges. The report provides critical data points to support an agenda for action:

Data for governance: Health outcomes data and data on reproductive health lag far behind data on inputs.

Data on governance: Only a minority of OGP countries regularly publish data on progress toward universal healthcare; and while most OGP countries had program-level budgeting, fewer reported on expenditures and outcome indicators.

Public participation and accountability: OGP members, while they do address improving participation and accountability in health, have largely focused on citizen input into policy and strategy. A smaller group has focused on budget and supply tracking. Four governments have focused on accountability for patient outcomes.

- **Education:** While a broad range of tools can improve access and quality of learning, open government approaches of access to information, civic participation, and public accountability can be equally as important. Education systems can work better when the public has: access to information, the opportunity to participate and influence decision-making, and the ability to seek answers from government. Achieving more inclusive, sustainable outcomes requires efforts beyond transparency alone. It requires sustained investment in institutions that can enhance participation and accountability and help education systems become more responsive to public needs (e.g., parent-educator accountability). The report outlines an open government agenda for education consisting of moving from inputs to outcomes and from tools to institutions.

Member pages: stories of OGP journeys

At the member level, the report summarizes key aspects of OGP member performance. Many OGP members do not know how they are performing relative to their peers in OGP and more broadly on implementing open government policies. The report uses IRM findings and credible third-party datasets to assess whether OGP members are contributing to more open government in selected policy dimensions.

Specifically, the report provides brief summaries of each OGP member's work in the partnership to date, including: their action plan focus, innovations, and major accomplishments; the OGP process in the country; action plan performance; and, where action plans have made an impact across five selected dimensions of open government.

This analysis will assist reformers in government and civil society in identifying where they can potentially use the OGP action plans and peer exchange to achieve greater impact. The report will enable a much clearer analysis of areas of excellence, as well as areas for improvement. By highlighting reform areas to a broader global audience, this can help support domestic reformers to better focus action plan commitments and hopefully inspire reformers in other countries to engage, step up, and get involved. With expert reformers in OGP countries around the world, this report may incentivize and serve as a larger call to action for those seeking to play global leadership roles in their areas of thematic excellence.

Conclusion: the imperative for collective action

Despite the individual and shared areas for improvement identified in this report, OGP countries and their partners are well positioned to address the challenges ahead. The report's honest analysis of progress and challenges across OGP countries provides an opportunity to expand the frontiers of open government.

Future progress can best be realized through improved country-level actions, the advancement of key policy areas, and the building of collective, innovative partnerships both within countries and across borders. These are the actions that can be taken now to ensure that citizen voices are not limited to election day and that democracy does indeed fulfill its promise.





"Woman in Paraguay participates in municipal council meeting about budget allocation." Photo by OGP

Report objectives and uses

This report builds on two sources. The first is the data and qualitative analysis of completion and results of more than 3,000 OGP commitments. This data is produced by the Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) expert researchers in each OGP country, tasked with reviewing the results of OGP commitments and reviewed by leading international experts in the area. The second major data source comes from the many organizations working on governance in fields relevant to OGP's collective goals. (See Annex C of the *Methods* section in *Volume II* of this report for a summary of the organizations behind the many indicators used in the preparation of this report.)

This report aims to be an honest, sober assessment of the progress and challenges of opening up government. While the focus is on OGP action plans and the reformers behind them, the report is ideally useful for reformers who are not yet part of OGP, but who prize the values of transparency, participation, and accountability. It is also for those reformers who are considering whether openness can help them achieve more instrumental aims. OGP is an obvious place to learn about what paths for reform have been taken, the paths that have not been taken, and what might lie ahead.

This report is for reformers

The goal of this report is to provide entry-points for reformers at the national and international level to improve governance in their countries. It provides member-by-member data on current innovations, past action plans, and progress and efforts in selected dimensions of open government. The aim is to nourish discussion within each country or locality, learning from the past, but identifying where to go in the future. Beyond looking at individual member pages, the authors hope that readers will engage with the featured policy areas and online resources at open-govpartnership.org to dig deeper into possibilities for future reforms. The report has three major parts:

- **Collective results.** This section highlights major issues in open government including impacts, trust, and gender. This section is primarily useful for the *curious*—those looking to learn about why an open government approach would be useful to them—or the *committed*—those looking to deepen their understanding of the role that OGP has played and may play in the coming years.
- **Priority policy areas.** This section highlights three high-impact policy areas: anti-corruption, civic space, and public services, looking at selected policies in these areas, how OGP countries are (and are not)

advancing and where action plans might go in the future. Ideally, readers will use this section to reflect on the situation in their country and identify potential new commitments or areas of action in future action plans. (Please see the section “Themes overview” for an insight into how these were selected among the dozens—if not hundreds—of possible themes.)

- **Member pages.** These pages tell the story of each OGP member country. Each one tries to strike a balance between (1) national highlights and major achievements, (2) the quality and process of each national action plan, and (3) progress and efforts toward collective goals. These pages aim to guide reformers working in OGP member countries and localities to identify whether there are areas for potential improvement in future action plans.

The report aims to inspire with relevant case studies and emerging standards. This report learns from the hard work and innovation of individual citizens, communities, civil society organizations, government reformers, and, in some cases, private sector actors. To that end, the report builds off the collective knowledge of a large community, presenting examples of innovative practices. These are rarely “best practices” but rather snapshots in time—useful for inspiration. (In fact, OGP has traditionally rejected any “best practice” approaches in its work, with the understanding that locally-adapted solutions are better, and every policy and practice is a story of evolution not teleology.) This report is not a recipe book; it is a “scrapbook” of the open government community, not as we wish to be, nor necessarily as we should be, but, rather, as we are.

This report will be successful if it more closely aligns national goals and problems with OGP action plans, inspiring more high-impact, concrete commitments.

What this report is not

An index

While this report builds off of cross-country comparative data, it does not rank countries or present high-level composite scores. The presentation of data follows the principle of making sure that scores hew as closely as possible to actual policies and implementation.

New data collection

All of the data in this report is synthesized from other sources. It is the centralization, presentation, and interpretation of this data that we hope helps OGP members. The data is largely descriptive to understand where the frontiers of open government lie in each policy area.

An IRM report

This report uses IRM data to identify areas for action across a number of dimensions of open government. The IRM distinguishes OGP with its original, locally-authored, peer-reviewed primary research on country commitments. This report summarizes past IRM reports (2013–2018) in an attempt to tell the story of each OGP member—the paths taken in the past and the paths that might be taken.

A standard-setting process

While many sections of the report show member performance in “collective goal” areas using standardized data, action plan contents remain the discretion of national or local actors involved in the OGP process. We offer up the comparisons to suggest areas where OGP members can play a more active role, either as reformers themselves or as supporters of others’ reforms.



GENDER IN THIS REPORT

A MISSION-CRITICAL UNDERTAKING

Mainstreaming gender is core to the success of open government. Women's participation in politics and policy has been shown to increase the range of issues addressed and the solutions proposed, improve outcomes of peacebuilding and reduce corruption. In addition to fairness, investments in approaches that take gender into account lead to positive outcomes such as reducing violence and improving the use and quality of services. Corruption and inefficiency disproportionately negatively affect women whether through decreased access to services and benefits, decreased respect of law, exposure to violence, or economic, legal, or political disempowerment (according to the United Nations Development Programme's report, *Corruption, Accountability and Gender: Understanding the Connections*).

GENDER MAINSTREAMING IN THIS REPORT

This report takes a gender mainstreamed approach. In consultation with experts from academia, nonprofits, and government, the authors have integrated features which focus on the gendered impacts of open government and initiatives which seek to improve gender equality. It is, of course, by no means complete or comprehensive and considerably more work can be done to address this essential component of open government.

The following features are included in the different sections of this report:

Priority policy areas

ANTI-CORRUPTION:

Open contracting: Gender-equitable procurement and contracting

CIVIC SPACE:

Freedom of association and assembly – the gendered impacts of restrictions on non-profit operation, including for LGBT+ and sex workers.

PUBLIC SERVICES:

Education: Disaggregation of education spending and outcomes data by gender in open data

Health: Lags in reproductive health data behind other data

Water and sanitation: Data on planning and finance around water, sanitation and hygiene

Member page reporting

DATA MODELS:

Civic space–Association: Includes indicators on women's participation in civil society

Access to information–Open data: Scores include open data on education disaggregated by gender and reproductive health data

For future editions, the authors hope to identify better baseline data differentiated by gender for other areas of the member data model, such as women's participation in policy making and data on program-based budgeting in fiscal openness.

About OGP

Open Government Partnership brings together government reformers and civil society leaders to create action plans that make governments more inclusive, responsive and accountable. In the spirit of broad collaboration, OGP is overseen by a Steering Committee including representatives of governments and civil society organizations.

To become a member of OGP, participating countries must endorse a high-level Open Government Declaration, deliver a country action plan developed with public consultation, and commit to independent reporting on their progress going forward.

The Open Government Partnership formally launched on 20 September 2011, when the eight founding governments (Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom and the United States) endorsed the Open Government Declaration and announced their country action plans. Since 2011, 79 OGP participating countries and 20 local governments have made over 3,800 commitments to make their governments more open and accountable.

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About this report

OGP's first Global Report was mandated by the OGP Steering Committee in 2017. Its objectives were to synthesize OGP's data and findings into one flagship publication to provide guidance to the Partnership and provide comparable snapshots on all OGP countries. Objectives include:

- 1. Visibility:** Build global awareness of OGP values and the partnership's role, as well as country performance, especially to high-level actors and politicians;
- 2. Close the gaps:** Create compelling incentives to close the *ambition* and *implementation* gaps at the national level;

- 3. Comparability:** Provide a means by which countries may compare themselves with one another and compare action plans over time;

- 4. Collective action:** Cultivate a sense of shared ownership and accountability for cross-cutting reforms in priority areas for all OGP countries;

- 5. Context and achievement:** Demonstrate and highlight many of the most relevant, ambitious and high-impact commitments.

This report has been made possible with the generous support of the International Development Research Council, Canada and the Department for International Development, United Kingdom.

OGP Global Report

Collective Results: Open Government & OGP



Open government is a cornerstone of an open society—a society where voices can be heard, ideas debated, and where there is opportunity for exchange between government and its people. That governments should be transparent, participatory, and accountable to the public is not a new idea. It dates back many decades, even centuries in some places. The last several decades have seen an accelerated spread of open government and its associated concepts well beyond traditional advocates.

The founding of the Open Government Partnership (OGP) in 2011 has been key to this growth. Initially established by eight governments and a number of recognized civil society organizations, the new partnership reflected a time of optimism about the power of democracy, technology, and open government to change lives. Together, this core set of countries pledged to work to spread more open societies.

Despite these encouraging trends, recent years have witnessed a recession in openness and democracy. This has been most acute in countries once viewed as champions of democratic transition. It has also taken place in some of the world's largest democracies. Some governments, which had been considered to be candidates for transition, have instead strengthened and exported authoritarian practice.

The time is right for an honest assessment of these trends. The Partnership provides a critical resource of lessons for shaping future reforms: what has worked, what hasn't, and what lies ahead. Today, having grown to 99 members, OGP has been a laboratory for

experimentation and reform, learning and accountability over the last ten years. Together with civil society, governments have collectively undertaken thousands of commitments worldwide through their two-year action plans, collaborated across sectors, and have been publicly evaluated on the success of their efforts. Perhaps just as importantly, the Partnership has created a global community of reformers working on the dozens of issues needed to advance open government. Moreover, it is a community to which countries seeking their own reforms can now turn to learn what they might adapt for their situations.

This report also lays out where the Partnership and its members could go over the course of the next decade. Its findings build on the tremendous knowledge and experience of civil society organizations who have used OGP action plans to advance their issues; government officials who have worked to implement difficult, often political reforms; and the international organizations that work to lift up reformers every day.

"Mural, Can Fabra public participation and cultural building, Barcelona." Photo by Joan Brebo

OGP AT A GLANCE

Open Government Partnership brings together government reformers and civil society leaders to create actions plans that make governments more inclusive, responsive, and accountable.

To become an OGP member, countries must first endorse a high-level Open Government Declaration and commit to delivering a two-year action plan developed with public consultation, as well as independent reporting on their progress going forward.

The Open Government Partnership formally launched on 20 September 2011 with eight founding governments: Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Norway, the Philippines, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Since that time, 79 OGP participating countries and 20 subnational governments have made over 3,100 commitments to make governments more open and accountable.

OGP is overseen by a Steering Committee, including representatives of governments and civil society organizations.

The case for open government

Healthy democracies require competing ideas, not just elections

The current democratic recession is directly affecting the openness of societies. However, it is unique from past waves of authoritarianism. Today, there are considerably fewer extra-legal palace coups or military takeovers of governments than in the 1930s or 1960s, for example.¹ Moreover, basic electoral systems have actually improved over the course of the past decade and suffrage has expanded.²

In contrast, it is the things that make elections meaningful—the civic life of countries—that has been eroded. Specifically, expert analysis show freedom of expression, rule of law, and freedom of association have declined in more countries than have seen gains. (Figure 1 below shows a net positive in the number of elements of improved free and fair elections, while fundamental freedoms continue to backslide according to the V-Dem Institute.)³ Cross-national public opinion polling from the World Justice project shows mixed results; with members of the public in 43 countries perceived improvements in freedom of expression, while 42 perceived declines.⁴


At the same time, some positive trends have emerged. For example, the democratic recession has not negatively affected all countries equally. Countries such as Kenya and Nigeria have made significant steps forward in strengthening democracy. Still others have simultaneously progressed in some areas while regressing in areas.

Even more encouraging, there is recent evidence to suggest the resurgence of political participation, specifically, participation by women and political minorities.⁵ Public opinion research by the World Justice Project shows that an overwhelming majority of the global population favors more open government (disclosures of the records of public officials, copies of public contracts, and detailed budget figures). These beliefs differ very little from country to country. Additionally, more people report engaging with media in 2018 than ever previously recorded.⁶

This places the Open Government Partnership in a critical position to build on the positive momentum and stop the attacks on open societies. The current wave of authoritarianism is taking place specifically outside of the electoral process and its solution will be found there, too.



FIGURE 1. Elections improve while fundamental freedoms backslide: 2007-2017 (Source: V-Dem Institute)



Source: V-Dem Institute, Version 8, April 2018

Open government works and open societies thrive

The evidence continues to show that open government makes a significant difference in people’s lives, especially as part of a broader ecosystem of accountability. Research increasingly shows that electoral democracy provides the most reliable long-term path to better health, longer life,⁷ and greater, more equitable economic growth.⁸ Less research, however, has specifically looked at democracy beyond the ballot box, especially the role of civil society and free media in promoting long-term inclusive growth. There are a growing number of arguments to support democracy beyond the ballot box.

First, there is a normative and legal case to be made for open government. Its aspirational principles serve as the foundation for democratic communities around the world. The right to freedom of expression, association, and assembly are clearly laid out in international human rights law, political agreements, and in the constitutions of nearly all countries. The rights to seek information, to participate in civic life, and to seek justice are similarly enshrined in international and domestic law.⁹ For many individuals and in many

societies, these ideas may be adequate justification to pursue open government.

However, beyond these normative arguments, evidence continues to affirm the long-term, positive impact of open government and open societies. Modern societies and current social, economic, political, and environmental challenges are complex and cannot be solved by powerful actors or markets alone. An accountable, responsive, and capable government sets the framework in which individuals, communities, and markets can succeed. Core to this accountability is the free flow of information to and from government. This is possible only where there is free and independent media, unhindered civil society, and channels for people to exercise their rights.

The growing evidence is clear: where there is free and independent media, civil society organizations, and government engages with citizens, societies achieve better health, education, and economic outcomes. Supporting data exists at both a micro- and macro-level. What follows is recent research that looks at both micro-level impacts and the long-term effects of openness.

Micro-level evidence on impact

There is a growing body of case-study evidence that open government results in better outcomes across a variety of areas. These were summarized in the recent *Skeptic's Guide to Open Government*, produced by OGP.¹⁰ Readers should refer to that document for extended case studies.

- **Public service delivery:** Public engagement in service delivery improved customer usage, service quality, and efficiency of spending in water (Korea), education (Kenya), health (Brazil), and infrastructure (Indonesia).
- **Prevention of corruption:** Lobbying reform in Chile and Estonia have led to greater public participation and access to elected and appointed officials, but also clearer information about influence. These efforts are part of a larger trend toward lowered corruption in each of these countries, and are considered models among their peers. Cote d'Ivoire has lowered perceptions of corruption in the country, in part through the establishment of local anti-racketeering committees, which include members of civil society.
- **Efficiency of public contracts:** Various studies have shown that open contracting can lead to cost-savings of between 7 and 25%.¹¹ In Slovakia, moving to an open contracting system doubled the number of bidders, leading to increased competition.
- **Trust:** Research on trust and open government is still in its early phases. There have been studies which demonstrate that greater disclosure leads to an increased perception of honesty and benevolence on the part of government.¹²

Long-term impact of openness

There is a growing body of evidence on the impact of transparency, participation, accountability, and a thriving civil society and media.

Economic impact of openness

Despite limited long-term data, research on the relationship between economic growth and open government is considerably more developed than that of the other societal benefits. Generally, improved

transparency is strongly correlated with better economic results:

- **Economic growth and business environment:** Greater policy transparency and frequent and accurate disclosure of macro-economic data is positively correlated with foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows and credit ratings.¹³
- **Improved trade:** An analysis of more than 100 trade agreements shows that each additional transparency clause enhances public visibility and predictability of applicable terms for all trading partners and is associated with a one percent higher flow in bilateral trade.¹⁴
- **Reduced red tape:** A study of 185 countries found that better disclosure of regulatory fee structures in four key areas (starting a business, obtaining construction permits, getting electricity, and registering property) is associated with higher quality regulations and reduced corruption.¹⁵
- **Greater stability and reduced risk:** Transparent publication of economic data leads to longer periods of political stability and democratic succession.¹⁶ Transparency in macro-economic data enables countries to borrow at lower costs, reducing credit spreads by 11% on average.¹⁷
- **Expanded economic opportunity:** In the European Union (EU), the total direct economic value of open data is expected to increase from a baseline of €52 billion in 2018 for the EU28 to €194 billion in 2030. Up to 75,000 jobs are estimated to have been created as a result of re-use of open data by 2016. This number is projected to grow to up to 100,000 by 2020.¹⁸ A study of G20 countries found that the average economic value-add of open data is US\$2.6 trillion, and a committed move towards open data could help G20 countries realize half of their envisioned economic growth targets.¹⁹

Social impact of openness

The social or human impact of more open societies is less well understood. To help mitigate the gaps in data, the authors of this report collaborated with the V-Dem (Varieties of Democracy) Institute, based at the University of Gothenburg in Sweden, who take an innovative approach to democracy analysis. Specifically,



researchers looked at the long-term impact of freedom of association, free and independent media, and government engagement with citizens—referred to as “diagonal accountability,” and includes various health, education, and economic outcomes (See Figure 2: “Diagonal accountability” for the relationship between openness and other democratic institutions).

Until recently, determining the long-term effects of democracy (or openness) on development outcomes had not been possible. The Varieties of Democracy dataset has annual data on 170 countries which now allows for correlations to be run with other global indicator sets to identify what relationship, if any, may exist.

The results from this new look at openness data were clear—stronger civil society, free press, and improved channels for public engagement lead to better development outcomes. The researchers controlled to make sure that they did not confuse improved


openness with other measures with which it is associated, such as national income, levels of urbanization, time lag, and interaction effects of stronger elections and checks and balances. Their findings tracked the effects across three categories:

1. Health

Infant mortality: Greater openness led to a measurable improvement in infant mortality rates, a reduction in 10 deaths per 1,000 births per decade between the most closed and most open countries. Over the course of decades, the result could be significant. (See Figure 3 comparing infant mortality between the most open and most closed societies.)

Life expectancy: Greater openness and accountability is associated with longer life expectancy for women and men in the medium- to long-term, with notably significant results over 10 and 20 years.

FIGURE 2: Diagonal accountability and other democratic institutions



Maternal mortality: The research did not find a statistically significant relationship between openness and maternal mortality. However, it is important to publish “non-findings,” as the lack of data may serve both future strategies and research. Additionally, it has been included here in the spirit of greater openness.

2. Education

Researchers looked at the impact openness had on years of education for the population 15 years and older. On average, adults in societies with the most diagonal accountability attain an additional year of schooling. Conversely, where accountability is weak, educational attainment falls behind. Notably, there is a 10- to 20-year lag for the effects of increasing diagonal accountability to make a difference.

3. Economics


Economic growth: The effect of openness on economic growth is positive and significant only with strong elections and strong checks and balances. However, diagonal accountability boosts the impact of both horizontal and vertical accountability at comparatively lower levels.

Economic equality: Countries with stronger civil society and free press have lower rates of inequality

(lower Gini coefficient). This effect is smaller, but still statistically significant.

The social and economic effects of openness are stronger when there is stronger civil service, stronger complementary democratic institutions, and at higher levels of per-capita income. These findings have significant implications for the types of open government interventions and reasonable expectations of outcomes within OGP action plans and in general. The next section builds on the work of other transparency and accountability experts to identify when and why it works and how, even in imperfect situations, transparency can lead to improved accountability and performance.

FIGURE 3: Reduction in infant mortality in the most open versus most closed societies over time



When and how does open government work?

The evidence that openness works is growing. But the evidence from the V-Dem institute also shows that openness works best when it is part of a broader ecosystem of accountability and government capacity. The research prepared for this report showed the following:

Openness works better when there are stronger elections and checks-and-balances. Democratic institutions are mutually reinforcing. Where electoral systems are stronger, civil society and free press are more effective at informing voters. In turn, voters are more likely to increase pressure on elected officials for results. Where oversight institutions are strong, again, public participation and access to information are predictive of better development outcomes.

Openness has a stronger effect when countries are wealthier and when the civil service is competitive and impartial. Mass mobilization has been credited with governance change in countries around the world. The Philippines' People Power movements are a good example of where civil society action by itself led to changes in leadership. However, far more typical are examples like the Republic of Korea's, where mass demonstrations and the Constitutional Court contributed to a shift toward a government with a strong anti-corruption platform. When civil society and other institutions work together, they tend to be more effective.

Even when countries have lower income or low levels of accountability, openness can improve state capacity. Free press and free civil society have a positive effect on the quality of civil service. This has significant implications for any one-size-fits-all approach to open government, especially in the least-developed countries or undemocratic countries. It suggests that openness will have a more indirect immediate effect on development outcomes, but is an integral first step in improving government function.

This data reaffirms the growing consensus that openness works. However, "transparency alone

is not enough," is also a common refrain. So, what makes transparency "enough" to change behavior? As the report will discuss, the answer requires the development and use of both formal and informal mechanisms of accountability.

Toward intentional accountability

An overall finding of this report is that many commitments, especially in public services, assume that information disclosure will result in improved performance, responsiveness, or accountability. While two-thirds of OGP commitments have some element of transparency, less than a third mention accountability, and of those, nearly half do not describe the actual means of achieving accountability—whether through courts, audits, complaint mechanisms, elections, or seeking services via alternative means.

These are, in essence, "black box" accountability commitments where there are inputs (in our case information), some unspecified process, and, shortly thereafter, accountability. By contrast, there are "glass box" accountability reforms, wherein information is disclosed and members of the public have a clear channel (or channels) to inform, persuade, or otherwise convince the government to act. In some cases, these commitments may promote accountability because the conditions for accountability are strong. In other cases, they may fall short. What exactly are those conditions?

Many have already mapped out the link between transparency, participation, and accountability.²⁰ This publication does not seek to replace or refute those models. Instead, its primary goal is to advance ambitious, credible reforms, and help move OGP action plans from transparency to accountability—from black box to glass box accountability.

Figure 4 shows four conditions under which transparency leads to greater accountability. Importantly, it does not limit means of accountability and citizen action to the work of non-governmental organizations but to the functioning of a variety of institutions. (The diagram relies heavily on work by Jonathan Fox, Tiago Peixoto, and Alasdair Roberts.)

Better clarifying the theory of change behind open government reforms can help lead to greater impact and lead to more significant improvements.

The who: Commitments should lay out the use cases for newly disclosed information: Who will be accountable to whom if the information is released?

The how: Where possible, those commitments should articulate the channels through which transparency will take place: The market? Participatory opportunities? The courts? During electoral campaigns?

The if: Commitments should reflect the current state of institutional accountability: Does the enabling environment exist in which people can safely use the information to criticize officials or change service providers?

These are the essential questions in assessing whether, and how, OGP action plans have achieved their goals. It is through this lens that reformers must view their future efforts, including public policy. In the accompanying sections, this report will look in detail at three core policy areas: anti-corruption initiatives, civic space, and public services.

FIGURE 4: Transparency depends on other institutions and conditions to lead to accountability



Global trends

Before examining policy-specific findings in other sections or modules, this section looks at global open government trends, as well as collective findings from OGP countries. The most significant transformations that openness brings are often measured in decades, rather than months or years. This means that the long-term impact of many current open government reforms may not yet be known, even where they have been successfully implemented. Nonetheless, we are able to look at early results using the data assembled for this report.

Divergence, convergence, and parallel trends over time

How do OGP countries compare across policy areas over time? Changes in eligibility requirements for countries that have been in OGP for more than five years suggests where there is progress and regress. Collectively, the indicators used for OGP eligibility are the most rigorous, transparent, and adequate proxies for actual performance. Moreover, they are generally accepted and referred to by organizations working on open government and related issues.²² The four eligibility requirements use indicators that represent major areas of work in OGP:

Fiscal openness: availability of executive budget proposal and audit report (Source: Open Budget Survey)

Access to information: existence of legal framework for access to information (Source: right2info.org and rti-rating.org)

Anti-corruption: asset disclosure by public officials (Source: World Bank database: Public Officials' Financial Disclosure)


Civic participation: civil liberties (Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, EIU Civil Liberties Index)

The findings are shown in figures 5.1-5.6 (following page). They compare the 42 countries that have been in OGP for more than five years to non-OGP countries.


- 1. OGP countries started and finished with high scores**, generally higher scores in the four eligibility areas and overall. See figure 5.1.
- On average, **more open government policies are in place** according to the narrowly defined overall eligibility scores. (See figure 5.2.)
- When comparing OGP across policy areas, **OGP countries continue to significantly outperform non-OGP countries**. (See figure 5.3.) While this is not surprising, it at least establishes that there was not a marked decline among OGP countries.
- There was global **convergence around access to information** law passage and asset disclosure. (See figure 5.4.) Whether this convergence proves that “improvements would have happened without OGP” discounts global norm-setting functions of OGP. It also does not prove that it happened because of OGP, only that there are emerging norms here.
- There was global **divergence around the open budget requirements** (publication of executive budget and audit report). While almost all OGP countries now had a perfect score on this between 2017 and 2018, many other countries are regressing. (See figure 5.5.) This squares with the evidence on OGP’s consistent high performance in budget transparency as observed by the Independent Reporting Mechanism. (See following subsection, “High-Performing Policies.”)
- There was a troubling **parallel downturn in civil liberties** among both OGP and non-OGP countries. (See figure 5.6.)

FIGURE 5: Global open government trends among OGP and non-OGP countries

Country scores across the various OGP eligibility criteria. Scores were normalized from 0 to 4. Visit opengovpartnership.org/eligibility-criteria to access the underlying data. (n=179)




1. OGP countries started and stayed high




2. Globally there was overall convergence




3. OGP countries significantly higher than non-OGP




4. Convergence on asset disclosure, ATI laws



5. Divergence on budget transparency



6. Parallel decline in civil liberties score



The troubling decline in civil liberties

The decline in civil liberties scores is of particular concern as civic space is fundamental to the functioning of open government of OGP. How robust is this finding and what is causing it?

The slide is not in every country, but it is nearly universal. Using the same Economist Intelligence Unit data, the global median and mean have shifted left, or declined, between 2011 (Figure 5.1) and 2017 (Figure 5.2). This has even occurred, however minutely, in traditionally high-scoring countries, including in countries considered to be traditionally strong democracies.

While the decline continues to be troubling, there are indicators to suggest that it can be mitigated and focusing on open government reforms is working:


- While the change in absolute terms is the same, relative to the initial starting point, OGP countries have fallen less (in pure percentage terms.)
- As a percentage change, OGP countries have declined less in relative terms (as a total percent) than the non-OGP average. This may be cold comfort to some.
- During a time of civil liberties declines, OGP may still be outperforming the global average. The relative drop suggests that OGP countries are at least not declining more quickly than non-OGP countries, which would certainly be cause for alarm. Given the shifts in some of the world's largest countries, which are part of OGP (Brazil, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, and the United States), this finding is unsurprising, but noteworthy. It is offset, to a small extent, by improvements in countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, and South Korea.

- This finding is consistent even when using indicators other than the EIU Score. While there are inherent issues with the EIU Civil Liberties Score (lack of transparency in method and underlying data among them), this finding holds up with robustness checks across other indicators, such as time series analysis of V-Dem's CSO Entry and Exit indicator and CSO Repression.
- The declines in many democracy indicators (especially non-electoral indicators) are alarming. However, when viewed over the course of decades, democratic institutions still remain near an all-time high in terms of indicators of liberal democracy (elections, respect for rights, and checks on executive power).²⁴

Despite the tempered progress seen among some OGP countries, as the "Innovations to Norms" section in this report shows, there can be little argument that OGP countries can and should continue to use their action plans to promote and protect fundamental civil liberties through their action plans.

FIGURE 6: OGP countries experience decline on civil liberties

Changes in OGP country scores on the Civil Liberties (CL) indicator from The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index. Comparisons are between scores in 2011 and 2017. Visit EIU Democracy Index to access the underlying data.



Source: The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) Democracy Index, Civil Liberties (CL), n=79

General recommendations

This first-ever, world-wide assessment of OGP efforts produced a significant amount of new findings, capturing both commitment successes as well as notable areas for growth. Importantly, they offer lessons which allow OGP countries to chart an even more strategic path forward.

Building off of this work, what follows are recommendations specifically tailored to meet the needs and contributions of key OGP constituencies. Collectively, these important groups will be responsible for co-creating and implementing critical future reforms.

For governments:

Ensure commitments reflect national priorities.

Continue to identify issues of national and local priority, even if those are not part of the policy areas explored in this report. These have a high-impact and play to OGP's strengths of matching each action plan to the local context.

Consider OGP high-priority areas. Identify areas where your government or civil society groups can play a leadership role. In particular, civic space has a strong asymmetry between what is needed and what is in action plans. For countries with new initiatives or works in progress, identify leaders and support structures within OGP which might help to ensure ambitious, credible implementation. For countries which do not have commitments in an area where performance data suggests improvements, identify commitments which might advance this work.

Continue to prioritize civic space. The data is fairly clear that there is a reversal in civic space, even within a "club of the committed" like OGP. As (one of) the world's leading forums in advancing this foundational element of democracy, identify innovative steps to ensure respect, protection, and promotion of these fundamental rights.

Make accountability more intentional. Move beyond "black box" accountability by incorporating explicit strategies and mechanisms to make transparency count for improving responsiveness and performance.

Move from project-based accountability to institution-based accountability. The cases of Mongolia in education and Brazil in health show that setting up permanent monitoring institutions where citizens have seats at the table and voices in the room have better results.

Involve the underserved. Engage ministries that represent parts of the population or groups of citizens that may otherwise be left out of the conversation regarding open government, corruption, and services. These could include women, youth, and people with disabilities.

For national level advocates:

Coalesce around national priorities. Identify policy areas within your country where there is a nexus of political ambition and your own advocacy goals. Ideally, this report helps share innovations and gaps in current policy and practice across borders.

Leverage advocacy expertise. Continue gathering evidence, initiating dialogue, and advocating reform in critical policies. The examples of European Centre for Non-profit Law in working to assure freedom of assembly and the many African organizations working with government to strike a balance between anti-money laundering rules and freedom of association can serve as some inspiration in civic space.

Use existing mechanisms. Identify and advocate on international conventions and existing commitments which have open government implications, and that may have been ratified but not yet implemented. An example would be the Convention to End Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).

Ensure end-user involvement. Make certain that advocacy for data includes potential users, especially journalists. Our evidence shows that data for accountability works better when end-users are involved in the design and publication of data.

For international organizations:

Continue production of cross-national data on decision-making. In particular, more data is needed on the levels of transparency of decisional documents (plans, budgets, drafts, decisions), the level of participation, and the presence of public complaint mechanisms within key policy areas.

Rely on, and use, the data. Use OGP cross-national data to identify binding constraints around core governance themes to: (1) better target areas that governments have already signaled as being politically important; (2) identify binding constraints within particular countries; and (3) identify potential champions who would be able to share approaches that worked in their countries.

Produce and use sex-disaggregated data. Collect sex-disaggregated data regarding budgets, services, and participation when applicable. Encourage governments and civil society organizations to collect sex-disaggregated data as well.

For researchers:

Use OGP data. OGP has published all of its data, including data from the Independent Reporting Mechanism and third parties into a single database in the hope that researchers will better be able to understand where reforms are successful and where they need continued effort. In addition, it may illuminate OGP's impact to a greater level of specificity than it has in the past.

Utilize the impact evaluation. This report touched on a number of relationships between open government and OGP in changing people's lives. More sophisticated research on causal links, wider scope of analysis on different topics, and attention to inclusion are just three of the areas that could be better explored in this area.

Centralize and promote good practices and standards. The work of academics and think tanks has been invaluable to the success of this report. The continued attention to the design of good policies around civic space, public participation, when (and how) transparency is most effective for accountability, reductions in corruption, improving lives, and rebuilding trust is key.

Take gender into account. When evaluating reforms, measuring impact, or creating good practices and standards, think about how the lives of men and women, boys and girls are different and how they interact differently with government. Women's relative lack of political and economic leverage reduces their ability to demand accountability or to highlight their specific experiences and concerns.

For everyone:

Reach out to OGP for support. Please do not hesitate to contact the authors of this report with queries, corrections, suggestions for future editions, and topics for what the authors hope to be a series of analytical papers. The world of open government is a beautiful, and sometimes frustrating, patchwork of knowledge, relationships, and individual reformers. It works better when people are in touch and can offer to share. Good ideas come from everywhere.



Endnotes

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OGP Global Report

Priority Areas for Reform:
From Innovations
to Norms



Data shows that some areas have seen tremendous progress on open government policies in the last several decades. Examples include the passage of freedom of information laws in the majority of the world's countries, the rise in asset disclosure requirements, and a general trend toward open budgeting. Several decades ago, these were "innovations" – experiments limited to a few countries. They have now been adopted by the majority of countries. These are, in essence, the new norms. While there is ample room for growth in actual practice, they are now relatively common policies.

Unfortunately, this is not yet the case with many other areas of open government. Company beneficial ownership data is only available in a minority of countries, and open contracting has been initiated in many, but still not in most OGP countries. As these issues are relatively new, this can be expected. A significant amount of energy and resources has gone into advancing clean water, high quality education, and health but large gaps still exist around many basic planning documents and data for governance. These sectors have been the subject of attention for a long time, but are still early in mainstreaming governance elements along with infrastructure and finance. Most concerning, as it is essential to the success of all of the other elements, civil liberties have experienced a steady erosion, even in OGP countries. Too little attention has been paid to affirmative steps that can be taken to stop this erosion.



Key Policy Areas

The remainder of this report is about the innovations—the islands of experimentation, hard work, and sometimes, failure. The report focuses on three frontier policy areas where OGP members have shown leadership but have work remaining, and where members are undertaking reforms to move from innovations to norms.

- **Anti-corruption**

OGP members were the earliest adoptees of beneficial ownership policies and open contracting standards. These two policies are not yet global norms, but they are represented in a growing number of OGP action plans. This section looks at what will make policies effective, increase efficiency, and ultimately reduce corruption. While these do not represent the whole of anti-corruption efforts (and are not purely anti-corruption in their intent), they are a starting point for further discussions.

- **Civic space**

Civic space is instrumental to OGP's success and, in many ways, is the goal of the partnership—changing the way governments do business with the public. Given declining civic space inside and outside of OGP's membership, much work remains to be done to tackle this issue. In this report, we look at three fundamental issues: freedom of assembly, freedom of association, and defending activists and journalists. This section aims to assess the problems more precisely and help reformers pivot to affirmative steps in addressing these issues.

- **Public services**

Open government can improve people's lives on a daily basis. How it does this is often unclear beyond open data and highly localized interventions. Public services are an opportunity to see tangible benefits of open government. This section looks at what data is available for decision-making, what decision-making processes are transparent, and where people have a means to make their voices heard and to inform decision-making. It looks at three key sectors: water and sanitation, education, and health.

A policy-specific approach

Why focus on policy?

The pursuit of open government is boundless. There is no limit to the parts of society that deserve a deeper examination through a lens of transparency, participation, and accountability. The early days of OGP were marked by innovation and a strong emphasis on the new—especially when it came to technology. Now, seven years later, the consensus is to ask:

- Transparency for what?
- Participation when? For whom?
- Who is accountable to whom?

This *Priority Areas for Reform* section is a first attempt to answer those questions for a subset of the critical topics OGP countries are working on. By taking a sectoral approach, OGP members can better identify the bridge between open government and a specific area, learn who the leaders are in a given policy area, and push forward on the next steps.

Why not other policy areas?

Very strong cases can be made that this report should have focused on other policy areas. Extractives industry revenue, money in politics, online freedoms—these topics and dozens of others deserve a deeper look. Perhaps they will be covered in the second edition of this report or as part of other future research.

However, any report requires limiting the number of goals it seeks to achieve. Again for this inaugural

edition of OGP's Flagship Report, the focus is on three essential areas:

- **Anti-corruption:** open contracting and beneficial ownership
- **Civic space:** association, assembly, and defending activists and journalists
- **Public services:** education, water, and sanitation and health

These policy areas come from universally endorsed documents (including the Open Government Declaration and the Paris Declaration on Open Government) and decisions passed by the OGP Steering Committee or laid out in OGP chair priorities. Further, these policies are areas of universal interest to all OGP members and members felt that they were areas where OGP and an open government approach had a significant comparative advantage in shifting global norms.

Use cases and audiences

Each section is broken into several core elements. The intent is for each section to introduce content to inform a variety of use cases and audiences:

- Open government advocates and reformers seeking to identify next steps, regardless of their particular focus;
- Newcomers to a particular policy area needing a clear framing of open government approaches; and

- Experienced sectoral advocates who have not yet thought about open government approaches or how to use OGP action plans and communities to advance their goals.

Section-by-section content

While each policy area featured in this report requires a slightly different organizational approach, they are all constructed to ensure that their content is easily accessible and useful. To those ends, each policy area provides the following:

- **Key points:** Findings and implications for reformers;
- **Priority area overview:** Why open government can help this particular policy area and why it is essential to OGP's mission;
- **Achievements to date:** What OGP members have and have not accomplished through their individual action plans; and
- **Frontiers for OGP members:** Beyond action plans, these ideas are based on data prepared by noted international organizations, and look at:
 - Citizen engagement in ensuring accountability and better outcomes; and
 - Data and information for governance: The essential data needed to support progress across each field.

The organization of each section varies but covers the same topics. For example, the civic space section does not lay out the future opportunities in quite the same way, as its problems and solutions do not require open government interventions (transparency, participation,

and governance), but rather are enabling conditions for open government.

Data and information

This report relies on the tremendous work of individuals and organizations across the OGP community. All analysis builds on the findings and expertise of many of the most noted researchers and reformers in the development and open government spaces, including:

- **Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) reports and data:** OGP's IRM, comprised of national researchers within each member country or locality, releases annual plans on the ambition, implementation, and early results of every OGP action plan, covering more than 3,000 commitments and counting.
- **Insights from OGP stakeholders:** In preparation of this report, the authors interviewed and received comments from many different organizations involved in OGP. These organizations offered invaluable insight into their fields of expertise, providing their unique perspective about how and when open government can advance their respective works.
- **Data from third-parties and international organizations:** This Priority Areas for Reform section relies heavily on the same data used for the member pages featured in this report (see Volume II and the method section for more details). In many cases, the report supplements the basic dataset with other data released that does not cover all OGP countries, but gives insights into the state of open government and patterns of implementation nonetheless.



Comparing progress on policy areas

As stated in the Collective Results section of this report, in terms of open government policy progress, OGP countries started from an advanced point relative to non-OGP countries, and remain stronger. This is true whether measuring by the OGP Eligibility requirements or by the 12 policy sub-dimensions collated as part of

this report. Figure 1 shows that OGP countries have higher scores across all 12 subdimensions of open government. In particular, OGP countries were much stronger in budget transparency, regulatory openness, and freedom of association.

FIGURE 1. OGP countries outperform non-OGP countries on open government

	OGP Mean	Non-OGP Mean	Difference
Anti-Corruption Initiatives			
Beneficial Ownership	0.8	0.6	0.2
Open Contracting	2.1	1.6	0.6
Civic Spaces			
Assembly	3.0	1.8	1.2
Association	3.2	2.3	0.9
Expression and defending activists and journalist	2.6	1.9	0.7
Open Policymaking			
Participation in lawmaking	2.5	1.5	1.0
Open rules and regulations	2.6	1.5	1.0
Access to Information			
Right to information	2.4	2.0	0.5
Open data in water and sanitation	1.8	1.5	0.4
Open data in health	1.7	1.4	0.3
Open data in education	1.6	1.2	0.4
Fiscal Openness			
Transparency	2.3	1.1	1.2
Participation	0.7	0.3	0.3
Accountability	2.5	1.8	0.7

This comparative distinction, however, is less important given self-selection of OGP countries and the requirements of eligibility.

It is more compelling to look at the areas where OGP countries have made significant achievements relative to real-world conditions. As part of this report, the OGP combined third-party data across five dimensions and twelve sub-dimensions (available in a public database at opengovpartnership.org/ogp-data). This allows for comparison of performance in OGP with “real-world” performance at the member level, and at the level of the action plan.

Figure 2 [at the end of this section] shows the strength of OGP commitments (according to the IRM) as well as performance overall for each policy area (according to third-party organizations). All scores are normalized from 0 to 4. Higher IRM-based scores indicate stronger commitments that were relevant, ambitious, significantly complete and/or showed major evidence of changes in openness. As a result, the figure highlights where there are strong performers (active on that issue in OGP or not active) and where countries are making notable efforts, even if the results are not yet clear. For underlying indicators and methods, please see the Methods section in Volume II of this report.

Anti-corruption initiatives

- While this report does not cover the totality of anti-corruption, it does cover two key initiatives advancing through OGP: beneficial ownership transparency and open contracting. Few countries are considered strong in these areas. That is to be expected, as they are relatively new areas for action. At the time of writing, just over a dozen countries have begun the difficult task of preparing **beneficial ownership registries**.
- **Open contracting**, however, has far more credible commitments due to being slightly older and having been adopted by the majority of OGP countries, with notable positive results. When returning to this issue in the next edition of this report, it will be possible to evaluate whether these many commitments have, in fact, moved the needle toward better performance.

- A longer discussion on the next steps in advancing these two important policies is in the section “Anti-corruption initiatives.”

Civic space

- **Civic space commitments** (around assembly, association, expression, and human rights defense) demonstrate a common pattern: despite a lack of strong commitments, performance is strong (according to third-party indicators) relative to almost any other policy area. This suggests that countries which are already succeeding in these areas could mentor peers seeking to improve their performance. Learning from peers can be extremely helpful in promoting civic space. The section “Civic Space” describes some of the many improvements OGP governments can take to improve assembly, association, expression, and human rights defense.

Open policymaking

- In some sense, open policymaking is core to the goals of open government, and there has been increasing attention paid to open legislatures. In fact, **open rules and regulations** have been one of the unsung accomplishments of OGP, with many strong commitments and overall good performance.
- By contrast, **participation in lawmaking**, similar to some anti-corruption initiatives, is new to OGP. Despite its promise, and the clear need for more commitments in the area, reforms have yet to evolve. This may be covered in a future publication.

Access to information

- **Right to information** laws are foundational to OGP and its mission and have gained considerable traction in OGP action plans. At the same time, overall performance on right to information (combining law and its application) shows considerable room for growth. OGP will take a deeper look at these issues in a forthcoming publication.



- **Open data** policies and practices have also been core to OGP’s culture since its inception. These proactive information mechanisms are an essential complement to reactive right to information laws. A persistent question has been “Open Data for What?” This section looks at three core public services: water and sanitation, health, and education. As Figure 2 shows, there are few high-achieving commitments in open data within these areas. Additionally, third-party scores show that, while collection of information is actually quite strong, publication of information in multi-year, disaggregated, open format is relatively rare, even in countries with a relatively strong open data infrastructure. See the section “Public Services” for a more thorough discussion.

Fiscal openness


- **Budget transparency** is similarly foundational to OGP. As noted in prior sections, it is also one of the areas of greatest accomplishment. This is indicated by the fact that the majority of OGP members evaluated by the IRM have high-impact

commitments in this area. By contrast, **participation in budget** and **openness of budgetary oversight** are newer areas, and performance and commitments are relatively nascent.

As Figure 2 shows, the three focus areas of this report have significant potential for growth, at least within OGP action plans. The anti-corruption initiatives, as featured within this report, are still new and have yet to see widespread adoption or changes in third-party indicators. Beneficial ownership, in particular, has yet to move from “innovations to norms.” While many elements of civic space are relatively safe within OGP countries, there remains much work to be done and it is not yet the norm that OGP action plans foster an enabling environment for civil society. Finally, the institutions and information for openness in basic public services remain underdeveloped in a large number of OGP countries.

The authors look forward to collaboration on supplements to this report tackling the frontiers of other issues such as fiscal openness, open policymaking, access to information laws, and justice.

FIGURE 2. A comparison of strength of OGP commitments with third-party performance indicators by policy area



- ◆ Anti-corruption ⊕ Civic Space ▲ Open policymaking
- Access to information ⊗ Fiscal openness



OGP Global Report

Civic Space

Freedom of Association • Freedom of Assembly
Defending Activists and Journalists



“Demonstrators hold lights during *Let’s stand for decency in Slovakia* after murder of reporter Jan Kuciak and his fiancée Martina Kusnirova.” Photo by Radovan Stoklasa, Reuters

Civic space

Every government that joins OGP signs the Open Government Declaration, committing to promote civic participation:

We value public participation of all people, equally and without discrimination, in decision-making and policy formulation. Public engagement, including the full participation of women, increases the effectiveness of governments, which benefit from people’s knowledge, ideas and ability to provide oversight. We commit to making policy formulation and decision making more transparent, creating and using channels to solicit public feedback, and deepening public participation in developing, monitoring and evaluating government activities. We commit to protecting the ability of not-for-profit and civil society organizations to operate in ways consistent with our commitment to freedom of expression, association, and opinion.

In one sense, OGP is the home of committed governments and actors willing to work on these issues. At the same time, however, even OGP countries face acute problems through lack of action, unintended side effects of other laws, unfortunate policies, or intentional interference.

Tackling civic space can be difficult as it is a broad topic. It includes the enabling environment for individuals, organizations, and communities to carry out their work, regardless of whether government is involved. It also includes spaces created by governments. This report focuses on the specific enabling environment, looking at the fundamental issues that allow open government to work—fundamental freedoms of association, assembly, and expression, as well as the institutions that protect them.

A narrow focus is necessary as there is much work to be done. A 2018 report by the OGP Support Unit found that nearly half of OGP countries struggled with the fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, and expression—the fundamental rights that make transparency, participation, and accountability work.¹ At the same time, very few of those countries were using their OGP action plans to dive into those issues. We know that there are indeed problems; we know less about the specific reforms and paths OGP members might take to improve these fundamental civil liberties and better ensure that open government works.

For this report, we will use definitions adapted from the UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights:

- **Assembly:** The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is the right to gather publicly or privately and collectively express, promote, pursue and defend common interests. This right includes the right to participate in peaceful assemblies, meetings, protests, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations and other temporary gatherings for a specific purpose.²
- **Association:** The right to freedom of association is the right to join a formal or informal group to take collective action. This right includes the right to form and/or join a group. Conversely, it includes the right not to be compelled to join an association. Associations can include civil society organizations, clubs, cooperatives, NGOs, religious associations, political parties, trade unions, foundations or even online associations. There is no requirement that the association be registered in order for freedom of association rights to apply.³
- **Expression:** The right to freedom of expression includes freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.⁴

Objectives

This Civic Space section aims to lay out a possible road map for action within the context of OGP action plans. The sections are divided based on who the intended actors might be, taking into account that many different actors play a role in protecting fundamental freedoms. For freedom of association, in most countries, tax and audit authorities have the core responsibilities of formation and reporting, and are responsible for the legal structure for the funding of nonprofit organizations. For freedom of assembly, it is assumed that police, justice, and interior ministries would be key actors. The final section, “Defending Journalists and Activists,” touches on free press, free expression, and the functioning of the institutions which defend those rights and actors. Freedom of

expression was not separated from human rights institutions because OGP action plans will likely have similar institutions and organizations working on expression and fundamental human rights.

Approach

This report attempts to identify the state of play both within OGP action plans based on IRM reporting, and in the world beyond those plans using data from major indices on governance. This report then provides a road map for how to tackle some of the most pressing issues in OGP countries based on input from members of the OGP community, and a review of recent literature. While civic space is indubitably linked to a broader array of policy issues, this Civic Space section focuses on these fundamental rights. Future research may look into new challenges to an evolving civic space, including: the impact of digitization and big data; social media; counter-terrorism; and freedoms of expression, association, and assembly online.

Cross-cutting themes and findings

Problem description

- **Legal frameworks:** While many, if not most, OGP countries have strong basic legal frameworks for civic space, implementation of and support for rights often lack clear guidance. Additionally, in a large minority of countries, legal frameworks are pointedly flawed or unevenly applied. In some, barriers may be intentional efforts to repress civil society groups.
- **Prevalence of civic space issues:** In general, nearly half of OGP countries, according to CIVICUS Monitor, have significant problems regarding the freedoms of association, assembly, expression, and face challenges in the effectiveness of human rights institutions.
- **Inclusion:** Often, marginalized groups that face deeply ingrained, systematic discrimination are most in need of fundamental rights as they are shut out of majoritarian politics and specifically targeted for exercising their civil rights. They are often the first groups to face limitations on civic space.



- **Protective mechanisms:** Areas of particular concern include protections for journalists, retaliation against activists, and follow-through with human rights reports.

OGP and Civic Space

- **Underutilization of OGP action plans:** Most countries with issues in these fundamental freedoms have not used their action plans as strategically as they could. Nonetheless, there are a considerable number of promising commitments in freedom of association and a smaller, but significant number guaranteeing free expression. There is only one commitment working to guarantee freedom of assembly.
- **Multi-level approach:** All governmental layers should be mobilized but particular attention should be placed on subnational governments as their support is key for protecting freedom of association and assembly.
- **Civil society work:** The work of activists is essential in opening civic space, whether that is investigating police protocols, ensuring equal participation of women, or ensuring human rights mechanisms are functioning.
- **Balancing competing values:** Anti-corruption, transparency, anti-terrorism, and public safety are legitimate concerns but, if poorly executed, can harm the civil society capacity to advocate and operate freely. In the worst cases, they are a figleaf for authoritarian moves. Any response requires an assessment of the situation and a proportional response. Similarly, human rights language, especially around free speech, might be used to limit the exercise of rights of marginalized groups.

OGP and civic space beyond action plans

OGP works to create change beyond its action plans, further leveraging both its core sets of principles and values, as well as the reach and experience of its member network. Regarding civic space, this includes:

- **Eligibility criteria:** Before they can join OGP, governments must meet OGP eligibility criteria. The founders of OGP recognized the necessity of citizen participation and engagement for openness in government, of which protection of civil liberties is inherent. Evaluation of civil liberties as a proxy measure of citizen engagement was therefore included as a component part of membership eligibility criteria.
- **OGP Values Check:** In September 2017, the OGP Steering Committee adopted the “Values Check” assessment, which examines governmental control and repression of civil society organizations.
- **Policy on upholding the values and principles of OGP:** Also known as the OGP Response Policy, this gives the public the right to present civic space concerns to the OGP Steering Committee and requires the Steering Committee to take corrective actions against the government in question when appropriate. By adopting the Response Policy, the Steering Committee acknowledged that “there may be issues outside the scope of National Action Plans that have a major impact on successful participation in OGP, and [this policy] creates an opportunity to address them. [These issues] may include restrictions on basic freedoms, access to information, and the overall enabling environment for civil society.”⁵
- **Peer exchange and international political leadership and diplomacy:** OGP is one of the world’s premier forums for discussing civic space. OGP Steering Committee members and civil society participants have used high-level OGP events, diplomatic exchanges, and communications to raise concerns about threats to civic space, including in OGP-participating countries.

Endnotes

- ¹ Tonusree Basu and Denisse Miranda, *The right tools for the right job: How OGP can help win the fight for civic space* (Washington, D.C.: OGP, 2018), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Right-Tools_Civic-Space_20180508.pdf.
- ² Former UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai, “What Are The Rights To Freedom Of Peaceful Assembly And Of Association?” (2019), freeassembly.net/about/freedoms/.
- ³ Kiai, “What Are The Rights To Freedom Of Peaceful Assembly And Of Association?”
- ⁴ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 19, UN Gen. Assem. (16 Dec. 1966), <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx>.
- ⁵ OGP, “OGP Steering Committee Agrees New Response Policy” (27 Oct. 2014), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/ogp-steering-committee-agrees-new-response-policy>.



OGP Global Report

Civic Space

Freedom of Association



Key points


Freedom of association is one of the rights-based pillars—along with freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, right to participate in the conduct of public affairs, freedom of movement, and access to information—that underpin civic space. Countries that guarantee freedom of association and other indicators of open civic space do better—politically, economically, and socially.¹ Where freedom of association is restricted, open data and freedom of information are much less likely to translate into accountability.

Restrictions to association include hindering entry or registration, organizational operation, access to funding and resources, advocacy work (e.g., through over-implementation of lobby laws, transparency laws, or electoral laws), and reporting and accountability. Such measures are counter to the principles, mission, and pledges of OGP members.

In its assessment of OGP member activities and freedom of association challenges, the report found the following:

- **OGP countries have mixed results on freedom of association.** While over half are doing well, international indicators show that 40 percent have noteworthy challenges according to a 2018 analysis of CIVICUS monitor by OGP.²
- **Freedom of association challenges are largely based in law.** Roughly one in four OGP countries have excessively restrictive laws and limitations on receiving foreign funding or mobilizing domestic funding.³
- **Action plans are underused.** Most OGP countries with documented challenges to freedom of association have not undertaken or completed ambitious commitments in their action plans.
- **Strong reforms can support not-for-profit work.** Findings show challenges with cumbersome registrations, securing tax advantages, navigating red tape to justify funding and activities, and accessing sustainable funding sources.
- **In pursuing other aims such as financial transparency, anti-corruption, and other policies,** OGP members need to ensure that reforms also “do no harm” to the legitimate participation of civil society in the policy process and in civic life.





Freedom of association is the right to join a formal or informal group to take collective action. Conversely, it also includes the right not to be compelled to join an association. Associations can include civil society organizations (CSO), clubs, cooperatives, NGOs, religious associations, political parties, trade unions, foundations, and even online associations. There is no requirement that the association be registered in order for freedom of association to apply.⁴

Freedom of association is a universal and fundamental right outlined by the UN Declaration of Human Rights⁵ and subsequent international agreements.⁶ International declarations on freedom of association aim to:

- Create independent, capable, effective, and vibrant CSOs;
- Ensure organizations are free to form and decide their membership, how they are funded, and what they can work on;
- Establish domestic laws that enable the exercise of freedom of association, including those governing an organization's legal existence, structure and governance, financial benefits and activities, sources of funding, reporting, and taxation;⁷ and
- Ensure that policy and practice affecting association meet international standards and the three-fold threshold test (legality, necessity, and proportionality) regarding any restrictions to association.⁸

"Sergels Square, Stockholm Sweden." Photo by Pavel L Photo and Video / Shutterstock.com



“Nicaragua, Newspaper Director Carlos Fernando Chamorro walks through ransacked offices after government raid on newspapers and nongovernmental organizations in December 2018.” Photo by Alfredo Zuniga, AP Photo

Civic space is critical for open and accountable political processes, a strong social fabric, and economic and private sector growth.⁹ As B-Team research has shown, freedom of association—and overall civic space—is good for business, not a threat to it.¹⁰ Freedom of association is critical to open government; it is part of the founding principles outlined in the Open Government Declaration and further endorsed by the Paris Declaration.¹¹

OGP’s theory of change relies in particular on the free operation of advocates and reformers that are able to form nonprofit, mission-driven organizations, or CSOs.¹²

- CSOs are essential to realizing the objectives of the OGP process: the co-creation of a two-year action plan with commitments collaboratively developed with governments.
- CSOs are a vital component of the OGP’s theory of change to trigger open government reforms.
- CSOs serve as a lever for more transparent governments. By having open access to information, CSOs and other members of civil society are able to engage with government to help inform and influence policy and practice.

- CSOs create more responsive governments, helping create checks on abuse of power. They are able to participate across the policy process from setting policy priorities, to monitoring results and often implementing services.¹³

OGP members must ensure that freedom of association is fulfilled as part of their OGP national action plans (NAPs), both regarding civic space as well as their broader set of commitments. This means ensuring that all commitments, including transparency, accountability, and anti-corruption commitments:

- Do no harm (i.e., do not burden or restrict freedom of association),
- Are expansive (i.e., increase freedom of association and take a whole-of-government approach),
- Are scoped (i.e., cover the full spectrum of related problems),
- Are tailored (i.e., match specific problems), and
- Have impact (i.e., produce measurable, positive change).

Attacks on freedom of association

Freedom of association faces attacks in OGP countries and around the world. There has been a noted trend of restrictions placed on organizations working in civil society, including restrictive laws, regulations, and practices, as well as notable barriers to access funding and funding cuts.¹⁴

- Restrictive laws are among the top five causes of reduced civic space in countries in Asia-Pacific, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia.¹⁵
- The International Center for Not-for-profit Law (ICNL) estimates that between 2015 and 2018, over 72 countries (including several OGP members) have introduced laws restricting the operation of not-for-profit organizations.¹⁶

Too often, such laws are politically-motivated and security considerations are used to justify limiting freedom of association.¹⁷ Reductions in freedom of association are often gradual but expansive, ultimately undermining democracy, inclusiveness, and accountability.¹⁸

Based on analysis of data compiled in the CIVICUS Monitor in 2018, nearly 40% of OGP countries experience challenges to freedom of association. The problems are not uniform across countries, but include (in order of most to least common):


- **Access to funding:** Limits to types of funding (particularly from international sources or by providing low domestic budgetary allocations, mainly for service providers) and obstacles to receive tax exempt status (24%);
- **Legal status and formation:** Burdensome processes to register an organization (22%);
- **Governance and operations:** Burdensome requirements for establishing boards and unreasonable limits on activities and scope of work (e.g., political engagement, human rights advocacy, or commercial areas, 13%); and
- **Reporting requirements:** Onerous obligations to file financial reports and organizational updates (7%).

Freedom of association may rely on literal interpretations of onerous laws or, in other cases, may be based on uneven application of laws to organizations or individuals.

Figure 1 shows the degree to which OGP members have used their action plans to address core issues within freedom of association. Of the countries in OGP that struggle with freedom of association, the majority lack commitments to address the issues.

FIGURE 1. Most OGP countries with notable problems in freedom of association lack relevant commitments

Match between problems in freedom of association and OGP commitments (n=64)



Source: OGP commitments database and CIVICUS Monitor Data coded by IRM staff.¹⁹



OGP accomplishments: freedom of association

Despite the considerable room for improvement, approaches to improving freedom of association are well-established in some OGP countries. OGP members have made notable advances in promoting freedom of association through their commitments (in contrast to other areas of civic space). Forty-six countries have made commitments related to the right to association in their OGP national action plans. Between 2012 and 2017, OGP's Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) assessed the state and success of these efforts and determined that 7 of the 46 countries had ambitious and significantly complete commitments related to association.²⁰ One additional new commitment is currently under review. These commitments have included pledges focused on the following:

Reducing barriers to entry

- El Salvador's 2016–2018 action plan²¹ sought to accelerate the process for creating an organization. It previously took between three and eight years to establish a CSO (with 18 separate steps).²² At the time of this report's publication (early 2019), a cross-ministerial work plan has been completed, along with a legislative proposal which is expected to be approved.
- Almost two-thirds of the countries in the OGP (including Brazil, Chile, Moldova, Armenia, Bulgaria, and Mongolia) allow unregistered CSOs to operate freely. A few countries in the world have laws explicitly stating that registration is voluntary; however, more frequently, CSO laws do not include a mandatory registration requirement and the state does not attempt to force organizations to register.²³

Strengthening organizational operations (activities, structure, governance)

- As part of Canada's action plan (2016–2018), the country included a commitment to facilitate information accessibility to CSOs regarding tax rules about allowable political activities for charities. This clarity can prevent arbitrary and unnecessary audits.²⁴


- In Kenya's third action plan (2018–2020), the country included a specific commitment to build more resilient and sustainable institutions to support open government,²⁵ which is seen as an opportunity to improve the operational and organizational environment of CSOs.²⁶

Increasing access to funding and resources

- In Ukraine, a commitment was included in its action plan (2014–2016) to update legislation on community organizations²⁷ to allow them to receive government funding when they provide social services or perform government tasks (still pending).²⁸
- Bulgaria has a starred commitment as part of its first action plan (2012) to establish clearer rules for financing organizations as part of its "Strategy to Support the Development of CSOs."²⁹
- Latvia has made concerted efforts prior to and across several action plans to address sustainability and transparent funding of the nonprofit sector. (See the box on the following page.)
- Overall, most OGP member countries across all regions (e.g., Argentina, the Czech Republic, Northern Macedonia, El Salvador, Malawi, Ghana, and Kenya) have no requirements to obtain government approval or register in order to access international funding.³⁰

Improving reporting transparency

- Sierra Leone included a commitment in its third action plan (2016–2018) to improve transparency of public funding received by CSOs working in post-Ebola recovery efforts. Reporting was public and in an open data format.³¹
- In its first action plan (2012–2013), Croatia created a new law which made CSO financial reports publicly available through its Non-Governmental Organization Register.³² The same action plan included creating a grants database about publicly-funded projects implemented by CSOs.³³



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Latvia: Committing funding to build its civil society

As part of the Soviet Union, Latvia did not have a tradition of civil society organizations. After becoming an independent country in 1991, while the economy grew and developed, its civil society landscape did not mature at the same rate. In such situations, governments can effectively support the sector and organizations by providing the right mix of incentives. These often include reduced red tape, tax exemptions or reduced tax rates, seed grants, a dedicated financial window (fund) for CSOs, and capacity building through training and other channels.³⁴ This is what the Latvian government decided to do. As a result, now setting up a CSO is a fairly easy process and is done in a few days.

Another area of concern was CSO funding and capacity. In its first action plan (2012–2014),³⁵ a specific commitment was included to create an “NGO Fund” to build CSO capacity to engage in policy processes. Such a fund was important as private support to CSOs is low and government grants offer a financial lifeline to the voluntary sector. With support from the European Economic Zone, a fund of 1 million euros was established which included a dedicated financial window for CSOs to access critical capacity building resources.³⁶

Despite these successes, recent assessments of the sector suggest that it continues to face financial sustainability challenges. For example, in 2017, the NGO community was challenged following the implementation of corporate tax incentives. Tax breaks were given to encourage the reinvestment of money back into businesses, likely reducing the amounts set aside for charitable donations.³⁷

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Photo by Ingusk, Adobe Stock



Frontiers of freedom of association in OGP

The majority of OGP countries have strong legal frameworks and practices to guarantee freedom of association, with minimal government intrusion. This is to be expected as minimal interference is part of the OGP “values check” before a country can join OGP. (Although the check was implemented in 2018, all but one country meet the current requirements.) Concurrently, many countries have significant room for improvement.

This report combines data from OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) with CIVICUS Monitor. Among its most concerning findings involve the frontiers of freedom of association within OGP. Data continues to show that most OGP countries are not making commitments to promote freedom of association in their countries. While troubling, this may present certain opportunities for continued work, with peer exchange and support for countries working on relevant issues.

- According to the IRM, 71 countries have weak or no commitments on freedom of association as part of past or current action plans.³⁸ This provides a real opportunity for positive change, as almost all countries have aspects for improvement through high-level, deeper commitments.
- More than 40% (32 countries) face notable limitations to freedom of association according to the CIVICUS monitor.³⁹
- 25% of OGP countries repress or present obstacles to engage in public life (see Figures 2 and 3), including organized labor (Figure 4) according to Freedom House.
- These challenges tend to affect organizations working on sensitive matters related to the promotion and protection of human rights and governance (Figure 5) and membership in political organizations (Figures 6 and 7).
- Of countries with notable challenges to freedom of association, a small number have adopted ambitious

commitments, according to OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM). These include Northern Macedonia, Serbia, and Ukraine. (Serbia and Ukraine are featured in boxes later in this section).

Third-party data generally show that OGP countries are relatively strong with respect to CSOs and their role in civic life. However, many areas continue to raise concern. Indicators from V-Dem, Freedom House, and World Justice Project explore these challenges below for civil society broadly as well as for human rights, labor, and political organizations as well as restrictions on the participation of women in civil society.

Civil society repression and restriction


OGP depends upon the free operation of citizens in OGP countries to advocate for issues of importance to them. In 2018, OGP adopted the V-Dem indicators to evaluate values of new governments joining OGP. Since May 2018, a government must score “3” or above on “CSO Entry and Exit” and “CSO Repression” in order to join OGP. The V-Dem indicators are a leading dataset which covers many different elements of democracy, led by an institute at the University of Gothenburg. This subsection looks at these broad indicators and what they say about the state of free association in OGP.

Figure 2 shows OGP members are roughly split between unconstrained and minimal control. A smaller group, which joined prior to the adoption of the 2018 OGP values check, demonstrates moderate control. No OGP countries exercise substantial or monopolistic control on CSO formation (entry and exit).

Similarly, as shown in Figure 3, no countries in OGP substantially repress CSOs; most exercise no repression while some weakly repress and a few moderately repress.

FIGURE 2. Most OGP countries have minimal or no restrictions on CSO entry and exit


To what extent do OGP country governments control entry and exit by CSOs in public life? (n=78)



Source: V-Dem CSO Entry and Exit, Version 8 (April 2018). Level of government control definitions are available in the Key.⁴⁰

FIGURE 3. A minority of OGP countries have some CSO repression, but most do not

Do OGP governments attempt to repress CSOs? (n=78)



Source: V-Dem CSO Entry and Exit, Version 8 (April 2018). Level of government repression definitions are available in the Key.⁴¹





“Honduras: Workers participate in Open Gov Week’s, *Honduras Digital Challenge*.” Photo by Comisionado de Transparencia, Honduras

Human rights and labor organizations


Freedom House data on association tells a slightly different story. Freedom House distinguishes between nonprofit associations and their aims (labor versus non-governmental organizations), rating the freedom for each to associate and organize on a 0–4 scale. Figures 4 (labor freedom) and 5 (non-governmental organization freedom) suggest that experiences are markedly different for different types of organizations. (Freedom House indicators do not include informal social movements or community organizations.) Many OGP members restrict activity of labor organizations, according to the 2018 *Freedom in the World* assessment. While over half of OGP members have the best possible score for non-governmental organizations (particularly those involved in governance and human rights work), only a third attain such a rating for trade unions and similar organizations.

The implications of this difference are twofold. First, many countries need to improve scores for both

types of civic organizations. Secondly, discussions of civic space and freedom of association which limit themselves to professional, human rights nonprofit organizations may miss the larger picture of freedom of association. Research has shown that labor unions and professional organizations are essential to delivering more equal,⁴² democratic societies.⁴³ The right to organize to demand safe, dignified work has been internationally recognized as a core element of empowerment of the poor⁴⁴ and achieving dignified work is part of the Sustainable Development Goals.⁴⁵ The fact that this gap is largely unexplored also shows the potential for better dialogue on civic space between labor and good governance advocates. In fact, international guidance on trade unions has a long history and is quite developed.⁴⁶ (This may also be true of other types of organizations and activist groups such as religious minorities, environmental activists, or indigenous communities. There is currently no analogous data on these particular groups.)

FIGURE 4. Freedom of association for labor organizations in OGP countries is often constrained


Is there freedom for trade unions and similar professional or labor organizations? (n=79)



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, E3.

FIGURE 5. Freedom for human rights and governance work is unconstrained with notable exceptions

Is there freedom for non-governmental organizations, particularly those that are engaged in human rights and governance-related work? (n=79)



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, E2.




Membership in political organizations

Experts in a significant minority of OGP countries have identified restrictions on political organizations. The World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Initiative surveys experts on the degree to which people can join political organizations. (It is unclear if respondents interpreted “political organization” as any organization participating in advocacy or more narrowly in terms

of political parties.) In addition, it surveys a large general population from the three largest cities in each country. Figures 6 and 7 show average expert views and general public views respectively on the ability to join political organizations within each country. The general public response is notably more pessimistic; it is unclear if this is due to more direct experience, differences in perception, or different understanding of the question. Within each country, the two scores are highly correlated.

FIGURE 6. Experts say that people can freely join political organizations in most OGP countries


In practice, people can freely join any political organization they want. (n=63)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 139 (expert survey).

FIGURE 7. Public perception of the ability to join political organizations is less optimistic in OGP countries

In practice, people can freely join any (unforbidden) political organization they want. (n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, GPP 44.



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

The state of nonprofit work in Ukraine

Obtaining official not-for-profit status for an organization in Ukraine has long been considered a difficult process. Unnecessary red tape encouraged bribery to expedite the approval process. First, an organization was required to legally register with the Ministry of Justice. Then, a separate application to be a not-for-profit had to be submitted to the Fiscal Service, Ukraine's tax authorities. These requests were often rejected because of missing documentation that had to be requested and provided by the Ministry of Justice.

One step forward

The 2014–2016 action plan committed to streamline the process in a “one-stop-shop.”⁴⁷ Under a new law, the Ministry of Justice would be the single point of contact, receiving a CSO's incorporation application and shepherding it to the tax authorities.

The necessary legal changes largely took place in 2015, according to the IRM.⁴⁸ Recent assessments of setting up a CSO in Ukraine also show this shift.⁴⁹ In 2016, new rules required CSOs to register to be in compliance with the new law.⁵⁰ Still in 2017, reports showed that the streamlined process had not been fully implemented.⁵¹

One step back

Despite this progress, Ukraine continues to see restrictions on CSO activities. There are reports of attempts to intimidate anti-corruption activists and organizations, including an onerous, disproportionate use of asset disclosure regulations.⁵² Funding continues to be a challenge as well, with a few organizations receiving the bulk of resources, particularly from international donors.⁵³

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LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Serbia: Fixing past problems with state funding for CSOs

Serbia's first OGP action plan (2014–2016) had an explicitly ambitious commitment on the transparent funding of CSOs.⁵⁴ It aimed to make transparent the public funding that CSOs received from the government.

Outside of public funding, there are diminishing alternative sources of support, particularly from international donors. Consequently, access to state funding was critical and had the potential to promote a more diverse and active local civil society. Existing regulation⁵⁵ of state support to CSOs aimed to distribute public support to CSOs fairly, transparently, and without bias.

However in practice, findings showed that regulations were not enforced and state funding was misused for political ends.⁵⁶ A media investigation found that a sizable number of CSOs that received public funding opened accounts only in the same year they received the funding and had ties to political party leaders.⁵⁷

The IRM assessed this commitment as substantially advancing transparency of public funding. It required the state to: 1) prepare annual summaries of funds spent and provided to CSOs; 2) publish all public tenders to CSOs on the E-Government Portal (including the evaluation of received proposals and final decisions); and 3) strengthen the capacity of public officials and civil servants to increase the transparency of civil society funding.⁵⁸

The IRM noted that some elements were not completed, especially publishing of tenders. Moreover, some CSOs continue to see the same lack of transparency about funding decisions.⁵⁹ This also took place in a context of tightening of civic space. The National Parliament decided, for the first time, to exclude CSOs from its 2017 Parliamentary Week. At the same time, there was a significant amount of negative media on CSOs, particularly those working on anti-corruption, political processes, and human rights.⁶⁰

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Photo by Djoronimo, Adobe Stock


Freedom of petition

The freedom of petition goes beyond the right of individuals to join a group. It speaks to their ability to act as a group (or individuals), and to bring grievances, questions, and requests before the state. The World Justice Project surveys experts and the public on the

views on their right to petition. Experts were generally positive about the strength of right to petition with a number of notable exceptions. (See Figure 8.) Members of the public were generally more optimistic than they were for joining political organizations, although some countries still had prevalent concerns (See Figure 9).

FIGURE 8. Experts say that in the majority of OGP countries, people can join together to petition the government


To what extent do you agree with the following statement: In practice, people in [COUNTRY] can freely join together with others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition. (n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 138 (expert survey).

FIGURE 9. The general public believes freedom of petition is strong in OGP countries, with some exceptions

In [COUNTRY], people can freely join together with others to draw attention to an issue or sign a petition (General survey). (n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, World Justice Project GPP 43.





“Bolivia: In Plaza Murillo, people protest against a mayor who held the same office for 8 years.” Photo by Danielle Pereira, Flickr


Gender exclusion in civil society

With notable exceptions, OGP countries are not found to restrict women’s participation in civil society organizations. Figure 10 measures gender parity within civil society. Specifically, it looks at whether women

are (a) prevented from joining CSOs and (b) whether CSOs pursuing women’s interest are prevented from participating in civic life. Nearly all OGP members “never” prevent women from taking part in associations. The remaining few countries require further investigation and action.

FIGURE 10. In nearly all OGP countries, women are almost never prevented from participating in civil society organizations

Are women prevented from participating in CSOs? (n=78)



Source: V-Dem v2csgender (3.10.7), Version 8 (April 2018).

Where to next for OGP countries?

Drawing on the preceding findings and experiences provides a path for possible future actions. Strong commitments would address the common barriers to freedom of association as identified by the above-mentioned UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association, CIVICUS, and ICNL. This section is adapted from ICNL's *Guide to Opening Government and Guidelines for Laws Affecting Non-Profit Organizations*.⁶¹

*Addressing barriers to entry*⁶²

- **Create laws, practices, and contexts that limit or eliminate restrictions in law and practice:** This is particularly important for organizations working on sensitive issues, such as anti-corruption, environment and land, human rights, political reform, and rights and access to services for women, especially with groups most at risk of harassment (including, LGBT+, religious minorities, and indigenous issues).⁶³
- **Lower transaction cost for entry and exit:** Ensure CSOs are able to register with a small number of documents through an established process with clear time limits. Eliminate complicated registration processes for CSOs and set up a one-stop-shop if possible. Ensure registration is equally accessible throughout the country.
- **Remove discretion:** Publicize transparent criteria and processes for approval for nonprofit status to ensure that there is minimal abuse within the process. Ensure there is adequate remedy for appealing denials of nonprofit status, including administrative and judicial means.
- **Remove discrimination:** Ensure that rules are fair and transparent to allow minority or unpopular viewpoints to be expressed in advocacy. Verify that any restrictions on association are prescribed by law, evenly applied between individuals, and are consonant with a democratic society, including the right of minorities and minority viewpoints.

- **Foreign branches and subsidiaries:** Clarify rules and minimize restrictions on foreign organizations, in accordance with all domestic rights and regulations.

*Organizational operation*⁶⁴

- **Internal governance:** Establish a legal operating environment which sets up a minimally restrictive governance structure for a registered civil society organization, including but not limited to requirements for governing documents, appropriate limitations on personal liability, and prohibitions on conflicts of interest.
- **Appropriate governance measures on operation:** Create narrowly defined guidance to assure good governance of the nonprofit sector to minimize abuse or discretion by regulatory authorities. These can reduce corruption and abuse by creating clear prohibitions on direct or private benefit, distribution of profits, private inurement, self-dealing, and reversion of assets.
- **Reporting and transparency:** Ensure financial reporting and transparency requirements, including executive compensation reporting, are consonant with international and human rights standards (including adherence to the principles of “proportionality to a legitimate aim”⁶⁵ and “minimal state interference”) and no more restrictive than other legal entities such as corporations, private companies, and religious institutions. A number of OGP countries (or provinces within those countries) have established a single registry of all nonprofit organizations with legal personhood.

Access to funding and resources

- **Promote mechanisms and funding to ensure sustainability:** This facilitates better long-term planning.⁶⁶ Eleven OGP countries have undertaken commitments in this area, making it the second most active area within association commitments.⁶⁷ Elements of these commitments include:




“Uganda: Employees of Daily Monitor newspaper protest closure of their offices in Kampala.” Photo by James Akena, Reuters

- Make tax benefits easy for nonprofit organizations to access. Provide tax benefits and tax incentives to individuals and businesses that donate to CSOs.
 - Provide access to international funding without the need for prior government registration, permission, or using state-controlled entities as the intermediary.
 - As appropriate, establish or strengthen a transparent, rule-based dedicated state-run fund or funds to support CSO activities and institutional development in priority areas.
 - Ensure legal ability to carry out independent fundraising activities in accordance to the law and to access foreign funding. Allow public fundraising.⁶⁸
 - Where state funding is essential, ensure the availability of core and infrastructure funding, as well as longer-term funding (three years or more).
 - **Political activity:** Clarify which charitable and political activities qualify an organization for different levels of tax benefit. Such approaches must account for rights to free speech, advocacy, and education while maintaining adequate protections for the integrity of elections or legislative and regulatory processes.⁶⁹
- Reporting and accountability*
- **Train officials:** Ensure that public servants and administration officials are well trained and sensitized to the varying capacity and formality of CSOs when providing services. Community-based organizations may have very different needs capabilities from large international organizations.
 - **Establish guidance:** Ensure that reporting regulations (including transparency commitments in OGP action plans) follow international standards, including those pertaining to privacy, legality, proportionality to a legitimate aim, and minimal state interference.
 - **Foster an environment to allow CSOs to self-regulate:** Use accepted and sector-endorsed CSO reporting and accountability mechanisms, which have been noted by CIVICUS and other CSO initiatives as a means to increase CSO effectiveness.⁷⁰ In relative terms, more OGP action plans have focused on this issue.⁷¹ With any of the commitments there is a risk of abuse, especially where accounting and auditing standards are non-standard or unevenly applied.⁷² To address these concerns, commitments may seek the following:
 - Endorse and implement relevant international and regional CSO accountability initiatives (such as AccountableNow and the Istanbul Principles).⁷³
 - Support reporting good practices, including the timely publication of financial and activity reports. Large CSOs can undertake independent audits.
 - State audit agencies should adopt clear audit procedures, including conditions triggering an audit, advance notice, procedures for random audits, restrictions on the use of audit for personal information or harassment, and reporting on use of public funds.
 - Standardize open data reporting of funds and projects, such as through the International Aid Transparency Initiative.⁷⁴

Do no harm: balancing free association with other values

Free association and the right to participate in civic life and decision-making are fundamental to democracy. However, governments must balance this right to associate against protecting the public, ensuring the integrity in policy-making and administration, and upholding the public interest in daily operations. These goals are also at the heart of open government. Unfortunately, these protective duties are used to justify restrictions on the nonprofit

sector. At times, this is ostensibly done in the name of transparency. Consequently, the rights of free association and participation come into tension with other open government values, requiring thoughtful navigation of the issues and engagement with affected stakeholders. Here, we feature cases about how freedom of association might be better protected while pursuing other goals.



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS


Uganda and Nigeria: security and freedom of association

The fight against money laundering and terrorism has come into tension with freedom of association and assembly in a number of countries. A group of OGP countries (including Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi, Nigeria, and South Africa) are currently working on terrorism finance, which affects nonprofit organizations.

Using the OGP action plan process to discuss and identify a proportionate response to money laundering that does not also impede civic space could be of considerable value to these efforts.

The advocacy of a number of CSOs in Uganda and Nigeria are highlighted to show how civil society is working to increase dialogue and transparency to ensure that responses to terrorism finance are not disproportionate or wielded as a political tool to suppress legitimate nonprofit activity.





In Uganda, this work is carried out by a network of CSOs led by the Defenders Protection Initiative (DPI). In Nigeria, a group is led by Spaces for Change (S4C). Beyond these two countries, there is a regional network of civil society leaders working to prevent overregulation of the nonprofit sector through domestic awareness-raising, collaborating with government, and the use of regional and continental blocs. This is done in collaboration with the International Center for Non-profit Law (ICNL), the European Centre for Not-for-Profit Law (ECNL), and the Human Security Collective.

Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Recommendation 8

The Financial Action Task Force Recommendation 8 lays out an approach for proportionate response to countering money laundering in the nonprofit sector:

That the laws and regulations that govern non-profit organisations be reviewed so that these organisations cannot be abused for the financing of terrorism. The FATF has established best practices aimed at preventing misuse of NPOs for the financing of terrorism while, at the same time, respecting legitimate actions of NPOs...

(d) Focused measures adopted by countries to protect NPOs from terrorist financing abuse should not disrupt or discourage legitimate charitable activities. Rather, such measures should promote accountability and engender greater confidence among NPOs, across the donor community and with the general public that charitable funds and services reach intended legitimate beneficiaries...

(e) Countries are required to identify and take effective and proportionate action against NPOs that either are exploited by, or knowingly supporting, terrorists or terrorist organisations, taking into account the specifics of the case.⁷⁵

While many of the FATF recommendations are not legally binding, they can affect bond ratings and the ability to borrow. Mutual evaluations rate governments and score governments on FATF recommendation compliance, including Recommendation 8.


Threats and dialogue in Uganda

Uganda is not an OGP member, but the work of Ugandan CSOs to undertake dialogue with governments illustrates a dialogue-based approach to developing appropriate regulation.

In 2017, the Government of Uganda, nominally acting under the auspices of FATF Recommendation 8, raided three major CSOs in the country with search warrants claiming the organizations were involved in illicit financial transactions and “subversive activities to destabilize Uganda.”⁷⁶ Following this event, the Defenders Protection Initiative, an umbrella organization for human rights activists, held a dialogue with Standard Charter Bank, the head of the Financial Intelligence Authority, and 40 activists from Ugandan CSOs. While the dialogue did not fully explore arbitrary search and seizure, the dialogue did discuss inconsistencies and further steps needed to improve the governance of the Ugandan nonprofit sector.

The dialogue surfaced issues that comported well with the 2016 mutual evaluation of Uganda on compliance with FATF standards:

The NPO sector in Uganda is still not supported by adequate legal framework to deal with issues of TF [terrorist financing]. The current requirements regulating the NPO sector do not deal with TF or the TF risks associated with the NPO sector. There is no TF risk assessment which has been done in the sector to determine which NPOs are vulnerable to TF risks and consistent with that, no guidance has been given to such NPOs on how to deal with the TF risks they are exposed to. NPOs are not obligated to submit financial statements breaking down the NPO's income and expenditure. The NGO Board has not engaged the NPO sector to raise awareness with them on TF matters and the NGO Board itself is not exposed to the kind of TF risks which some of the NPOs could be vulnerable to. Currently, the NGO Board does not have the capacity to carry out most of its functions and there is no proper coordination and administration of TF information related to the NPO sector.⁷⁷



Weak institutional environments harm nonprofit organizations and weaken the control of terrorism financing. Unclear rules and processes hinder potential support of nonprofits, can physically endanger nonprofit organizations, and weakens the ability of the government to identify actual risks. Government efforts to strengthen the NGO board (the unit responsible for implementing the recommendations) must include proactive engagement with nonprofit representatives and identify a proportionate response.

Evidence-based advocacy in Nigeria

In 2016, as part of its FATF membership candidacy, Nigeria underwent a National Risk Assessment. The assessment aimed to identify threats and vulnerabilities across a number of sectors, including those to nonprofits. The assessment took place in the context of a defeated NGO bill which would have created onerous regulation of the nonprofit sector, especially those which received foreign funding.

With other Nigerian NGOs, Spaces for Change analyzed the results of the National Risk Assessment. The report found that the assessment did not adequately address its goals of (a) identifying the NPO geographies or activities which were vulnerable, (b) identifying the particular vulnerabilities of nonprofit actors for financing (e.g. cash vs. bank transfers), or (c) assessing the adequacy of the regulatory environment. As a result, the response and regulation could overreach without addressing the real vulnerabilities or potential threats within the country.⁷⁸

This type of analysis, as well as advocacy for a targeted approach to risk assessment, can help identify actual risks to ensure that regulation does not overreach and cannot be used arbitrarily to target advocacy or dissent.

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Photo on page 19 by El9th, Adobe Stock

GOOD TO KNOW

ICNL Report: HIV/AIDS and Freedom of Association in East Africa



“Ethiopia: Reproductive health center at Gandhi Memorial Hospital, Addis Ababa.” Photo by Saul Loed, Reuters

A recent report from the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL) shows how restrictions on civic space impact public health.⁷⁹ In East Africa, the HIV/AIDS epidemic remains a critical public health concern, especially for sex workers, people who inject drugs, and LGBT+ people. In countries like Kenya, the HIV prevalence rate among these groups is two to three times higher than that of the general population, reaching 18% in 2011. Often, social and legal stigmatization limit these communities’ access to information and medical treatment. Kenyan CSOs work to mobilize communities in response to HIV. Several organizations educate communities about protection methods and what steps individuals should take if they are exposed to or are living with HIV.

Despite their important work, challenges to civic space in Kenya have limited CSOs from working with certain stigmatized, vulnerable populations. For example, the NGO Coordination Act of 1990 allows the NGO Board, which regulates nonprofits, to refuse to register an organization if its purpose is not in the “national interest,” a term that is at best vaguely defined. Because prostitution, illegal drug use, and homosexuality are criminal

under national law, citizens are unable to collectively act and advocate for themselves by forming associations, legal or illegal. Similarly, organizations specifically working on behalf of these groups can face penalties or license removal should they openly conduct their work.

However, legal challenges to restrictive legislation have begun to turn the tide for Kenyan CSOs. In one 2014 case, the court ruled in favor of Transgender Education and Advocacy, a group which the NGO Coordination Board had previously barred from registering. The court held that the Board had violated the constitution by discriminating against this organization and the individuals it assists. Although restrictions and intimidation still persist in some cases, the decision enabled the organization to register and successfully advocate for transgender people.

Together with CSO public events and awareness-raising campaigns, efforts like these have helped open the door for conversation in the civic sphere. As a result, Kenyan society has become incrementally more open to public dialogue on sexuality, and the media sometimes positively features members of the LGBT community.



Endnotes

- ¹ The B Team, “The Business Case for Protecting Civic Rights” (15 Oct. 2018), <http://www.bteam.org/announcements/the-business-case-for-protecting-civic-rights/>.
- ² Data assessments are from Freedom House, V-Dem and the World Justice Project. In addition, OGP staff carried out a coding of CIVICUS Monitor data in 2018. Basu and Miranda, *The Right Tools for the Right Job*.
- ³ Based on data from the World Justice Project. This survey covers over 80% of OGP members. Source: World Justice Project. 2019. Current & historical Data. Online database available at: https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/FINAL_2019_wjp_rule_of_law_index_HISTORICAL_DATA_FILE_0.xlsx.
- ⁴ Former UN Special Rapporteur Maina Kiai, “The Right To Freedom Of Association” (2019), <http://freeassembly.net/about/freedoms/>.
- ⁵ *Universal Declaration of Human Rights*, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 20, UN Gen. Assem. (10 Dec. 1948), <http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/>.
- ⁶ *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights*, G. A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 22. For the European Region, see also the *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, art. 11, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1 Jun. 2010), https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf%23page=9; Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, art. 52 (3), 2012 O.J. (C 326/02), <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:12012P/TXT&from=DE>; and Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, ¶ 9.3, Org. for Sec. and Co-operation in Eur. (1990), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/elections/14304>.
- ⁷ Leon Irish, Robert Kushen and Karla Simon, *Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organizations*, 2nd ed. (Open Soc’y Inst., 2004), https://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/guidelines_laws_english.pdf.
- ⁸ As set out by Article 22 of the ICCR, restrictions are allowed if: 1) they are prescribed by law; 2) pursuant to a closed list of legitimate interests under international law; and 3) necessary in a democratic society (i.e., meet a proportionality test between the restriction and the legitimate interest pursued). Margaret Scotti, OGP: *The Guide to Opening Government An Enabling Environment for Civil Society Organizations* (ICNL and OGP) 3, https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/OGP-ICNL_Guide-Opening-Government_20180508.pdf.
- ⁹ For political processes, see Institute of Development Studies, *Making Space for Citizens*, IDS Policy Briefing, issue 27 (Mar. 2006), <http://archive.ids.ac.uk/drcitizen/system/assets/1052734498/original/1052734498-shankland.2006-making.pdf>. For society benefits, see World Economic Forum, *The Future Role of Civil Society*, World Scenario Series (Jan. 2013), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_FutureRoleCivilSociety_Report_2013.pdf. For economic and business growth, see The B Team, “The Business Case for Protecting Civic Rights.”
- ¹⁰ The B Team, “The Business Case for Protecting Civic Rights.”
- ¹¹ OGP, *Open Government Declaration* (Sept. 2011), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/open-government-declaration>; OGP, *OGP Paris Declaration* (2016), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/paris-declaration>.
- ¹² In this paper, civil society organizations (CSOs) are any private voluntary organization that is independent of government, self-governed, and non-commercial (does not distribute profits). As such, this term include non-governmental organizations (NGOs), charities and other related organizations.
- ¹³ See the UN SR FOAA report on the essential role associations play in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development: UN Gen. Assem., Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, UN Doc. A/73/279 (7 Aug. 2018), <https://undocs.org/A/73/279>.
- ¹⁴ Transparency and Accountability Initiative, *Closing Civic Space: Grantee Challenges and Funder Responses*, Introduction & Overview (2018), <https://www.transparency-initiative.org/civic-space-compendium/#introduction>. See also the UN SR FOAA report on the eight major trends in restriction of freedom of association and assembly: UN Gen Assem., *Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association*, UN Doc. A/HRC/38/34 (26 Jul. 2018), <https://undocs.org/A/HRC/38/34>.
- ¹⁵ The CIVICUS Monitor, *People Power Under Attack: A Global Analysis of Threats to Fundamental Freedoms* (27 Nov. 2018) 8, <https://www.civicus.org/documents/People-PowerUnderAttack.Report.27November.pdf>.
- ¹⁶ ICNL, *Global Trends in NGO Law: Survey of Trends Affecting Civic Space: 2015-16*, vol. 7 issue 4 (Sept. 2016), <http://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends7-4.pdf?pdf=trends7-4>; The B Team, “The Business Case for Protecting Civic Rights.”
- ¹⁷ Transparency and Accountability Initiative, *Closing Civic Space: Grantee Challenges and Funder Responses*, Law or Rule-Based Restrictions (2018), <https://www.transparency-initiative.org/civic-space-compendium/#law-or-rule-based-restrictions-strategies>. Civil society organizations often work in networks and alliances but this cooperation is under threat in a number of countries. Recently, in the United States, a number of private companies have used federal racketeering laws (e.g., 18 CFR 96) to accuse CSO networks of criminal conspiracy. While the lawsuits have failed, it represents a new line of targeted harassment of CSOs.

- ¹⁸ V-Dem Institute, *Democracy for All? V-Dem Annual Democracy Report 2018* (2018), https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/3f/19/3f19efc9-e25f-4356-b159-b5c0e-c894115/v-dem_democracy_report_2018.pdf.
- ¹⁹ Tonusree Basu and Denisse Miranda, *The Right Tools for the Right Job* (Washington, D.C.: OGP, 2018), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Right-Tools_Civic-Space_20180508.pdf.
- ²⁰ Basu and Miranda, *The Right Tools for the Right Job*.
- ²¹ OGP, “Ley de Organizaciones Sociales” (2016), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/14-ley-de-organizaciones-sociales>.
- ²² Jaime David Ayala, *Mecanismo de Revision Independiente (MRI), El Salvador Mid-term Report 2016-2018* (OGP, 2017), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/El-Salvador_Mid-Term_Report_2016-2018.pdf.
- ²³ Scotti, *The Guide to Opening Government*, 6.
- ²⁴ OGP, “Engage Canadians to Improve Key Canada Revenue Agency Services” (2016), www.opengovpartnership.org/commitment/22-engage-canadians-improve-key-canada-revenue-agency-services; Michael Karanicolas, *Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM): Canada Progress Report 2016-2017* (OGP, 2017), <http://nsrighttoknow.ca/wp-content/uploads/2018/04/Canada-OGP-IRM-Report-English.pdf>.
- ²⁵ Government of Kenya, *Kenya National Action Plan III 2018-2020* (OGP, 2018), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/KENYA_Action-Plan_2018-2020_0.pdf.
- ²⁶ Churchill Ongere, “Grasping Opportunities in Kenya: Using OGP to Improve the Operating Environment of CSOs” (OGP, 15 Jan. 2019), www.opengovpartnership.org/stories/grasping-opportunities-kenya-using-ogp-improve-operating-environment-of-csos.
- ²⁷ OGP, “Financing of Charities” (2014), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/commitment/02-financing-of-charities>.
- ²⁸ Dmytro Kotlyar, *Ukraine End of Term Report 2015-2016* (OGP, 2017), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Ukraine_EOTR_2014-2016_ENG.pdf.
- ²⁹ Government of Bulgaria, *Bulgaria National Action Plan*, (OGP, 2012), PLAN-BG-ENGLast_0.doc.
- ³⁰ Scotti, *The Guide to Opening Government*, 11.
- ³¹ Several expert reviewers of this report have noted that the operating environment for CSOs in Sierra Leone has a number of restrictive provisions in law and policy. The UN Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Assembly and Association has sent to two communications to the government and received a response. See SLE 1/2018 and SLE 1/2019. For documentation on the specific commitment, see: OGP, “Foreign Aid Transparency” (2016), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/commitment/02-foreign-aid-transparency> and Charlie Hughes, *Sierra Leone Mid-Term Report*, (OGP, 2016) <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/report/sierra-leone-mid-term-report-2016-2018-year-1>.
- ³² OGP, “Improving Access to Information on Expending Public Resources and Contents of Relevant Registers: Disclosure of NGOs financial statements” (2012), www.opengovpartnership.org/commitment/069-improving-access-information-on-expending-public-resources-and-contents-of-relevant.
- ³³ Aida Bagić, *Croatia Progress Report 2012-13* (OGP, 2012), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/Croatia_progress_report_2012_Eng.pdf.
- ³⁴ Joseph Foti et al., *Voice and Choice, Opening the Door to Environmental Democracy* (WRI, 2008) 74, https://pdf.wri.org/voice_and_choice.pdf.
- ³⁵ OGP, “Improving the Quality of the Involvement of Society in Decision Making: NGO fund” (2012), www.opengovpartnership.org/011-improving-quality-of-involvement-of-society-decision-making-ngo-fund.
- ³⁶ Foti et al., *Voice and Choice*, 74.
- ³⁷ USAID, FHI 360 and ICNL, *The 2017 Civil Society Organization Sustainability Index for Central and Eastern Europe and Eurasia*, 21st ed. (Sept. 2018) 4, 114, <https://www.fhi360.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/resource-civil-society-organization-2017-regional-report.PDF>.
- ³⁸ Based on indicators used by V-Dem, the World Justice Project, and Freedom House.
- ³⁹ Based on indicators used by V-Dem, the World Justice Project, and Freedom House.
- ⁴⁰ Key:
- 1. Substantial control.** The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.
- 2: Moderate control.** Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on CSOs, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either government weakness or political expediency.
- 3: Minimal control.** Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow



the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action (e.g., the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and judicial independence.

4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged to violently overthrow the government.

(Source: Michael Coppedge et al., *V-Dem Codebook*, ver. 8 (V-Dem, Jul. 2018) 175, https://www.v-dem.net/media/filer_public/64/ad/64ad9308-45fa-473e-8e2b-e1c-0c4e421e6/v-dem_codebook_v8.pdf.)

⁴¹ Key:

1: Substantial repression. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in responses 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).

2: Moderate repression. In addition to material sanctions, the government also engages in legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs' actions. The government may also affect CSOs' scope by restricting their association with each other and political parties, barring CSOs from taking certain actions, or blocking international contacts.

3: Weak repression. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow formation of new CSOs and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize movements or NGOs (i.e., GONGOS) to crowd out independent organizations.

4: No repression. CSOs are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

⁴² Henry Farber et al., *Unions and Inequality Over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data* (Princeton Univ., 1 May 2018), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kuziemko/files/union_submitted.pdf.

⁴³ Henry Farber et al., *Unions and Inequality Over the Twentieth Century: New Evidence from Survey Data* (Princeton Univ., 1 May 2018), https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/kuziemko/files/union_submitted.pdf.

⁴⁴ Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, *Making the Law Work for Everyone*, vol. 2 (2008), http://www.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/democratic-governance/legal-empowerment/reports-of-the-commission-on-legal-empowerment-of-the-poor/making-the-law-work-for-everyone---vol-ii---english-only/making_the_law_work_ll.pdf.

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⁵² Halayna Korba, "Harassment of Anti-Corruption Activists" [in Ukrainian], *Novoe vremya*, issue 27 (Media-DK Publishing House LLC, 28 Jul. 2017), <http://magazine.nv.ua/article/post/64142-travlya-borcov-s-korrupcyey>.

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⁵⁵ These laws are: the Law on Associations, the Law on Endowments and Foundations, and the Regulation on Resources for Supporting Programs or Providing Co-financing for Programs of Public Interest that are Implemented by Associations. Orza, *IRM Serbia Progress Report 2014-2015*.

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- ⁶² As of December 2018, there were six countries with commitments in this area: Bulgaria, Canada, El Salvador, Lithuania, Norway, and Ukraine.
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- ⁶⁴ A December 2018 analysis showed that nine countries have commitments affecting organizational operation: Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, El Salvador, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Macedonia and Ukraine.
- ⁶⁵ There is a significant disparity of enabling environments between private business and CSOs, as documented by the UN SR FoAA (https://nhri.ohchr.org/EN/News/Documents/GANHRI-BackgroundPaper%20-HLPF16-Shrinking-Space_publ.com.pdf).
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- ⁶⁸ ECNL, *The Regulatory Framework for Fundraising in Europe* (2018), <http://ecnl.org/publications/regulatory-framework-fundraising-europe/>.
- ⁶⁹ Katerina Hadzi-Miceva Evans, Expert Council on NGO Law: *Regulating Political Activities of Non-Governmental Organisations* (Conf. of INGOs of the Council of Europe, Dec. 2015), <https://rm.coe.int/CoERMPublicCommon-SearchServices/DisplayDCTMContent?documentId=0900001680640fc2>.
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- ⁷¹ Based on a 2018 analysis, these countries are: Bulgaria, Croatia, El Salvador, Estonia, Guatemala, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Northern Macedonia, Mongolia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Spain and Ukraine.
- ⁷² Transparency and Accountability Initiative, *Closing Civic Space: Grantee Challenges and Funder Responses*, Hostile Local Narratives (2018), <https://www.transparency-initiative.org/civic-space-compendium/#hostile-local-narratives>.
- ⁷³ Accountable Now is found at <https://accountablenow.org/about-accountable-now/> and the Concord, Istanbul Principles are found at <https://concordeurope.org/blog/2012/09/21/istanbul-principles/>.
- ⁷⁴ International Aid Transparency Initiative is found at <https://www.iatistandard.org/en/>.
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OGP Global Report

Civic Space

Freedom of Assembly




Key points

Peaceful assembly is a bedrock of democratic institutions. It allows people to bring attention to issues, demand change, and get answers from public officials. Without freedom of assembly, there are fewer channels between elections for people to use information and opportunities for participation in open government.

Assessing OGP member countries' work in this space over the last decade, this report concluded the following:

- **All governments have a duty to respect, protect, and promote freedom of assembly.** International covenants, including the Open Government Declaration, oblige all governments to protect and promote people's rights to peacefully protest and assemble.
- **Some protections and commitments related to freedom of assembly remain weak.** About half of all OGP governments have challenges to freedom of assembly, but lack any type of commitments.
- **Restrictions affect demonstrations and protests in some OGP countries. Restrictions include police use of force.** While many OGP countries do not have such restrictions, there has been limited peer interaction.
- **Almost no OGP countries have commitments related to freedom of assembly.**
- **All OGP members could advance related policies and practices in five areas:**
 - 1) notification and permits; 2) police force, detention, and surveillance; 3) criminalization and penalties; 4) digital and online activities; and 5) non-state actors.





One of the principal barriers to protecting and promoting the right to assembly is that the necessary people to enact change are often not involved in policy discussions. The principal recommendations in this report are derived from this premise. OGP members looking to promote freedom of assembly would greatly benefit from expanding the players involved.

- **Move beyond police.** Expand the definition of parties who protect and promote the right to freedom of assembly beyond state actors.
- **Act locally and globally.** Create commitments in a federated, multi-level approach. The US example of the Police Data Initiative provides an effective model. Police commissioners from over 30 major US cities voluntarily began publishing their data and coordinating to develop a national database.¹
- **Involve Ministries of Justice in OGP.** Especially include departments involved with police oversight, coordination, and setting standards.
- **Activate silent leaders.** Develop a means of creating active leadership from countries with advanced protocols and legal frameworks to begin peer-sharing. OGP local members in particular have a strong leadership role to play here.
- **Improve reporting on protocols and transparency.** Activists around the world can scale up and replicate the approach of ECNL to identify whether the legal and administrative framework exists to promote, respect, and protect the right to peaceful assembly.

“Prague, Czech Republic.” Photo by Bits and Splits, Adobe Stock



Photo by Nito, Adobe Stock

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly is the fundamental right to collectively express, promote, pursue, and defend a common interest for whatever reason or motivation without fear of retribution. This right includes the right to participate in peaceful assemblies, meetings, protests, strikes, sit-ins, demonstrations, and other temporary gatherings for a specific purpose. Assemblies can be in public or private spaces; they may be online or offline; and they can be for a few hours, as well as a few months.²

The legal case for freedom of assembly

Freedom of assembly is an established global norm. It is enshrined in a number of international legal agreements and declarations. It is:

- Outlined in international agreements like the UN Universal Declaration on Human Rights (Article 20) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 21),³ as well as regional conventions and standards.⁴
- Inter-connected to other rights, such as the freedom of association and expression, and the right to information and privacy, all endorsed in the *Open Government Declaration* signed by all OGP members.⁵
- Established as both a positive duty and a negative obligation—states must create the right frameworks in policy and practice that secure freedom of assembly and prevent and respond to violations but they must also refrain from restrictions of the right.⁶

The practical case for freedom of assembly

Beyond normative arguments, freedom of assembly is essential to the functioning of open government and for healthy societies. It shapes debate, public policies, and strengthens governance by:⁷

- Allowing diverse and different ideas to be expressed and heard, including the voices of minority or opposition groups.⁸ This is most critical for groups that have historically suffered discrimination, which might not have control of broadcast media, or may be disenfranchised;⁹
- Providing a critical channel for public dialogue about issues affecting a country—political, economic, social, and environmental;¹⁰
- Serving as a means to demand accountability: people asking questions and making demands of their leaders between elections, exercising this right through protest, and being informed by an open and free media;¹¹
- Catalyzing change: protests pushing governments to prioritize and speed-up their responses to reflect changes in social demands and perceptions;¹² and
- Making leaders responsive, which has been statistically shown to positively affect public health, education, economies, and income equality.¹³

Open government cannot work without assembly

Open government is rooted in the idea of more transparent, accountable and participatory governments.¹⁴ However, for participation to be meaningful and effective, it cannot be limited to elections or formal, “invited,” channels of engagement or exchanges with officials. Freedom of peaceful

assembly is also a critical form of political participation in a healthy civil society ecosystem:¹⁵

- Peaceful assembly through protests is an important feature in the modern history of many OGP members and has been essential for mass mobilization in the face of corruption and disenfranchisement.
- Peaceful assembly serves as a means for youth, migrants, or others who are unable to vote to make their voices heard.¹⁶
- Peaceful assembly is an extension of voting rights and political organizing. Moreover, people attending political gatherings also have extremely high rates of voting.¹⁷

Freedom of peaceful assembly is also tied to greater government openness and accountability—the other pillars of OGP.

- Assembly allows citizens to hold decision-makers accountable when the public has good, open information.¹⁸ For example, freedom of assembly is associated with reductions in corruption.¹⁹
- Assembly helps publicize open and accessible information (or lack thereof) and sparks public action through other channels (such as voting or litigation) on issues such as the environment, women’s rights, and public services.²⁰
- Public information is important to know how protests are handled. This can be knowing what police equipment is deployed,²¹ as well as legal restrictions to protesting.²²



Assembly in OGP: the need for greater commitment

The “why” of freedom of assembly is clear in the context of OGP. Nonetheless, independently produced data consistently shows that between a third and half of OGP countries have notable interference with the right to peaceful assembly.²³ At the same time, roughly a third to half of OGP countries perform consistently well. This suggests there is considerable room for leadership innovation and peer learning in this area.

To those important ends, this report looks at data on the current state of assembly in OGP countries from three sources: the CIVICUS monitor (combined with OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism findings); Freedom House’s Freedom in the World Report; and the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index.

CIVICUS monitor and Independent Reporting Mechanism


The CIVICUS monitor provides current news on fundamental freedoms in 65 OGP countries. According to CIVICUS, an international network of advocates for nonprofit space and civil liberties, three of the top

ten violations to civic space are related to peaceful assembly: excessive force during protests; the limitation, disruption and prevention of protests; and the detention of protesters.²⁴

Based on a 2018 analysis by the OGP Support Unit, more than half (33) of OGP countries have had some interference with freedom of assembly. The OGP Support Unit also coded OGP commitments that were relevant to peaceful assembly. Two OGP countries have made commitments related to “the right to assembly” in OGP national action plans: Montenegro²⁵ and Ukraine.²⁶ Of the 33 facing challenges, Ukraine is the only country to have used its action plan. Between 2012 and 2017, OGP’s Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) found only Ukraine had credibly implemented ambitious commitments on assembly.²⁷

Using IRM data and the data from CIVICUS, the disconnect between real world experience and OGP action plans is stark. Figure 1 shows that, despite problems with freedom of assembly, few countries have used their OGP action plans to address those issues.²⁸

FIGURE 1. Despite many notable issues with freedom of assembly, few OGP countries have undertaken commitments in this area



Source: OGP commitments database and CIVICUS Monitor Data coded by IRM staff.²⁹ (n=64)



Photo by Scena Studio, Adobe Stock


Freedom House

Freedom House assesses all OGP countries annually, scoring them 1–4. Consistent with the other evaluations, the countries were roughly split; just under half had the highest possible score and just over half had clear room for improvement. No current

member of OGP had the lowest score of zero, but fourteen did have a score of 1 or 2. This suggests that freedom of assembly is an acute issue in a number of OGP countries and an issue that needs urgent improvement in others. (See Figure 2.)

FIGURE 2. A number of OGP countries have concerning restrictions on freedom of assembly

Is there freedom of assembly? n=79



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, E1.



World Justice Project

The World Justice Project found similar mixed results regarding assembly freedoms, but provided greater detail.


- **Absence of reprisal for demonstrations** (expert survey): Most legal experts surveyed in OGP countries agreed that people can hold non-violent demonstrations without fear of reprisal (see Figure 3).
- **Police violence** (expert survey): Concerningly, legal experts surveyed were slightly less optimistic about

the behavior of police. Respondents in one-third of OGP countries suggested that it was either “likely” or “very likely” that a protestor would be beaten by police (see Figure 4).

- **Community meetings** (public survey data): In slightly less than a third of OGP countries, citizens felt that they could not freely attend community meetings. (See Figure 5.)

FIGURE 3. In some OGP countries there is fear of reprisal for participation in non-violent demonstrations


In practice, people in your country can freely hold public non-violent demonstrations without fear of reprisal. (n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 127.

FIGURE 4. In many OGP countries, there is a perception of excessive police response to non-violent demonstrations


How likely is a citizen to be beaten by the police, without justification, for participating in a non-violent public demonstration? (Expert survey, n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 126


FIGURE 5. In most OGP countries, people feel that they can freely attend community meetings

In your country, people can freely attend community meetings. (General survey, n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, GPP 42






LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Citizen involvement in parades in Northern Ireland

In Northern Ireland, parades, processions, carnivals, and commemorations are core to cultural, political, and religious traditions. Unfortunately, parades have been marred by—and are sometimes the impetus for—sectarian violence. This comes to a head during the annual “marching season” between March and August. Participants often carry flags and other emblems that their neighbors consider inflammatory.

In 1998, preceding the Good Friday accords, the Northern Ireland Parades Commission was established to approve permits for parades.³⁰ While it is not without critics, its establishment offers two positive lessons for countries struggling to balance public order and safety with freedom of assembly:

- *Removing the police from decision-making around parades.* The first major accomplishment of the Parades Commission was to move the permitting decision from the police department (previously the Royal Ulster Constabulary, now the Police Service of Northern Ireland). This allowed the police to focus on maintaining public order rather than judging the legitimacy of each parade.
- *Citizen voice in monitoring freedom of assembly.* The quasi-judicial body is made of citizens that compete for nominations by the Secretary of State of Northern Ireland.



Despite initial success, there has been concern about the Parades Commission. In 2013, the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association (see “Guidance and Standards: UN Special Rapporteur’s Guidance” later this section), at the invitation of the UK government, issued a report on the sensitive issue. The Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission followed with another report on how best to balance the competing demands for assembly and security.³¹

The two human rights bodies’ reports, followed by action by the Parades Commission, resulted in a framework called “Resolution by Dialogue.” It mapped the competing considerations of different human rights (e.g. freedom from violence and religious freedom) and invited participants and affected communities to suggest ways of improving the process. Interestingly, the resolution by dialogue was based on the participatory approach in the Framework Convention on National Minorities, which requires the state to foster dialogue and mutual understanding; specifically, governments must allow minority groups to voice their opinions. Governments must also provide dialogue in accordance with OSCE Guidelines on Assembly (see box at the end of this section), which emphasize voluntary dialogue as a necessary first step before escalation to legal means such as banning a particular parade.

While the guidance is in place, some of the most controversial civic groups do not recognize the legitimacy of the body. Nonetheless, Northern Ireland offers a promising approach to citizen dialogue in promoting and protecting the right of assembly within broader security concerns.

.....
 Page 10: “Orangemen parade to Drumcree Church defying orders for a route change.” Photo by Reuters
 Page 11: “Members of British Army prepare barricades around Drumcree Church.” Photo by Reuters





“Seoul: Balloon protest against corruption, 2006.” Photo by Austin King, Flickr

Improving the environment for peaceful assembly

This section lays out potential focus areas and next steps for OGP members seeking to increase freedom of assembly, both through their action plans and outside of them. There are a number of relevant issues to consider. Moreover, issues such as digital surveillance and data sharing have taken on a new relevance with evolving technology and political landscapes.

Unlike other policy areas in this report, the lack of OGP commitments on freedom of assembly makes a deeper analysis of effective measures in OGP countries more difficult. For that reason, we turn to a review of existing and emerging international standards that can help to illuminate a path forward for OGP countries.

At the international level, there are five principal sources of legal content outlining the freedom of assembly. These include international laws such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the European Convention of Human Rights (which applies to all 47 members of the Council of Europe). For EU members, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights also applies. These are further elaborated in General Comments of the UN Human Rights Committee and Guidelines of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). (See the boxes on “Guidance and standards” later in this section for a brief discussion of developments in each of these arenas.)

Most importantly for OGP are the legal and administrative procedures that individual government entities enact to make freedom of assembly a reality on the ground. Guidelines for these areas are summarized in the box on the UN Special Rapporteur’s guidance (later in this section) based on the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association. Readers are encouraged to familiarize themselves with these standards as they are ambitious relative to the current state of most OGP members. They provide inspiration for potential future areas of work. The practical difficulties of implementing even the most ambitious commitments are highlighted in three case studies: citizen dialogue in Northern Ireland on controversial parade routes (in the “Lessons from reformers” box, later in this section), freedom of assembly in East Africa in the “Lessons from reformers: Demonstrator’s early response - Uganda” box, and a legal survey of Eastern Partnership members in OGP carried out by the European Centre for Non-profit Law. (See “Lessons from reformers: Seven OGP Countries Addressing Assembly.”)

The remainder of this section addresses core problems identified in OGP countries through the review of the CIVICUS Monitor, relevant case law and examples from OGP countries outside of their OGP action plans, and potential commitments or actions that could be taken to address these concerns.

Notification and authorization

Problems:

- Use of notification and permission systems as a means to authorize or delay permits.
- Denial of permits without probable cause or due to issues such as conflicts with “time, place, or manner” of assembly³² or other vaguely defined exemptions to the right (“public morality,” “public order,” or “national security”).

Relevant cases:

- **Ukraine:** The first action plan (2012–2013) worked to develop a draft law, “On Procedure of Organising and Conducting Peaceful Events.” Various ministries—from Justice and the Interior, as well as the Cabinet of Ministers—were actively engaged in the process.³³
- **Panama:** Under the country’s constitution, organizers of a peaceful meeting or assembly are supposed to notify the mayor’s office 24 hours in advance of the event. This notification is not authorization under the law; the mayor is simply supposed to issue a statement that s/he has been notified.³⁴
- **Northern Ireland:** A civilian panel evaluates and makes binding decisions on route changes for controversial parades to ensure public safety (see the previous box).

Possible solutions:

- Prevent restrictions on peaceful assembly, including those of a political and/or public nature, including signature collections and “spontaneous assembly.”
- Notification processes should not be used as a form of authorization and should be ideally limited to those assemblies large in nature and/or posing a significant disruption.
- Enact regulation to ensure that no authorization is required to hold an assembly per internationally-agreed standards.³⁵
- Notification periods should not be excessively long and should only be used to facilitate the right to assembly.

Use of police force

Problems:

- Lack of oversight (such as through monitors), accountability, and information.
- Excessive and disproportionate use of weapons, equipment, and authority.
- Detention of protestors before arrival at demonstration, use of “kettling” techniques to encircle demonstrators.
- Use of “agent provocateurs” or plain clothes police to infiltrate assemblies.³⁶

Relevant cases:

- **Slovenia:** The Act on Public Assembly (2004) states that police and organizers must work cooperatively to determine the necessary police presence.³⁷ (Slovenia is not currently an OGP member.)
- **United States:** The District of Columbia’s First Amendment Rights and Police Standards Act (2004) states that police lines cannot be used at assemblies in an attempt to encircle individuals expressing their right to peaceful assembly.

Possible solutions:

- Establish open, clear, and ethical protocols addressing police conduct prior to, during, and following protests.
- Ensure that the cost for adequate security and safety for assemblies is covered by public authorities.
- Pre-plan with assembly organizers.
- Make transparent and easily accessible the guidance for use of force and equipment, and post-assembly reporting of police operations. This includes limiting the use of containment strategies to “exceptional” cases.³⁸
- Publish information on policing at protests following events.
- Train police officers in proportionate responses and requirements for the use of uniformed police at assemblies.
- Ensure adequate legal and practical protections for independent monitors to provide oversight of police and protester actions during assemblies.³⁹





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Demonstrator's early response - Uganda

The Ugandan constitution guarantees citizens the freedom to assemble and demonstrate peacefully. However, laws such as the Public Order Management Act (POMA) give police wide-ranging power to regulate public meetings and prevent them from occurring. This provision has enabled the police to justify arresting and detaining opposition politicians and their supporters at political rallies.

In the face of these challenges, CSOs have stepped up to defend the freedom of assembly. In 2016, Solidarity Uganda—a nonprofit organization that builds capacity with community-based organizations—created a rapid response system to assist protesters facing state-sponsored violence and repression. Operated full-time, the system has an emergency hotline that protesters and others can call for emergency assistance. When activists are arrested, the hotline coordinator connects them with a pro bono lawyer who assists with bail and representation if they choose to sue the state. The organization also provides medical and psychosocial care.

Alongside Solidarity Uganda, Chapter Four Uganda is a network of lawyers and legal experts who conduct public interest and strategic litigation in cases where activists' civil or human right have been violated. In addition to legal assistance, the organization also pressures authorities to regulate protests less violently.⁴⁰

Photo by Vladimir Wrangel, Adobe Stock

Criminalization and penalties

Problems:

- Excessive application of criminal charges for protesting or changes in liability regimes for damages during protests.
- Disproportionate civil and administrative charges, fines, or penalties for unpermitted assembly.
- Charges combined with other claims, such as public morality, terrorism, and national security violations.

Relevant cases:

- **South Africa:** In 2018, the South African Constitutional Court struck down a restrictive protest law that was being used by the government to criminalize public assembly—through fines and jail time—as unconstitutional.⁴¹
- **France and Bulgaria:** In 2018, the European Fundamental Rights Agency found that both countries had introduced counter-terrorism legislation which allowed for denial of public assemblies (France) and the potential closure of nonprofits (Bulgaria). The French Constitutional Court ruled that the use of emergency powers to stop labor and climate protests was overly broad and lacked sufficient safeguards.⁴²

Possible solutions:

- Decriminalize assembly activities, including clear regulations of this process.
- Apply criminal or administrative liability compliant with well-proscribed law (for example, not prosecuting organizers for actions made in “good faith” or for participants that were not involved in any violent actions). This would include the proportionate application and use of civil and administrative fines and penalties (for violations).⁴³
- Any detentions must meet legal “minimum standards,” ensuring that other vague policy frameworks—such as for public morality or national security—are not misused for prosecuting and limiting assembly.

Digital and online activities

Problems:

- Internet blackouts or service disruptions.
- Shutting down or monitoring of platforms being used to organize assembly.
- Online surveillance and privacy violations.
- Online gender-based violence and harassment of women’s public participation.

Relevant cases:

- **Estonia:** Estonians set out a positive framework regarding citizens’ online security, anonymity, privacy, and rights. Anyone can see which of their data is available or has been accessed by public authorities.⁴⁴
- **Italy:** As part of the country’s third OGP action plan, a specific commitment was adopted on promoting its Charter of Internet Rights, which was approved by its legislature in 2015. This included getting the public and officials to recognize the links between on and offline rights, including basic civil liberties such as assembly.⁴⁵

Possible solutions:

- Ensure cybersecurity measures and laws uphold human rights online (including freedom of assembly and the right to privacy).
- Guaranteeing unobstructed access to social platforms and the broader web at all times (i.e., for mobilizing, sharing, and creating content, etc.).
- Clarifying and making transparent grounds for online surveillance and attacks, including direct denial of service cyber-attacks.
- Using digital surveillance and facial recognition software during assemblies, and providing consistent, publicly accessible standards and processes for destroying, preserving (in relevant cases), accessing, or expunging that data.⁴⁶



- Clarifying the rights of individuals participating in online town halls and interacting with public officials acting in an official capacity, including on private platforms.⁴⁷
- Introducing measures and engaging all stakeholders to address gender-based violence against women online.

Non-state actors

Problems:

- OGP analysis of CIVICUS Monitor shows that non-state actors (counter-protestors and private security) are involved in a significant amount of violence during assemblies.⁴⁸
- Use of private security forces or parastate actors not subject to public oversight.⁴⁹
- Curtailment of assembly on publicly used but privately-owned spaces.

Relevant cases:

- **Netherlands:** A 2012 district court ruling in Amsterdam now allows public protests against business practices on business premises as long as they are proportionate.⁵⁰

Possible solutions:

- Provide for government oversight and industry standards to maximize safety and right to assemble.⁵¹
- Introduce measures to clarify the legitimate use and accountability of private and parastate security forces during protests and assemblies.⁵² Such measures would ensure that private security services do not perform policing functions during assemblies in lieu of democratically controlled police forces.⁵³
- Introduce rules to clarify and allow for the right of assembly on publicly-accessed private land (such as shopping malls).
- Enact rules to limit assembly organizers from “frivolous” civil lawsuits aimed at limiting the right to assembly.⁵⁴

Special Rapporteur's guidance on peaceful assembly

In 2010, the United Nations Human Rights Council established the Special Rapporteur on the Rights to Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and of Association. The current rapporteur is Clément Voule, a jurist and activist from Togo, preceded by Annalisa Ciampi and Maina Kiai, a lawyer from Kenya.

The Special Rapporteur: 1) gathers information on trends in assembly and of association and makes recommendations; 2) undertakes fact-finding missions to countries and issues urgent appeals regarding reported violations of the rights (see earlier box on Northern Ireland); 3) submits an annual report to the UN Human Rights Council and General Assembly; and 4) engages a range of stakeholders on receiving, responding and reporting on violations.⁵⁵

The rapporteur utilizes a set of guidelines and indicators to assess how a country is managing assemblies.⁵⁶ Importantly for OGP members, this guidance can serve as a means of assessing freedom of assembly in the country prior to developing ambitious commitments for an action plan. These assessment indicators include:

1. State duty to respect and ensure freedom of assembly:

States should respect and ensure all rights of persons participating in assemblies. This includes a positive presumption in favor of peaceful assembly.

2. The inalienable right to take part in peaceful assemblies:

- *Scope of assemblies:* The obligation to protect freedom of assembly extends to spontaneous assemblies, simultaneous assemblies, and counter-protests.
- *Notification:* States should have systems of notification, rather than authorization, only when necessary, legal, and proportionate. There should be a presumption in favor of assemblies with narrow limits to restrict assemblies, determined by an assessment of proportionality. Notification processes should be required in less than 48 hours, easily accessible to anyone, and not overly bureaucratic.
- *Risk assessment and mitigation:* When there is notification of multiple assemblies for the same place and time, the State conducts a thorough assessment of any risks and develops strategies for their mitigation.
- *Dialogue and non-discrimination:* The State employs a process for determining necessary restrictions through voluntary mutual agreement or, where not possible, processes that do not discriminate between the proposed assemblies.



3. Limited restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly:

- *Mandated body:* There is a legally established body with a clear mandate to deal with notifications of assembly, independent of undue interference, with clear guidance on exercising discretion in decision-making.
- *Fair process:* Proposed restrictions are put in writing, and justified and communicated to organizers in a timely manner. Formal appeals can be brought through administrative and judicial means without restriction. Any such rules must also allow for adequate flexibility to allow for spontaneous assembly.

4. Facilitation of the right to peaceful assembly:

- *Genuine engagement:* Law enforcement agencies liaise with organizers through an accessible point of contact skilled in conflict management and independent from other policing functions.
- *Travel and escorts:* Authorities do not require organizers to provide stewards. Intrusive anticipatory measures are not used in an assembly. Participants on their way to an assembly are not stopped, searched, or arrested unless there is a clear and present danger of imminent violence.

5. Use of force:

- *Capacity:* Law enforcement officials have the necessary equipment, training, and instructions to police assemblies without recourse to force, emphasizing de-escalation, communication, and engagement.

- *Equipment:* Non-lethal weapons and protective equipment should be used only in cases of real need and only where there is training, monitoring, and where options have been evaluated to comply with human rights standards to minimize indiscriminate harm. Automatic and autonomous weapons are not allowed.
- *Dispersal:* Comprehensive, public guidelines on the dispersal of assemblies follow international guidelines, provide practical guidance on which circumstances warrant dispersal, measures to be taken before dispersal (including de-escalation), and who may issue a dispersal order.
- *Monitoring:* There are established effective government systems for monitoring and publicly reporting the use of force, including when and with whom force is used. Effective controls prevent trade in monitoring data and crowd-control equipment, including surveillance technology, especially where there is a risk of unlawful killings, torture, or other abuses.

6. The right to observe, monitor, and record assemblies:

- *Communication:* Authorities proactively engage with monitors by communicating consistently before, during, and after an assembly.
- *Information distribution and access:* Authorities proactively provide access and information to members of the media and other monitors. Any interference with the recording of an assembly, including the seizure or damage of any equipment, is prohibited without a warrant.

7. Privacy and collection of personal information:

- *Privacy:* The State notifies demonstrators of any filming. Where biometric technologies, including facial recognition software, are used, appropriate protections of public privacy, personal data protection and safety have been implemented.
- *Data destruction and preservation:* There is a clear process for data retention and destruction, except: where it depicts use of force, detention, arrest, or dispersal; where it relates to the subject of a complaint; or where law enforcement, oversight authorities or the subject of data have reasonable suspicion of crime or misconduct. The public knows whether data has been stored and has a complaints process regarding retention and expungement of the data.
- *Undercover officers:* Democratic bodies determine and review necessity and proportionality tests. Police agencies have internal review systems and external, independent oversight. Judges must authorize any undercover police.

8. Access to information on police protocols and training:

- *Proactive dissemination:* This includes relevant: (a) laws and regulations; (b) standard operating procedures and policies for policing and management; (c) types of equipment; (d) training of law enforcement officers; and (e) how to access accountability processes.
- *Right to information:* Existence of a right to information mechanism assuming maximum disclosure and allowing for appeals.

9. Responsibilities of business enterprises:

- *Publicly accessed private space:* Where privately owned spaces are open to the general public and serve a similar function as public spaces, they are treated as a public space for the purposes of the rights to freedom of assembly and expression.
- *Protection from legal retaliation:* There are legal protections for assembly organizers and participants from civil lawsuits brought frivolously, or with the purpose of deterring public participation.

10. State accountability:

- *Liability and review:* Police have liability for official misconduct. There is adequately resourced non-judicial oversight, including internal investigations and a statutory independent police oversight body. Suspected crimes are quickly referred to a prosecutor, and officers under investigation would not be redeployed until conclusion of the investigation.
- *Independent oversight body:* Purview includes investigating complaints from the public; accepting referrals from police; and initiating investigations in the public interest, including use of force.






LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Seven OGP countries addressing assembly

The European Center for Not-for-profit Law (ECNL), in an innovative project on freedom of assembly, assessed seven OGP countries in Central and Eastern Europe for relevant law and practices between 2017 and 2019. (There were also two non-OGP countries included in the assessment.) Many of these OGP countries have strong legal frameworks, but face implementation challenges around policing of events and lack standardized processes among authorities, especially at the local level.

- *Albania*: The country's legal framework protects assembly. Still, in practice, Albania has room for improvement. It is unclear whether organizers need notification or authorization to demonstrate. De facto, this restricts spontaneous assemblies and creates a lack of coordination with police.⁵⁷ Organizers have been fined for lacking authorization. A more standardized, unified, and transparent process for authorization could resolve some of these issues.
- *Armenia*: Since passage of the 2011 Law on Freedom of Assembly, implementation has gradually improved. Prior to the 2018 Velvet Revolution, there had been a marked decrease in violence during the 2016 election as compared to years prior.⁵⁸ Nonetheless, there was significant discretion in the use of force, especially during opposition rallies, with well-documented unlawful, and excessive violence against assembly participants including flash grenades and undercover police officers. There was aggressive prosecution and prolonged detention of assembly participants.⁵⁹
- *Croatia*: Croatia's law and practice are well-harmonized with international standards. Standardization could limit local authorities' discretion and discrimination and create an independent body to decide bans and restrictions.⁶⁰



- **Northern Macedonia:** The legal framework is strong, although not entirely aligned with international standards and protocols for local authorities and organizers are not all transparent or clear. A number of legal restrictions limit assembly; an “assembly” is restricted to 20 or more people and organizers must pay a fee for policing, in disagreement with OSCE guidelines. (See the box on the following page for more.)⁶¹
- **Moldova:** Despite one of the most liberal frameworks for freedom of assembly in the region, Moldova faces implementation challenges around competing claims for public space, particularly at lower levels of government. Some municipalities and smaller towns close public spaces for official ceremonies. A number of organizations have sent notification years in advance—including, in one case, 80 years—de facto blocking others from being able to assemble at the same time and place. In addition, opposition assembly organizers perceive a difference in treatment from pro-government assemblies. As with other countries in the survey, procedures and protocols regarding the use of force, equipment, and officers remain opaque.⁶²
- **Serbia:** Despite the recent Law on Public Assembly (2016), Serbia has lost ground on the freedom of assembly. In practice, spontaneous assemblies, legal even without any organizer, face restrictions, especially if groups are politically sensitive. Policing and arguably excessive sanctions have restricted assemblies.⁶³
- **Ukraine:** Despite unequivocal progress, Ukraine still lacks a specific law on freedom of assembly. Draft legislation proposes extending military control over peaceful gatherings, despite constitutional protections. Local authorities restrict freedom of assembly through cumbersome processes of notification and authorization. Police lack clear guidelines and training for dealing with public assemblies, including preemptive detentions and unclear identification of officers.⁶⁴ (As mentioned earlier in this section, Ukraine made an early OGP commitment on the fundamental right to assembly.)

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Photo page 21 by Mindstorm, Adobe Stock



Emerging standards on assembly



"Seoul: Hundreds of thousands of people gather to demand the ouster of President Park Geun-hye, 2016."
Photo by Getty Images

OSCE Guidance on Freedom of Assembly

Starting in 2007, the regional Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) produced guidelines to assist members in aligning their legislation with agreed European and international standards on freedom of assembly.⁶⁵ The standards are part of a broader program of support, which includes LegislatiOnline.org, a database that collects good examples of national legislation on freedom of assembly. This effort aims to provide countries with different models to regulate the right to free assembly.

The guidelines draw on international and regional treaties to establish minimum protections of the right to assembly. The guidelines address:

- Legitimate grounds for restrictions,
- Procedural issues (including spontaneous assemblies and counter-demonstrations),
- Independent monitoring of assemblies, and
- Use of force and monitors for independent oversight of assembly.

For example, the guidelines state that no permission should be needed to assemble and that laws should presume peaceful assembly. While most countries have a constitutional guarantee of freedom of assembly, most existing legislation may not make such assumptions explicit. Armenia, for example, has this right in its constitution, but passed an enacting law in 2008 guaranteeing no unreasonable restriction to the exercise of assembly.⁶⁶

Finally, the guidelines underscore the importance of working with different stakeholders in the drafting and implementation of related laws. The guidelines are currently under revision and will receive a third update in 2019.

General Comment on Article 21 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The United Nations High Commission for Human Rights (OHCHR) is preparing a general comment on the right of freedom of assembly during the writing and publication of this report. General comments are non-legally binding, but authoritative interpretations of existing international law. The goal of the comment is to give legal guidance for states in how to implement the abstract right laid out in the Covenant. This can assist OGP members wishing to implement assembly commitments.

International Finance Corporation (IFC) Good Practice Handbook

The IFC is the World Bank's private sector promotional arm. It has developed standards for the use of private security forces under

the organization's "Performance Standard 4," which requires private companies to consider security risks both to and from communities. This is especially important in emerging markets where major infrastructure investments often conflict with local needs. The standard provides good practices for security-community relations, community engagement, women's voices, proportional response, and compliance with human rights protocols, including assembly. This includes establishing robust preventative measures and formal grievance mechanisms.⁶⁷

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)

Less ambitious in its overall scope than other standards, but unique as it comes from an industry association, INGAA's "Guidelines for Contractors to Prepare for Onsite Protests" outlines processes for risk-management and de-escalation with communities on large-scale infrastructure projects.⁶⁸ The guidelines primarily focus on managing fallout from protests and do not explicitly deal with individual or community rights to publicly voice concern about major projects.



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- ⁶³ Katarina Golubović, Milan Filipović, and Milena Vasić, *Monitoring the Right to Free Assembly: 2017–2018 Serbia* (ECNL and ICNL, Jan. 2019), <http://ecnl.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Serbia-Monitoring-assembly-report-2018.pdf>.
- ⁶⁴ Liubov Halan, *Monitoring the Right to Free Assembly: 2017–2018 Ukraine* (ECNL and ICNL, Dec. 2018), http://ecnl.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Ukraine_Monitoring-report-2017-2018.pdf.
- ⁶⁵ OSCE, *Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly*, 2nd ed. (Warsaw/Strasbourg: 2010), <https://www.osce.org/odihr/73405?download=true>.
- ⁶⁶ OSCE, *Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly*, 2nd ed. (Warsaw/Strasbourg: 2010) 37, <https://www.osce.org/odihr/73405?download=true>.

- ⁶⁷ IFC, *Good Practice Handbook: Use of Security Forces: Assessing and Managing Risks and Impacts*, Guidance for the Private Sector in Emerging Markets (Feb. 2017), https://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/ab19adc0-290e-4930-966f-22c119d95cda/p_handbook_SecurityForces_2017.pdf?MOD=AJPERES.
- ⁶⁸ The INGAA Foundation, Inc., “Guidelines for Contractors to Prepare for Onsite Protests” (16 Jun. 2017), <https://www.ingaa.org/File.aspx?id=32565>.



OGP Global Report

Civic Space

Defending Activists and Journalists



Key points


Without activists and journalists, open government is severely weakened. They serve as critical intermediaries, connecting public institutions and decision-makers with everyday citizens. They inform and raise awareness of issues—as well as demand accountability when it is needed. Protecting this essential watchdog role also protects the people who use open government every day to create change.

Freedoms required by activists and journalists continue to face threats around the world. This section explores specific challenges within OGP countries and possible solutions. Key findings include:

- **Activists are diverse.** They come from all ages, genders and backgrounds, and have different needs, particularly when it comes to women, LGBT+, and marginalized groups. They are often communities of people, not just individuals or professional organizations.
- **In four out of five OGP countries,** journalists report harassment, often from non-state actors.
- **In a small but notable minority of OGP countries,** activists face harassment, stigmatization, detention, and violence.
- **In 50 OGP countries, there is inadequate investigation** and prosecution of threats against activists and journalists.
- **OGP members can use their action plans to help activists and journalists by limiting harmful practices,** establishing accountability against officials, strengthening investigative and prosecutorial bodies that can redress harms, and proactively communicating the important role journalists play in society.

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Time and again, OGP members have publicly committed to protect expression. All OGP members sign the Open Government Declaration upon joining, committing to create government “that empowers and delivers for citizens” that is “consistent with our commitment to freedom of expression, association, and opinion.”¹

The Paris Declaration, adopted by the OGP Steering Committee on behalf of the membership in 2016, commits to:

protect, consistent with international law, freedom of expression, including for the press and all media, defend the role of journalism as a crucial force for transparency and accountability, and stand up against attacks and detention of journalists.

Moreover, the OGP theory of change upholds civil society engagement as one of the four forces needed for open government reform.

Beyond statements of aspiration, activists and journalists are at the heart of making open government work:

- **They defend the mission and vision of the partnership.** This includes everyone from environmental and human rights defenders—including women’s and youth rights activists—to academics, journalists, and bloggers.
- **They query, vet, and use open and publicly available information.** This helps to promote positive changes in government, build trust, and support political processes. One survey in the US found that 80% of adults believe that news media are “critical or very important” for the country’s democratic system.²

- **They help ensure checks and balances on powerful interests.** In the Philippines, a data-driven approach to governance encouraged local governments (“Barangay”) to use open data to let community members monitor local government budgets and engage in planning.³
- **Their work helps to ensure healthy, inclusive growth.** Recent findings looking at over 200 countries show that where civic freedoms are respected in a country, they correlate with good economic and human development outcomes.⁴

Inversely, when civil society actors are harassed online or in person (either for their activities, gender, sexuality, religion, or ethnicity, etc.), people will be intimidated and fearful to speak out and engage with government. Intimidation includes sexualized violence online, harassment, disclosures of home addresses and workplaces, and threats against civil society actors and family members. This will ultimately erode the free flow of information and collaboration. This often disproportionately impacts women, minorities, and minority viewpoints.

Beyond OGP public declarations, the obligation to protect activists and journalists is enshrined in international and domestic law.

- Article 19 of the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* obligates states to respect, protect, and promote expression and the right to seek information, including enacting domestic legislation.
- According to the Declaration on Human Rights Defenders (1998), these defenders contribute to “the effective elimination of all violations of human rights and [to] fundamental freedoms of peoples and individuals.”⁵
- The UN Human Rights Commission Resolution 33/2 declares states have the obligation to prevent, protect, and prosecute attacks against journalists.⁶

More recently, the UN Human Rights Council appointed a Special Rapporteur on the Situation of

Human Rights Defenders and a Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression.⁷ Similar rapporteurs exist for regional bodies in Africa, Europe, and Latin America. These rapporteurs document abuses, raise awareness of human rights, and build political will for domestic reforms at the national level. The UN specifically set a global target to “ensure public access to information and protect fundamental freedoms, in accordance with national legislation and international agreements,” in Sustainable Development Goal 16.10.

An important note on terminology: this report uses “activists,” but there is increasing international consensus around the term “human rights defenders.” The United Nations General Assembly recognizes “human rights defenders” to include journalists, environmentalists, whistle-blowers, trade unionists, lawyers, teachers, housing campaigners, and others.⁸ In this report, “activist” and “defender” are used interchangeably. This is intentional as this report is primarily aimed at a domestic audience who may not be familiar with the resolutions and terminology of the United Nations and other international organizations. Activists include individuals, organizations, or communities, formal or informal, who engage in civic life. The usage of “activists and journalists” is not intended to undermine or be a substitute for the important legal work done by other organizations.

Additionally, this “Defending Activists and Journalists” section combines findings on freedom of expression with findings on basic human rights institutions. This intends to avoid a conflation of the two elements. The data illustrates that institutions that protect and promote free expression are ineffective, or, where effective in investigating and making recommendations, are unheeded. Again, this is not consistent with international human rights law, but the combination of freedom of expression and human rights institutions aims to make this report useful to domestic reformers.

Threats to activists and journalists

Attacks against activists and journalists are one of the leading threats to open governments and civil society around the world.⁹ Data on both the extent and reach of these dangers is concerning.

- For human rights defenders, Latin America is the most dangerous region, accounting for 85% of the recorded killings of activists in 2017.¹⁰
- For journalists, Afghanistan, India, Mexico, and the US account for the most killings based on figures from Reporters without Borders.¹¹
- Beside governments, non-state actors like organized crime, armed groups, and private (international) companies have targeted activists and journalists that challenge their operations, leading some to claim that harassment and killing have reached a peak unseen for at least a decade.¹²

Threats to activists and journalists are not limited to physical violence. They also include:

Harassment

- *Asset seizure* has been applied to groups and individuals from Azerbaijan to Zambia and the European Union to Turkey; it often has been

against groups working on sensitive topics like anti-corruption, land rights, political opposition activities, human rights, and LGBT+ issues.

- *Travel bans* have been used against leading civil society actors and their families in Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Egypt, and Turkey, among others.
- *Harassment by private actors* can involve death threats and vandalism. In a recent report, the Fundamental Rights Agency asked a variety of CSOs about threats and/or attacks to their staff in the last three years. It found that, “Most CSOs reported mainly verbal and online threats and attacks or being targeted by negative media campaigns and digital security threats. However, as many as 15 organizations [out of 136 respondents] said that their staff or volunteers had been physically attacked for reasons linked to their work. Furthermore, 20 organizations reported damage to their premises (such as vandalism, graffiti and broken windows). At the same time, only a quarter of the organizations that experienced such incidents reported them to the authorities.”¹³



Stigmatization

- *Labeling and vilification.* In Russia, CSOs must register under the *Foreign Agents Law* if they receive any non-domestic funding.¹⁴ Hungary passed similar legislation in 2017.¹⁵ (See the “Freedom of Association” section of the OGP Global Report for more information.)
- *Intimidation.* In the United States, President Trump has regularly assailed the press as an “enemy of the people.” According to the 2019 Freedom House report, “Trump has assailed essential institutions and traditions including the separation of powers, a free press, an independent judiciary, the impartial delivery of justice, safeguards against corruption, and most disturbingly, the legitimacy of elections.”¹⁶

Detention

- Using a state of emergency that was declared in 2016, the Turkish government has since detained at least 50,000 people pending trial, with at least 112 journalists sentenced in 2018 alone.¹⁷
- Police in a number of West African countries, including a few OGP countries, have increasingly detained journalists, including without formal charges.¹⁸

Defamation and legal intimidation

- *SLAPPs* (Strategic Lawsuits against Public Participation) are drawn-out, expensive lawsuits used to silence and harass journalist activists. (See “Good to know: The rise of SLAPPs to silence speech” later in this section for more.)
- *Chilling speech and press.* Use of overly-discretionary slander, defamation,¹⁹ libel, and blasphemy laws.

Criminalization


- *Use of law to restrict association.* In 2018, an outspoken anti-government Filipino news site, the Rappler, was charged with evading taxes.²⁰ Similar charges have been levied against human rights organizations in Kenya.²¹
- *Criminalizing protest.* Ten US states²² have passed laws lessening penalties for injuring demonstrators who block public roads.
- *Criminalizing legal services.* In Europe, there is significant criminalization of providing basic services (including information and legal services) to refugees and migrants.²³

Violence

- *Killings.* Despite the peace accords related to ongoing conflict in the area, the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office shows that 282 community activists and journalists were murdered between January 2016 and February 2018. Additionally, two journalists were killed in Malta and Slovakia in 2017 and 2018 respectively.


Based on a 2018 OGP analysis of 64 OGP countries, a significant group of OGP governments face challenges with the functioning of human rights institutions (37 countries) and freedom of expression (29 countries). Of these countries, most have not used their OGP action plans to undertake reforms to prevent, investigate, and sanction harassment of activists (see Figures 1 and 2). Figure 1 looks at commitments that deal specifically with freedom of expression or the media. Figure 2 looks at the number of countries with commitments to improve human rights protection institutions. (For reasons of precision, these commitments are only coded as relevant to human rights protection if they use the term “human rights” or its equivalent.)

FIGURE 1. A small number of OGP countries with problems in freedom of expression have undertaken commitments



Source: OGP commitments database and CIVICUS Monitor Data coded by IRM staff.²⁴ (n=64)

FIGURE 2. Most OGP countries have problems with human rights investigation and follow-up, but few have used their action plans to address the problem



Source: OGP commitments database and CIVICUS Monitor Data coded by IRM staff.²⁵ (n=64)



OGP major accomplishments to date

Despite the gloomy global picture, some OGP action plans have undertaken steps to defend journalists and activists from different threats and actions coming from governments, companies, and other non-state actors.

- Eleven countries have commitments to strengthen human rights institutions, monitor and comply with recommendations from international human rights conventions, and protect activists, journalists, and human rights defenders from harassment. Seven of these countries have “ambitious” commitments, as assessed by the IRM.²⁶
- However, two-thirds of countries with noteworthy problems do not have commitments addressing these issues in their action plans. This accounts for 30 percent of OGP countries.²⁷

The countries that have made commitments tend to focus on prevention, protection, and sanctions.

Prevention:

- Colombia committed in its second action plan (2015–2017) to create a national archive to document and provide information about past victims of its armed conflict. (See the “Colombia: Opening up information on past abuses” box later in this section.)²⁸
- Norway focused on advancing freedom of information through its foreign and development policy work to promote free expression and counter rising attacks against civil society by state and non-state actors in other countries.²⁹
- Uruguay, in its third action plan, is moving toward an open data approach to look at access to information, including human rights violations under the military dictatorship.³⁰

Protections:

- Croatia committed in its second action plan (2014–2016) to strengthen protection mechanisms for journalists who speak out against censorship.³¹
- Ireland committed in its national action plan (2014–2016) to build a culture of whistleblowing and adopt

national legislation to protect people speaking up. (See the box on the next page.)³²

- Italy focused on implementing its “Declaration of Digital Rights,” which was approved in 2015, as part of its third action plan (2016–2018).³³
- In 2016, Mongolia committed to adopt a new media freedom law based on international standards, which would include protecting journalistic confidentiality. In addition, the government committed to amend the National Broadcasting Law to protect the media from political influence and promote its independence.³⁴

Sanctions:

- Jordan adopted a commitment to track data on human rights related complaints in its action plan (2016–2018). An electronic database was set up to file and track complaints to ensure accountability in the process and escalation of legal cases.³⁵
- Mexico made a commitment in its action plan (2014–2016) to begin a process to address the forced disappearance of people. (See “Mexico: Attempting to address violence against activists and journalists” later in this section.)³⁶
- Montenegro put forward a commitment for the government to resolve crimes against journalists, including the establishment of a task force to look into past and unsolved murders, as its neighbor Serbia had done. (See “Serbia: Ending impunity in the killing of journalists” later in the section.)³⁷

Beyond commitments, the Partnership has taken an active role in addressing problems among members through the OGP Response Policy:³⁸

- The Response Policy was initiated against Hungary after four CSOs submitted a Letter of Concern in July 2015. When the OGP Steering Committee found the claims were valid and relevant, the government of Hungary withdrew from OGP in December 2016.³⁹
- In May 2016, Azerbaijan became the first OGP country to be designated as inactive under the OGP Response Policy.⁴⁰

- In 2018, CSOs involved in OGP brought a Response Policy case regarding spying in Mexico. The case is still open, pending a review of the concern and possible government remedies.⁴¹ (See the “Mexico: Attempting to address violence against activists and journalists” box later in this section for further explanation.)
- In 2016, a case regarding freedom of movement in Israel was raised, but was dismissed as the party bringing the claim lacked standing.⁴²
- A letter of concern was filed against Turkey. The filing party lacked standing because Turkey had not had a working OGP structure for several years. Consequently, in September 2016, Turkey was designated inactive by the OGP Steering Committee after failing to provide a national action plan developed with partners for two consecutive cycles.⁴³
- A final letter filed concerning the government of Australia was found to be without factual merit.⁴⁴



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Ireland: Shifting protections and culture about whistleblowers

Whistleblowers serve a critical social function by flagging neglect or abuses in the public and private sector. Having the right to speak out about alleged abuses—such as corruption or harassment—is essential for a safe environment and culture for everyone. However, these individuals need adequate protections and social acceptance to be able to fulfill this role.⁴⁵

Ireland used its national action plan (2014–2016) to begin to encourage, protect, and raise awareness about whistleblower duties and protections (as outlined under Ireland’s Protected Disclosures legislation).⁴⁶ The law was passed in 2014 during the first year of the action plan and was developed in close cooperation with civil society. It has been considered among the most comprehensive whistleblowing laws in the European Union as it covers the reporting of abuses in all sectors of society.

Ireland’s inclusion of whistleblowing in its action plan was considered transformative and a starred commitment. An independent assessment of the plan classified it as being completed within two years and having an “outstanding” effect on opening up government.⁴⁷ The government, through the Department of Public Expenditure and Reform (DPER), worked with trade unions, CSOs and associations representing employers to carry out the commitment and pass legislation. The timing was optimal; a bill for whistleblowing legislation was just being discussed as the action plan was being developed.

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Photo by Ronstik, Adobe Stock



The data shows the need for change

In spite of laudable advances within the context of action plans, data from V-Dem, World Justice Project, and Freedom House show that many OGP countries continue to experience severe challenges, especially journalist harassment and follow up by institutions investigating human rights violations. This section looks at these challenges across three categories: free press, free expression, and human rights institutions.

Free press


Many OGP countries have problems upholding free press; powerful actors directly harass the press and, in some cases, the media self-censors its work. Figures 3 and 4 analyze data from two

sources (V-Dem and Freedom House), and show that journalists face threats worldwide, some severe, even in OGP member countries.

- The majority of OGP countries have journalists who are harassed (by government or other actors). This is true in roughly four out of every five OGP countries, according to V-Dem data.
- People surveyed in 48 OGP countries feel that journalists face threats, punishment, or imprisonment for their work according to the World Justice Project.
- Over two-thirds of OGP countries face severe to moderate constraints to a free and independent media, according to Freedom House.

FIGURE 3. In many OGP countries journalists face severe harassment


Are individual journalists harassed—i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed—by governmental or powerful non-governmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities? (n=78)




Source: V-Dem v2meharjrn (3.11.8), Version 8 (April 2018).

FIGURE 4. Some OGP countries have weaker environment for independent media

Are there free and independent media? (n=79)



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, D1.



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Serbia: Ending impunity in the killing of journalists

For journalists' access to justice, there must be mechanisms to ensure investigations and prosecutions for crimes against them. One good example of this is the Commission for the Investigation into the Murders of Journalists, which Serbia established to re-examine old cases that ended in impunity.⁴⁸

The commission was established in 2012 in response to violence against journalists following the breakup of former Yugoslavia in 1992. Over 40 journalists disappeared or were killed in the country since that time, with very few of the cases being concluded.

The Commission has several working groups, all led by the Ministry of Interior, and its work is highly transparent. In addition to the ministry, the Commission includes representatives of professional journalists and representatives of the Security Information Agency (BIA), Serbia's national security body.⁴⁹ Three cases have been brought to justice. A public awareness campaign,⁵⁰ which won an award at the 2014 Cannes Lions International Festival of Creativity, was also launched to engage the public about the Commission's work.⁵¹

While Serbia continues to have challenges with press freedom, the Commission is considered an example whose model is exportable. Neighboring country, Montenegro, has since set up a similar body.

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LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Mexico: Attempting to address violence against activists and journalists

The Mexican justice system suffers from lack of judicial independence and is part of a broader environment of impunity.⁵² Their second OGP action plan states that only between 1 and 2 percent of committed crimes resulted in sentencing and many individuals (96 percent) do not report crimes at all due to fear, corruption, and/or the lack of faith in Mexico’s institutions to respond. With disappearances being a severe problem in the country, this lack of criminal justice means that many cases are going unreported and not investigated. In 2014, this came to an acute head with the forced disappearance, and likely killing of 43 student teachers while travelling to a demonstration in Iguala, Guerrero.

Mexico’s 2016 action plan committed to analysis of the patterns of disappearances, a mechanism to track them, and publication of open data about the cases. This would build upon a prior action plan (2013–2015), where Mexico made related commitments to gather and publish data about disappearances and provide information on people that have been detained. Those two commitments were fully completed.⁵³

Unfortunately, these efforts lost momentum when it was discovered that the government had used spyware to harass activists, including civil society members of the “Tripartite Commission” responsible for governing OGP. The government is currently under review by the OGP Support Unit following an OGP Response Policy letter from Mexican organizations.

At the time of writing, the newly appointed Mexican administration has affirmed its commitment to work with civil society to address these concerns. A report outlining the findings of the merits of the original concerns is to be completed by the first quarter of 2019. Based on these findings, and the responses provided by the government, an update and report will be prepared and presented to the OGP Steering Committee at its next meeting in May 2019.

Photo by Edgard Garrido, Reuters


Free expression

While most OGP countries are relatively strong on issues of free expression for CSOs and individuals, notable constraints remain in over 40 percent of OGP countries (see Figure 5). Moreover, OGP countries are not immune to some of the worst violations:

- **Retaliation:** In five OGP countries, CSOs face retaliation for opposition viewpoints.
- **Killings and disappearances:** In 11 countries, dissidents are “likely” or “very likely” to be imprisoned or killed by agents of the state.
- **Extrajudicial detention:** In 14 countries, respondents stated that activists are “likely” or “very likely” to face extrajudicial detention.
- **Extrajudicial search:** In 17 countries, activists or dissidents are “likely” or “very likely” to experience warrantless searches.

FIGURE 5. In a large minority of OGP countries, individuals expressing political views fear surveillance and retribution


Are individuals free to express their views on political or other sensitive topics without fear of surveillance or retribution? (n=79)



Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2018, D4.

FIGURE 6. In most OGP countries, civil society organizations can speak against the government without fear of retribution

In practice, civil society organizations in [COUNTRY] can freely express opinions against government policies and actions without fear of retaliation. (n=65)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 134.





"European Court of Human Rights." Photo by Svetavo, Adobe Stock

Human rights institutions

When human rights violations occur, there is often inadequate reporting, investigation, or follow up, leading to impunity of the violators. This may be because the institutions responsible for protecting human rights do not or cannot investigate or report. Alternately, reporting might occur, but justice is not carried out.

Human rights institutions are bodies set up to protect basic human rights, as proscribed in international and domestic law. While there is much attention paid to international or supranational human rights institutions, OGP is better positioned to improve these institutions at the national level. Some of these bodies are judicial (determining facts and law), some are single-purpose (e.g., truth and reconciliation commissions), and others address human rights across a variety of issues.⁵⁴ In some cases, these institutions provide temporary relief, including accompaniment, safe havens, or evacuation.

Data show a perceived lack of protections against and sanctions for human rights abuses. Organizations tasked with investigating human rights violations are seen as ineffective or not taken seriously by authorities (see Figures 7 and 8).


Additionally, Figures 7 and 8 illustrate some of the causes for impunity in OGP countries. Figure 7 shows that almost all OGP countries included in the Rule of Law Index have either a human rights institution, an ombudsman's office, or their equivalent. But in many of the countries, these institutions are ineffective or do not take on major issues. Only 12 countries surveyed have effective institutions.

Figure 8 shows that, even though there are effective institutions in those countries, only half see their findings taken forward to corrective action. Experts in the majority of countries surveyed find there is little action taken on the findings of these institutions.

These findings suggest that in a number of OGP countries, basic investigative powers and independence may be an essential first step. However, in a larger group, creating the means to ensure that findings are acted upon is perhaps more important.

FIGURE 7. In most OGP countries, human rights institutions are slow in responding to abuses

Experts chose the statement that was closest to their views on how the National Human Rights Institution (ombudsman) operates in practice in their country. (n=64)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 15.

Key for Figure 7:

(a) The institution is effective in investigating human rights violations.

(b) The institution starts investigations into human rights violations, but is limited in its effectiveness.


The institution may be slow or unwilling to take on politically sensitive issues.

(c) The institution does not effectively investigate human rights violations.

(d) There is no such institution in my country.

FIGURE 8. In most OGP countries, corrective action for human rights abuses is slow to occur

In practice, the reports issued by the national human rights institution/ombudsman are taken seriously by the authorities, with negative findings drawing prompt corrective action. Figures for OGP countries. (n=63)



Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 16.





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Colombia: Opening up information on past abuses

As part of its second action plan (2015–2017), Colombia committed to create a national archive on human rights and historical memory to document the victims of its armed conflict.⁵⁵ During the conflict, an estimated 220,000 people died and more than 7 million people were internally displaced.

In the first year, nearly 230,000 documents were made public. This number rose to 240,000 during the second year.

This collection of information about the conflict in an open data format is critical for helping the country in its process of national reconciliation.

Colombia also has included a commitment to create an integrated information system to track the completion of commitments after the peace agreements as part of its third action plan (2017–2019).⁵⁶ This step is important as Colombia continues to suffer an escalation of attacks against journalists and activists after the signing of these agreements.⁵⁷

Photo by LM Spencer, Adobe Stock

The rise of SLAPPs to silence speech



"Memorial to slain investigative journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia." Photo by Ethan Doyle White, Wikimedia

Daphne Caruana Galizia was a journalist who reported on government corruption in Malta before she was brutally murdered in a car bomb in October 2017. Before her death, Caruana Galizia faced non-stop harassment, including death threats, arson, and lawsuits.⁵⁸ At the time of her death, she faced 47 libel suits from those who wanted to end her reporting, indicative of a growing trend of using strategic lawsuits against public participation, known as SLAPPs, to silence journalists and activists.⁵⁹

What are SLAPPs?

SLAPPs are lawsuits used to harass and intimidate CSOs or individuals, notably environmental and human rights defenders. Plaintiffs usually do not expect to win. Instead, they use the lawsuits to damage the reputation of their critics and force them to spend time and money on legal proceedings. Although many SLAPPs involve defamation claims, they can take many forms and are particularly harmful in places where legal costs are high, speech laws are flexible, and safeguards are non-existent.⁶⁰ As an instrument for powerful interests to silence their critics, SLAPPs pose a clear threat to freedom of speech.

What is the solution?

In response to the murder of Caruana Galizia, Malta decriminalized defamation in April 2018, although no anti-SLAPP provisions were enacted.⁶¹ Elsewhere, anti-SLAPP statutes are slowly taking hold in places like the U.S., Australia, and Canada.⁶² In Ontario, a member of the OGP Local Program, recent legal cases are clarifying how courts can interpret anti-SLAPP statutes to balance freedom of speech and the right to defend oneself.⁶³

Still, more work needs to be done. As a result, future OGP commitments could focus on implementing anti-SLAPP statutes and regulations that:

- Establish penalties for those who file abusive lawsuits, including fines;
- Allow for the early dismissal of abusive lawsuits in court; and
- Enable the recovery of legal costs incurred by defendants who face abusive lawsuits.⁶⁴

Closing the gaps in OGP countries

Given the global backsliding on freedom of expression and civic space, OGP members must create a line of defense to protect activists and journalists. There is a need to continue to benchmark OGP countries against non-OGP countries to see how governments in the Partnership are performing. Current findings suggest OGP countries are doing only slightly better than non-members in defending activists and journalists.⁶⁵

The challenge is how to stop and reverse these negative trends, starting with OGP countries. There are specific dimensions that need to be taken into account when thinking through the right approach:

- **Ensure that responses to other threats are legal and proportionate:** Often, violations against activists are claimed in the name of national security or anti-corruption. Such laws may be distorted to attack activists and journalists.⁶⁶ Currently, these attacks have extended to legislation around cybersecurity, including in OGP member countries.⁶⁷ Responses to threats should be proportionate, specifically targeted to actual threats, and based on law consistent with international standards.
- **Focus on ending impunity:** Often attacks against civil society—particularly journalists—go unpunished and unacknowledged. Findings suggest journalists’ killers go free in nine out of ten cases.⁶⁸ This requires a systemic approach—perhaps through action plan commitments—that target broader access to justice initiatives to protect activists and journalists, including police investigations, access to legal counsel, guaranteed due process, and witness protection. Essential to this is an independent and non-susceptible judiciary.
- **Consider the unique needs of all victims:** Evidence has shown that repression, harassment, and violence can manifest differently against women and minority groups (including sexual, racial, and religious minorities).⁶⁹ For example, rape and sexualized attacks are deployed to silence women’s groups.⁷⁰ In thinking through OGP commitments, women’s rights, indigenous rights, and LGBT+ rights

organizations have unique and specific political demands that must be heard and which require specific commitments.⁷¹

The findings are clear: activists and journalists are fundamental to both open government and a healthy, engaged civil society. Defending the critical role they play should be a consideration of any OGP country, particularly given the reach and severity of the challenges they face. Reflecting the difficult realities described above, the next generation of OGP commitments could include a number of concrete steps for prevention, protection, and sanctions. (See “Guidance and Standards” box in this section for detailed sample commitments to promote and protect free and independent media.)

Actions for prevention

Data

- Collect official open data (e.g., reports filed on killings, harassment, other forms of violence against civil society actors, and the number of cases investigated and prosecuted) with adequate privacy protections, especially where threats include sexual assault.

Capacity building

- Establish training programs on respecting and protecting expression. All state authorities responsible for protecting journalists and freedom of expression should participate.
- Ensure CSOs know their rights and obligations under the law, and facilitate access to counsel, including sound legal and accounting advice.
- Engage organizations representing women and other minorities in crafting solutions to harassment and violence.
- Establish training programs on physical, digital, and psychological safety for CSOs.
- Educate and engage broader the civil society about their obligations to publicly defend activists and journalists, including online.

Media environment

- Increase international pressure on state-led harassment, detention, or killing; establish rules and protections for press freedom in digital and print media; establish guidance on safety of journalists; and create conditions for greater media pluralism.
- Involve civil society and media outlets in the development of laws around media ownership to encourage media pluralism while ensuring legality, minimal interference, and proportionality in response. This may include negotiating rules independence of state-funded media, political party ownership of media, or ownership registries.
- Improve media access to all government institutions.
- Assess, reform, and revise rules on content and defamation as needed in consultation with media and civil society.

Actions for protection

- Adopt, implement, and report on whistleblower protections, aligned with global best practice and standards.
- Provide rapid early-warning, and emergency support to activists (including security, relocation, travel, work, and family assistance).
- Guarantee effective protection of female and LGBT+ media and civil society actors from gender-related dangers of their work.

Sanctions

- Remove statute of limitations to investigate crimes against the freedom of expression.
- Set out strong protections to investigate and prosecute violence against journalists and other civil society actors (ensuring access to justice).
- Establish adequate levels of compensation for victims of crimes against activists and journalists.
- Provide judicial remedy (such as sanctions) against countries where there are cases of impunity for attacks against activists and journalists.



Sample commitments for enabling media environment



Photo by Esebene, Adobe stock

Commitments that ensure an enabling environment for a free and independent media perfectly align with OGP's founding declaration and underlying pillars: transparency, accountability, and participation.

Whistleblowers

- Action area: Adopt, implement, and report on whistleblower protections that are aligned with global best practices and standards.
- Action: Inform the public of whistleblowing rights, including disseminating relevant information on protections and mechanisms.
- Action: Ensure competent authorities have the mandate, power, and resources to facilitate and protect whistleblowing, especially where adequate channels of whistleblowing do not exist.

Content rules

- Action area: Assess, reform, and revise as needed rules on content (e.g., libel and defamation laws, censorship, and hate speech provisions) and on media regulation

(e.g., public and private broadcasting rules).

- Action: Reform laws to depenalize criminal defamation and ensure press freedoms.
- Action: Work with companies and civil society organisations to establish fact-checking initiatives around electoral processes.
- Action: Guarantee and protect the media's right to investigate, criticize, and express opinions.
- Action: Develop monitoring mechanisms to provide track the internationally-agreed targets of the SDG process.
- Action: Ensure media regulations promote a free, independent, and diverse media.

Access

- Action area: Provide the media with open access to all government institutions.
- Action: Permit media to record (audio/visual) and disseminate (e.g., television, radio, print, and online) all parliamentary committee hearings and discussions.

- Action: Establish media and press centers in all government ministries and institutions, and provide for formal and regular press conferences.
- Action: Put in place rules on open meetings so that all decision-making meetings are open by default and may be closed only for appropriate reasons (such as to protect privacy).

Protections

- Action area: Establish strong protections to prevent, investigate, and prosecute violence against journalists.
- Action: Establish government protection programs for at-risk journalists, including early warning and rapid-response mechanisms.
- Action: Set up investigative programs and provide resources to investigate and prosecute threats to, and attacks on, freedom of expression.
- Action: Remove statute of limitations to investigate crimes against the freedom of expression.
- Action: Guarantee effective protection of female journalists and other female media actors from gender-related dangers of their work.
- Action: Establish training programs for all state authorities responsible for protecting journalists and freedom of expression.

Ownership

- Action area: Review, amend, and align national broadcasting and media laws to ensure diversity, independence, and transparency of ownership.

- Action: Track and publish the beneficial owners of media companies as part of a government's broader open data policy.
- Action: Review and update cross-ownership rules to ensure diversity, independence, and transparency of media ownership.
- Action: Establish a regulatory framework and commission to cap media ownership shares, monitor media concentration, and review licensing.
- Action: Establish mechanisms for the public to participate in the review and approval of media licensing and mergers and acquisitions.

Online access

- Action area: Establish laws and other necessary measures to ensure a free and open internet.
- Action: Prevent illegal internet shutdowns and the blocking of specific sites.
- Action: Establish a comprehensive open internet regulatory framework.
- Action: Establish internet connectivity as a basic right, with appropriate pricing mechanisms to ensure universal access and minimal restrictions.
- Action: Establish government strategies and frameworks for increasing connectivity among specific and/or marginalized groups in a country.
- Action: Update and maintain robust net neutrality regulations to ensure no throttling, blocking, or paid prioritization of content.



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OGP Global Report

Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Open Contracting • Beneficial Ownership



Photo by Kali9, Getty Images

Anti-corruption initiatives

Approach

The topic of anti-corruption is broad and deserves multiple reports of its own. However, this report looks at two policy areas where OGP members have used their action plans to drive significant results: open contracting and disclosure of beneficial ownership of companies. They represent two of the most promising areas of focus, as OGP continues to play a major role in catalyzing reform.

Themes and findings

- **Involve users from the start**

Open contracting data in particular works better when end-users (such as journalists, businesses, or non-governmental organizations) have the opportunity to shape how it is presented and argue for how it would be used.

- **Reforms drive results and accountability**

Identifying means by which people can register complaints or flag suspect activity is core to ensuring that this data achieves impact. In addition,

procurement, licensing, and tax reforms can yield: (1) revenue and spending savings; (2) gender equality in procurement improvement; (3) deterrence of tax evasion; (4) increased trust in bidding processes; and (5) increased competitiveness. These are critical for making the case for these interventions, but also for identifying when, how, and where they are most effective.

- **Data quality needs improvement**

Much of the data in this area is either missing or not systematically entered. In the case of contracts and beneficial ownership, there are major gaps in regular updating. In addition, verification is often weak in both systems. For beneficial ownership, there are also significant loopholes that need to be closed.

- **Standardization and interoperability is key**

When data is released piecemeal, comparison is more difficult within and between jurisdictions.

OGP Global Report

Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Open Contracting



Key points

Open contracting continues to gain momentum, and is on the way to becoming a global norm. Many governments in OGP have assumed open contracting commitments, several of which have led to strong results. Still, important challenges remain that require moving beyond the status quo of contracting reforms:

- **Engaging citizens to utilize contracting data for impact is key.** Most open contracting commitments in OGP focus exclusively on information disclosure and do not include essential ingredients for data usage, such as citizen feedback loops. Engagement with users may be more important than immediate standardization.
- **Higher-quality contracting data is imperative.** A lack of high-quality data continues to present challenges. Timeliness and completeness are essential to ensuring greater impact. In addition, usability is key, specifically, getting data out of PDFs and into a machine-readable format.
- **Empowering women improves both processes and results.** Women are largely excluded from public procurement. Greater gender-disaggregated data collection and disclosure, gender-responsive policies, and citizen engagement would significantly enhance gender equality and drive more inclusive economic growth.





Prourement is an essential component of government spending. Worldwide, governments spend about US\$9.5 trillion—or 15% of global GDP—on contracts with companies to procure goods and services.¹ Procurement constitutes about 30% of government expenditure in high-income countries. In low- and middle-income countries, it makes up an average of 50%.²

Corruption is a major problem during the contracting process. The OECD, the European Commission, and the UN Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC) all cite public procurement as the largest corruption risk for governments.³ According to the UNODC, corruption reduces the value of a public contract by 10 to 25%.⁴ Most bribery cases prosecuted under the OECD Anti-Bribery Convention involved bribery during the contracting process.⁵ The financial cost—not to mention the human cost—of corruption in this sector is significant.

The importance of open contracting goes well beyond anti-corruption. A clear case can be made that it has a significant impact on government efficiency, value for money, and fair competition. A recent study of 3.5 million procurement records across Europe found a clear correlation between publishing more information about tenders and a reduced likelihood of single-bid contracts, equivalent to savings of about €3.6–6.3 billion per year. This study also found that single-bid contracts are 7–10% more expensive.⁶

“Tanjung Priok Port, Jakarta, site of major infrastructure investment.”
Photo by Beawiharta Beawiharta, Reuters



“Road improvements in Kenya.” Photo by Computerwhiz417, Flickr

The case for open contracting

What is open contracting?

At its core, open contracting consists of: 1) the affirmative disclosure of information; and 2) participation, monitoring, and oversight. According to the Open Contracting Partnership (OCP), “open contracting is about publishing and using open, accessible, and timely information on government contracting to engage citizens and businesses in identifying and fixing problems.”⁷ Importantly, open contracting consists of disclosure and engagement throughout the entire chain of procurement, including planning, tendering, awarding, and implementation. It can also cover non-procurement issues such as licensing and extractives contracts.

What are the benefits?

Open contracting can improve value for money, efficiency, competition, quality of services, and public integrity. Open contracting data can enable effective oversight of government services by revealing who is getting paid how much to deliver what, as well as how they were selected, and whether they delivered on time and with quality. This can expose anomalies that alert the public and government officials to procure-

ment processes that are inefficient or uncompetitive, delivered the wrong results, delivered them late, or are too expensive. This, in turn, can help identify kickbacks or collusion during the procurement process. (See the *Idiot’s Guide to Looting Public Procurement and Getting Rich Quickly*⁸ and *Red Flags for Integrity: Giving the Green Light for Open Data Solutions*⁹ for a deeper dive on how to detect anomalies.)

In addition, the transparency of the announcement and awarding of tenders can encourage new, often smaller, companies to participate in public procurement, and clarify demographic differences in who is applying. This, in turn, can promote sustainable development and higher-quality goods and services. The publication and use of open contracting data for monitoring and oversight therefore helps to achieve a number of mutually reinforcing goals:

- Deliver better value for money and efficiency for governments;
- Create fairer competition and a level playing field for business, especially smaller firms;
- Drive higher-quality goods, works, and services for citizens;

- Prevent fraud and corruption; and
- Promote smarter analysis and better solutions for public problems.¹⁰

There is empirical evidence for the advantages of open contracting. A 2017 World Bank study covering 34,000 firms in 88 countries found that greater transparency in the contracting process (as well as effective complaint mechanisms and external auditing systems) leads to greater competition—particularly from smaller firms—and fewer kickbacks to officials.¹¹

Many countries have now reaped the benefits of open contracting. In Ukraine, the ProZorro procurement platform more than doubled the number of private procurement marketplaces. Where three or more companies bid, the Ukrainian government saved on average 30%¹². In addition, the number of suppliers per procuring entity rose dramatically by 45%¹³. In Paraguay, the lower cost of office supplies, achieved by improving the country’s online procurement platform, has saved taxpayers at least PYG 400 billion (about US \$68 million).¹⁴



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Colombia uses open contracting to save school meals

Given documented cases of corruption in the provision of school meals, the government of Colombia published information on the full procurement cycle of Bogota’s school feeding program as part of its 2015–2017 OGP action plan. By reaching out to smaller suppliers, setting minimum and maximum prices, and implementing principles of open contracting, the government achieved savings of 10–15% and more than quadrupled the number of suppliers participating in the procurement process. The transparent tendering process also helped to break up a suspected \$22 million price-fixing scheme.¹⁵

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 “Bogota: Children in public school enjoy competitively contracted lunches.”
 Photo by Secretaría de Educación, Bogotá




Open contracting around the world

Open contracting is an emerging global norm. In 2015, the G20 recognized openness in contracting as a key element in its *Anti-Corruption Open Data Principles*¹⁶ and *Principles for Promoting Integrity in Public Procurement*.¹⁷ At the 2016 UK Anti-Corruption Summit, 14 countries committed to make public procurement open by default, proposing “a concrete vision of accessible, useable data across the entire chain of public contracting” for the first time.¹⁸ Soon afterward, at the 2016 OGP Global Summit, the governments of Colombia, France, Mexico, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine founded the Contracting 5 to advance open contracting.¹⁹ The

Paris Declaration on Open Government, signed by all members of OGP in 2016, pledged to promote open procurement as its first “collective action.”²⁰

At the same time, the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS) has become a global standard for open contracting. As a global, non-proprietary standard, the OCDS defines a common data model for disclosing data and documents at all stages of the contracting process.²¹ Today, 19 countries (at different levels of government) are disclosing procurement data in OCDS format,²² and more than 50 countries are pursuing open contracting more broadly.²³



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Leveraging OGP to implement the OCDS in Nigeria

After joining OGP in 2016, the government of Nigeria made a commitment in its first OGP action plan (2017–2019) to adopt the OCDS in its public procurement systems. The government decided to prioritize reforms in key ministries, including Power, Transportation, Works, Agriculture, Health, Education, Niger Delta, Environment, and Solid Minerals. Importantly, the government committed not only to disclose information in OCDS format, but also to establish a multistakeholder procurement council and train civil society organizations, the private sector, and the media on the use of the new platform as a way of improving citizen engagement in the procurement process.²⁴

.....
“Nkwoji Migrant Fishermen Children School in Anambra, Nigeria, is unfinished due to weak contracting processes.” Photo by PPDC

Open contracting in OGP

Most OGP members have leveraged the OGP platform to promote open contracting. Since the inception of OGP in 2011, more than three quarters of OGP members have made at least one open contracting commitment. Just over half of OGP members have an active open contracting commitment (in either a 2017-2019 or 2018-2020 action plan).²⁵ Indeed, open contracting is now one of the most common policy areas for OGP commitments. In terms of content, this subset of OGP commitments has covered various topics, ranging from establishing data portals with procurement information to aligning contracting data with the OCDS.²⁶

According to the Independent Reporting Mechanism

(IRM), which assesses the quality and implementation of OGP commitments, open contracting commitments achieve better results than other commitments. More than two of every five open contracting commitments achieved significant changes in levels of transparency in procurement.²⁷ This is more than double the rate of “successful” commitments overall.

Still, commitments continue to focus on information disclosure over citizen engagement. For instance, there were no open contracting commitments that achieved significant gains in levels of civic participation or public accountability. As the following section makes clear, involving users is a key next step.

The frontiers of open contracting

Despite the relative strength of open contracting commitments in OGP, several important areas for improvement remain. The rest of this chapter provides a roadmap for advancing the current frontiers of open contracting reforms. In particular, the sections that follow are grouped into three broad suggested areas for reform:

- Engaging users at the sector level
- Disclosing higher-quality data
- Empowering women through open contracting.

Engaging users at the sector level

For many countries, improving utilization of contracting data can be more feasible when focusing on a particular problem or sector, at least to begin with. Working with stakeholders in a particular sector who are trying to solve a concrete set of problems or make bids can be an efficient means of getting more data. It can also be more cost-effective. Different actors will be able to speak to different issues, whether, for example, large infrastructure projects, the construction of hospitals, or the licensing process for petroleum contracts. Importantly, the OCDS is aligned with and can support reforms made through the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative and the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative, as highlighted

in the box “Lessons from reformers: The case for open contracting in infrastructure” later in this section.


For the most part, OGP members are taking a cross-sector or unspecified approach in their open contracting reforms. Only about one of every five open contracting commitments references a specific policy area.

Although most open contracting commitments lack a sectoral focus, those that do reference specific sectors tend to deal with infrastructure and environmental issues. The most common sectors addressed by open contracting commitments are listed on the next page in Figure 1, which reveals that infrastructure is the most common sectoral focus. There are also a handful of open contracting commitments that reference extractive industries, land, and other environmental issues such as climate. Another subset of commitments focuses on contracting in public services, such as education, health, and water. Notably, there are no open contracting commitments that explicitly take gender into account.

Contracting procedures—and the risks associated with them—vary widely across sectors. Given the disparity in contracting policies across sectors, a sector-by-sector approach to open contracting can target particular



FIGURE 1. Many OGP open contracting commitments deal with infrastructure




Source: OGP commitment data, December 2018.²⁸ (n=191)

high-risk areas. For instance, the data from the *World Justice Project's Rule of Law Index* in Figure 2 shows that country experts consider bidding procedures to be stronger for public works than for health. Specifically, legal experts surveyed in OGP countries perceived more formal, albeit flawed, bidding procedures for public works than for public health.²⁹ Money earmarked for infrastructure is often considerably higher, so this is relatively positive. Nonetheless, it underscores the key message that governments can undertake risk assessments to determine the sectors that are most prone to inefficiencies and corruption in their jurisdiction, and plan their open contracting reforms accordingly.

Like open data more broadly, publishing contracting data alone is of course not enough. To achieve improvements in governance, data disclosures must meet several fundamental conditions, such as publicity and space for civic participation. For people to use data, it must be well publicized and usable. In some cases, this might require development and publication of information using portals in a location where users would be likely to find and use it. (As an example, reporters working on the healthcare system might want to see health procurement data on the hospital administration website or environmental organizations might want to see major extractives contracts on the ministry of mining site.)

FIGURE 2. Experts in OGP countries consider bidding procedures in public works to be more open than those in public health

Experts chose the statement that was closest to their views on government procurement on major public works (airports, highways, power plants, etc.) and public health procurement (i.e. money spent on medications, vaccines, medical equipment, buildings, etc.) in their country. (n=65)




Source: World Justice Project, Rule of Law Index 2017-2018, QRQ 46, QRQ 50.

Although open contracting requires data usage and active engagement, most open contracting commitments in OGP have focused exclusively on the disclosure of information. Figure 3 below shows that there are nearly four times as many commitments


centered around information disclosure than around civic participation or public accountability. In addition, about a third of open contracting commitments in OGP specifically refer to open data principles.³⁰

FIGURE 3. Most open contracting commitments are focused on information disclosure



Source: OGP commitment data, December 2018.³¹ (n=193).





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

The case for open contracting in infrastructure

According to the International Monetary Fund, the inefficiencies in public infrastructure—as measured by the gap between the level of public investment and the coverage/quality of the resulting infrastructure—amounts to around 30%.³² In addition, only about one third of OGP countries have an open and competitive bidding process for public works, as illustrated by Figure 2. Open contracting can help to address these issues. In particular, the Construction Sector Transparency Initiative (CoST) is an important mechanism for implementing open contracting in infrastructure through the disclosure of information at key stages of the entire project cycle, an independent review process, multi-stakeholder engagement, and channels for social accountability.

OGP commitments focused on implementing CoST have already achieved important results. In Honduras, the government disclosed data from almost 1,000 infrastructure projects, including public-private partnerships. In Ukraine, a review of more than 120 public road reparation contracts led to the identification of several issues, such as poor-quality works and pricing discrepancies. Perhaps more importantly, these commitments have resulted in both greater civic engagement and concrete policy changes.

Example: Civic Participation Makes a Difference in Malawi

CoST Malawi established several channels for citizens to share their concerns about public infrastructure projects. An SMS messaging service and public radio debates allow citizens to share feedback and question decision-makers. CoST Malawi also made an effort to engage the media through training and “Media Awards” that recognize excellent reporting on key issues in public infrastructure. As for impacts, CoST Malawi helped to terminate a contract on a public road that included poor quality work, as well as a price increase. This outcome mirrors those that CoST has achieved elsewhere, such as ensuring that a defective bridge in Ukraine was repaired and helping to stop environmental pollution on a construction site in Honduras.³³

“Citizens monitor the Canal Seco construction, a new highway connecting the Caribbean with the Pacific.” Photo by CoST Honduras

Essential ingredients for increasing the use of contracting data

Aligning the supply of data with user demands

Past research shows that there is often a mismatch between data supply and demand in OGP countries.³⁴ Many countries develop open data platforms first, and then look to engage stakeholders and encourage use. Instead, identifying and consulting stakeholders before the development of a new contracting platform can help tailor the information disclosures to meet user needs. For example, as part of its most recent OGP action plan, the US government collaborated with investigative journalists and civil society organizations during the design of a new spending data portal to ensure that the end product was useful and usable. The end result was that the data and site (www.usaspending.gov) were developed with two parallel tracks—one for the general public and one for investigators.³⁵

It is important to remember that consulting users means better—not necessarily more—data. Prioritization is important, and involving end users in the initial stages of reform can help governments determine which data fields are most essential for publication.

Making contracting data actionable

Data usage relies on data users having access to usable, actionable data. This often requires translating raw contracting data into new formats that provide insight to different audiences. Setting and tracking key performance indicators, for example, can help users measure progress on particular outcomes. Possible indicators include the percentage of new suppliers that submitted bids, total percent savings, and the percentage of contracts implemented on time. Many relevant resources already exist. The OCP has developed a list of indicators aligned to the end use for contracting data,³⁶ along with guidance on how best to link them to data in OCDS format.³⁷ The OCP has also developed user guides,³⁸ a tools directory,³⁹ and a new tool to collect and analyze OCDS data.⁴⁰

As a way of addressing public integrity in particular, incorporating red-flagging tools can also make the data more actionable for users. These tools, such as those

that Development Gateway developed in collaboration with the OCP, can help detect corruption risks using raw procurement data.⁴¹ As an example, since the end of October 2018, the State Audit Service of Ukraine runs an automatic verification of tenders in the country's e-procurement system based on 35 risk indicators.⁴² Incorporating these kinds of tools into existing systems is much easier when the underlying procurement data is already in a standardized format such as the OCDS. The red flags are also more useful if the data is proactively (and regularly) updated. Without a commitment to timely updating, analysis will be challenging.

Making data interoperable

Another important way to make procurement data more actionable is to link it across key government sectors. For example, data on contractors is more useful when it is tied to beneficial ownership registries or to portals tracking large infrastructure projects. Likewise, data on contracting expenses provides a more complete picture when linked to government budgetary and actual spending data.⁴³ As the OCP acknowledges, this is why the use of unique identifiers in procurement data (as included in the OCDS scheme) is so essential.⁴⁴

Collecting feedback and closing the feedback loops

Governments need to establish clear feedback mechanisms and opportunities for the public to act on the disclosed procurement data, such as by filing complaints, reporting irregularities, or suggesting improvements. Ideally, these mechanisms would be institutionalized and would enable interaction between government, civil society, and the private sector, both within and across sectors. Perhaps more importantly, however, governments need to close the feedback loop by responding to and acting on the feedback received. Effective oversight and continued user engagement requires that oversight bodies hold officials accountable through sanctions or other penalties in response to improper behavior. The DoZorro platform highlighted on the next page in the box, “Lessons from reformers: Empowering citizens as watchdogs in Ukraine,” represents an example of a platform that incentivizes using open contracting data for impact.





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Empowering citizens as watchdogs in Ukraine

After the successful launch of the ProZorro e-procurement platform in 2015, Ukraine launched DoZorro in November 2016 as part of its 2016–2018 OGP action plan.⁴⁵ DoZorro is a public procurement monitoring platform that enables citizens to submit feedback, including alerts of possible irregularities and reports of violations in the public procurement sector. According to the government, more than 700,000 users have visited the website since its launch, flagging nearly 74,000 concerns, of which 20,000 were found to relate to actual violations of public procurement rules and principles.⁴⁶

Most importantly, the government has taken concrete steps to act on the citizen feedback, such as by directing appeals to controlling bodies, changing tenders, and initiating formal investigations.⁴⁷ In this way, the government has created an enabling environment for responding to user complaints. Today, a newly formed monitoring group is working on designing policies that further improve the timeliness and efficiency of the enforcement process. At the same time, Transparency International Ukraine is making progress on technological tools powered by artificial intelligence that reveal the potential of automating the monitoring of violation risks.

Photo by Cabinet Ministers of Ukraine


Disclosing higher-quality contracting data

The usability of online contracting data is a binding constraint. An important factor in achieving impact through the release of contracting data is ensuring that the data is usable. According to the Web Foundation’s Open Data Barometer, OGP countries perform well on the collection and disclosure of contracting information, but less so on measures of data usability, such as timeliness and machine-readability. As Figure 4 below illustrates, all OGP countries currently collect contracting information. More than four out of five OGP countries publish this information online, regardless of

format. However, only about a third of OGP countries publish contracting information in a machine-readable format that would facilitate use.

Completeness of information is also critical. While completeness of contracting information is difficult to measure, it is a key component of the quality of information. Rules and processes can be put in place to ensure that disclosure is the norm. The “Principles for Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts” can serve as a strong starting point.⁴⁸ (See the box, “Guidance and standards: Principles for Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts,” on the next page.)

FIGURE 4. Most OGP countries publish contracting data, but machine readability remains a challenge



Source: Open Data Barometer, 4th and Leaders Edition, 2017-2018.⁴⁹ (n=65)



Center for Global Development Principles for Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts⁵⁰



"Buenos Aires Underground." Photo by Hernán Piñera, Flickr

Transparency by Design

1. Public contracting should be designed for transparency and efficiency.
2. Full contract publication should be the norm.
3. Information needed to judge value for money should be disclosed.

Exceptions in the Public Interest

4. Information should only be redacted for reasons of commercial sensitivity when the public interest in withholding information is greater than the public interest for disclosure.
5. The public interest test should take into account the wider economic benefits of the sharing of commercial information, as well as the case for accountability and the public's right to know.
6. All redactions should be clearly marked with the reason for redaction.

7. Governments should issue clear guidance to public entities, agencies, and firms on contract publication and when information may be exempted from publication for commercial sensitivity reasons.

A Clear and Robust Process


8. Where redaction is potentially allowed, there should be a clear process for determining what is redacted, why, for how long, and with what appeals process.
9. There should be a system for ensuring that contracts and contract information are in fact disclosed in practice.
10. Where exemption to disclosure of information is granted for commercial sensitivity reasons, this should be grounds for increased scrutiny through other oversight mechanisms.

There is also significant room for improvement on other key aspects of open data. Besides machine-readability, other important elements of open data, as found in the Open Definition laid out by Open Knowledge International,⁵¹ are that the data must be free, downloadable all at once, and openly licensed. Figure 5 below shows how well OGP countries perform on these measures as it relates to their contracting data disclosures. The analysis reveals that the cost of the data is not a widespread issue. Rather, issues of open licenses and bulk downloads are much more common. The bottom-most bar in the graph shows that only about 1 in 10 OGP countries fulfill all of these key open data requirements.

According to this definition, the Open Data Barometer considers that only seven OGP countries are disclosing open contracting data.

In terms of data coverage, there is room for expanded scope beyond procurement. While countries still need to do much more to cover the full scope of public contracts, including goods, services, and infrastructure, they will also need to expand to contracts related to public-private partnerships and major concessions or licenses, including oil and gas contracts (in line with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative).

FIGURE 5. Few OGP countries meet the key elements of open data disclosure as it relates to contracting



Source: *Open Data Barometer, 4th and Leaders Editions, 2017-2018.*⁵² (n=65)



Empowering women through open contracting

Women are largely excluded from public procurement. Although public procurement makes up 15% of GDP worldwide, the International Trade Centre (ITC) estimates that women entrepreneurs win only 1% of all public contracts.⁵³ The ITC cites limited access to information on bids, a lack of understanding about procedures, and an inability to meet requirements as significant barriers for women entrepreneurs.⁵⁴ Public procurement policy is therefore an important tool that governments can utilize to actively promote gender equality.

Greater participation by women in government procurement makes sense financially. Expanding women's access to public procurement opportunities can have important spillover effects on the economy. For example, women entrepreneurs reinvest up to 90% of their earnings in their families and communities, compared to 35% for men, which highlights the role of women-owned businesses as an important engine for growth.⁵⁵ Women-owned businesses also tend to employ more women than men (40% of women-owned businesses employ a majority of women).⁵⁶ In addition, inclusion of women in the contracting process can alter the implementation of a project, especially in situations where women are disproportionately affected, such as displacement.⁵⁷

How to get started: data collection, disclosure, and citizen engagement

Collecting and disclosing data

There is a general lack of gender-disaggregated contracting data,⁵⁸ which can make it difficult to identify how effectively women-owned businesses are participating in the public procurement process. As a result, one of the most important first steps is to collect and disclose better data on women-owned businesses. (See the box, "Good to know: Defining a women-owned business," for definitions.) Data on the

GOOD TO KNOW

Defining a "women-owned business"

While definitions vary across contexts, it is essential that definitions incorporate a woman's direct ownership of the company as well as day-to-day control. For example, in the United States, a women-owned small business is defined as a business that has 1) at least 51% ownership and control by one or more women who are US citizens and 2) women who manage day-to-day operations and make long-term decisions. Definitions should also be uniform across government agencies to ensure meaningful data.

basic questions below would set important baselines and help identify the scope of the problem:

- How many women-owned businesses are in the country or region?
- How many women-owned businesses are registered as government contractors?
- How many women-owned businesses are submitting tenders for government contracts?
- How many women-owned businesses are receiving contract awards?
- What percentage of procurement spending is awarded to women-owned businesses?
- How many women-owned businesses are prequalified for approved vendor lists?⁵⁹



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Inclusive contracting in Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kenya

Although Kenya’s Access to Government Procurement Opportunities (AGPO) program⁶⁰ requires that 30% of procurement opportunities be allocated to women, youth, and people with disabilities, these groups still face significant obstacles (related to finance and expertise) in the procurement market. Unfortunately, unethical contractors have taken advantage by using proxies to capitalize on the AGPO policy.⁶¹

To address these issues, as part of its first OGP action plan in 2017, the county government held a training specifically for special interest groups—including women, youth, and people with disabilities—on how to access government procurement opportunities. This work continues in the current 2018–2020 action plan, in which the government commits to implement several policies aimed at further involving the public in the procurement process and, in particular, combating the abuse of AGPO so that special interest groups can take full advantage of procurement opportunities.

.....
Photo by Elgeyo-Marakwet, Open Government Partnership



While disaggregating contracting data by women-owned businesses is a basic first step, further disaggregation of the data would provide additional insights. For example, disaggregating women-owned businesses by new versus existing businesses, or by other minority or protected class status could help measure the success of targeted outreach efforts over time. Similarly, it would be useful to track the quality of implementation, as well as the distribution of prime contracts versus subcontracts awarded to women. (See “Lessons from reformers: Inclusive contracting in Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kenya” on the previous page for an example of practice in OGP.)

Engaging citizens to design gender-responsive policies

Beyond disclosing data on the participation of women-owned businesses in public procurement, governments could engage women’s business groups and civil society more broadly to develop gender-responsive procurement policies. There are a variety of reforms that governments can implement to address the low involvement of women in public procurement, such

as establishing mandatory goals or targets, instituting preferences for women-owned businesses, or carrying out capacity-building programs. Regardless of the policy, governments should actively collaborate with civil society—women’s business groups in particular—to ensure that policies take into account the particular challenges that women entrepreneurs face when they try to access public procurement markets.

Given that limited access to information is a significant barrier for women entrepreneurs, governments could also devote resources to raising awareness of tender opportunities and instructions on how to submit bids. While this information may already be online in public contracting platforms, sharing information directly with women’s business organizations and other associations can be a more effective way of overcoming common hurdles, such as lack of internet access. (See “Lessons from reformers: Inclusive contracting in Elgeyo-Marakwet, Kenya” and “Lessons from reformers: Using data on women-owned businesses in Albania” for examples of practice in OGP.)



“A meeting of advocates for women-owned businesses meet to discuss progress on open contracting.”
Photo by Albanian Institute of Science

LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Using data on women-owned businesses in Albania

In 2016, the Albanian Institute of Science (AIS)—one of the CSOs engaged in the OGP process in Albania—conducted a study using data on women-owned businesses. The study revealed that:

- women-owned businesses in Albania receive 5% of municipal contracts, which accounts for only 3.2% of total municipal procurement;
- contracts awarded to women entrepreneurs tend to be more cost-effective;
- larger municipalities award mostly lower-value contracts to women-owned businesses; and
- 11 municipalities did not award any contracts to women entrepreneurs.

In March 2017, AIS hosted a public discussion with experts from government and civil society on how to overcome the challenges faced by women-owned businesses and to debate a series of new government initiatives focused on supporting women entrepreneurs. As a result, the analysis of publicly available data on women-owned businesses set important baselines, enabled stakeholders to track the performance of individual government institutions, and facilitated a more-informed discussion on how to increase women’s participation in public procurement.⁶²

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- ²⁷ Please note that the IRM carries out this assessment after the end of the action plan cycle and first began measuring this variable in 2016. For this reason, the sample size here is smaller than the overall pool of open contracting commitments.
- ²⁸ This graph only includes commitments that are relevant to both procurement/licensing and the OGP values of access to information, civic participation, or public accountability. Commitments from non-assessed action plans are also included.
- ²⁹ For more details about these indicators and how they are measured, please see the methodology document published by the World Justice Project for the Rule of Law Index, available here: https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/ROLIndex2017-2018_Variables_FINAL.pdf.
- ³⁰ This information is derived using the “Open Data” tag in the OGP Commitment Database. For more information about this tag and others referenced in this report, please see the method chapter.
- ³¹ Note that these categories are not mutually exclusive, i.e., a commitment can be relevant to multiple core values of OGP. This graph does not include commitments from non-IRM-assessed action plans.
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- ³⁵ OGP, “Commitment 32. Spending Transparency,” <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/32-spending-transparency/>.
- ³⁶ OCP, “Use case guide: Indicators linked to OCDS #public,” https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1j-Y0ktZiOyhZzi-2GSabBCnzx6fF5lv8h1KYwi_Q9GM/edit#gid=612001000.
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- ³⁹ The tools directory is available via Airtable at: <https://airtable.com/shrzycSNYRcmVOWSZ/tblhHNGcDXuievZ74?-blocks=hide>.
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- ⁴² Transparency International Ukraine, “DoZorro Artificial Intelligence to Find Violations in ProZorro: How It Works,” (2 Nov. 2018), <https://ti-ukraine.org/en/news/dozorro-artificial-intelligence-to-find-violations-in-prozorro-how-it-works/>.
- ⁴³ See this study from Paraguay for an example of how open contracting is being used to compare planned and actual spending: <https://www.open-contracting.org/2019/02/22/a-case-study-on-how-paraguay-could-save-millions-by-reducing-late-payments-in-public-procurement/>.
- ⁴⁴ OCP, Using it, not losing it, over procurement data.
- ⁴⁵ OGP, “Commitment 08 Open Public Procurement” (2016), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/commitment/08-open-public-procurement>.
- ⁴⁶ Email correspondence from Nataliia Oksha, Secretary of the OGP Coordinating Council and Deputy Director of the Department of Information and Communication, Government of Ukraine. Received by the Report team on 29 Mar. 2019.
- ⁴⁷ Granickas, “Learning insights, the latest impacts emerging from Ukraine’s Prozorro reforms.”
- ⁴⁸ Center for Global Development: The Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts Working Group, Principles on Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts, <https://www.cgdev.org/sites/default/files/contract-transparency-principles-cgd.pdf>.
- ⁴⁹ The graph is built using the latest data for each OGP country, either from the Leaders Edition (published in 2018) or the 4th Edition (published in 2017). For consistency, 4th edition scores were adjusted to match the method used in the Leaders Edition.
- ⁵⁰ Guidance and standards are taken from Center for Global Development, The Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts Working Group, Principles on Commercial Transparency in Public Contracts.
- ⁵¹ Open Definition 2.1 is available at: <https://www.opendefinition.org/od/2.1/en>.



- ⁵² The graph is built using the latest data for each OGP country, either from the Leaders Edition (published in 2018) or the 4th Edition (published in 2017). For consistency, 4th edition scores were adjusted to match the method used in the Leaders Edition.
- ⁵³ Keric Chin, Empowering Women Through Public Procurement (International Trade Centre, 2014), <http://www.intracen.org/uploadedFiles/intracenorg/Content/Publications/Women%20procurement%20guide-final-web.pdf>.
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- ⁵⁵ Clinton Global Initiative, “Empowering Girls & Women,” <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/phlntrpy/notes/clinton.pdf>.
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- ⁶¹ OGP, “01 Transparent public procurement” (2018), <https://www.opengovpartnership.org/commitment/01-transparent-public-procurement>.
- ⁶² OCP, “Using open data to boost business opportunities for women in Albania” (7 Mar. 2018), <https://medium.com/opencontracting/using-open-data-to-boost-business-opportunities-for-women-in-albania-473296de4f27>.

OGP Global Report

Anti-Corruption Initiatives

Beneficial Ownership

Key points

Beneficial ownership transparency has emerged as an essential means for combating corruption, stemming illicit financial flows, and fighting tax evasion. In response, governments as diverse as Denmark, Kenya, Nigeria, and the United Kingdom have committed to publish beneficial ownership information.¹ Compared to the larger OGP membership, however, still very few have made commitments to date. Moving forward, there are four key issues to be addressed by new beneficial ownership commitments:

- **Strengthening the disclosure requirements.** Reinforcing underlying legal and regulatory requirements for disclosure of different types of ownership across various legal vehicles is fundamental to more effective, transparent processes.
- **Improving the interoperability of information.** Applying common standards such as the Beneficial Ownership Data Standard and linking ownership information with other policy areas can help to track money and assets across sectors and jurisdictions.
- **Verifying registered informations.** Open beneficial ownership data, coupled with strong verification systems, ensures data is accurate and useable.
- **Engaging citizens in monitoring and accountability.** Informal and formal channels for accountability enable citizens to actively use ownership data to uncover networks of corruption.



Creating companies is an easy and effective way of concealing an identity. In most countries, a company can be formed without disclosing the identity of the individual who ultimately controls or profits from the business, i.e., the beneficial owner. Criminals can assign “nominee” shareholders to be listed on official documents or can list other legal entities as the “owners,” thereby creating a chain of companies—often across borders—that can be difficult for investigators to trace. For example, it took authorities two-and-a-half years to build enough evidence of embezzlement against former Kazakh banker Mukhtar Ablyazov,² who had used a chain of eight companies to hide his crimes.

Anonymous companies are often used to mask corruption. According to the World Bank, roughly 70% of the biggest corruption cases between 1980 and 2010 involved anonymous companies.³ In the United States alone, authorities have estimated that US\$300 billion is generated in illicit proceeds and untaxed activities each year, driven in large part by the abuse of corporate vehicles.⁴ These structures can also be used to hide unlawful relationships between government officials and companies competing in lucrative public procurement processes. It is estimated that governments around the globe spend US\$9.5 trillion on public procurement processes each year, of which up to 25% may be lost due to corruption or fraud.⁵

Complex company structures are also used for tax evasion and money laundering. As the Panama⁶ and Paradise Papers⁷ illustrate, complex company structures allow individuals to move funds across borders without alerting tax authorities. Such structures can be used to launder dirty money or reduce a company’s tax burden. When it comes to the oil, gas, and mining sectors, the loss of such tax revenues for a country can add up quickly. It has been estimated that up to US\$1 trillion is siphoned out of developing countries in lost tax revenues through shell companies that hide their beneficial owners.⁸ (See “Good to know: Company ownership 101” on the next page for definitions.)

Company ownership 101



“Between 2010 and 2014, Russian criminals used Deutsche Bank to move money into the Western financial system. The cash involved could total \$80bn, detectives believe.” Photo by Deutsche Bank

What is a “beneficial owner?”

A beneficial owner is the individual (or individuals) who ultimately owns, controls, or benefits from a company (or any other form of legal vehicle). Importantly, the beneficial owner can be different from a company’s legal owner, i.e., the person or entity with immediate and formal ownership. While the two can be the same, say for a small business with one clear owner, they can also differ. In fact, in the case of complex and opaque corporate structures, the legal owners are often companies or individuals with little actual control. In these cases, a whole chain of legal owners might obscure the beneficial owner, i.e., the individual at the end of the chain with ultimate control.

What is a “shell company?”

Shell companies are legal entities that are non-operational and lack assets or staff. While these corporate structures often have legitimate functions, they are also an attractive type of anonymous company for money launderers, who can use them in combination with other (often legal) techniques to keep their identity hidden from government authorities and to funnel funds across borders.

The case for beneficial ownership transparency

Publishing registers with beneficial ownership information helps shine a light on secret corporate structures that can be exploited to launder the proceeds of corruption, hide conflicts of interest, improperly win lucrative government contracts, and evade tax payments. Creating an open registry, built and run on open data, provides a key tool for governments to achieve a variety of objectives, such as those listed below.¹

Beneficial ownership transparency helps strengthen tax collection by clamping down on tax evasion. Based on some estimates, the Panama Papers—which revealed the true owners behind various shell companies—have helped authorities around the world to collect more than US\$500 million in unpaid taxes and penalties, and to prosecute the guilty.⁹ For example, the US Department of Justice charged four defendants linked to the law firm implicated in the Panama Papers for helping individuals to evade US taxes through shell companies.¹⁰ Governments can significantly benefit by identifying these hidden funds and levying taxes. In the case of African countries, both the UN and African Union have estimated that countries across the continent could gain US\$50 billion each year by stemming illicit financial outflows, which are facilitated by shell companies.¹¹


Public beneficial ownership data enables citizens to hold companies accountable. Journalists in Mexico,¹² South Africa,¹³ and elsewhere have used access to information laws and open data to flag suspected wrongdoing, but their work can only go so far without access to clear evidence on who really owns companies. For this reason, information on beneficial owners that is accessible to everyone, not just law enforcement authorities, is important. For example, in Slovakia, public company ownership information allowed the media and watchdog organizations to flag an incorrect submission by a company winning many lucrative government contracts, which prompted a fine from the Public Procurement Office.

In addition, public beneficial ownership information aids in the fight against corruption and money laundering, as required by global, regional, and national anti-money laundering directives, such as the Fifth EU Anti-Money Laundering (AML) Directive.¹⁴ In particular, this may be important in real estate, where it is essential to identify money-laundering activities in major capitals.¹⁵

Public beneficial ownership registries also make financial sense. A cost-benefit analysis commissioned by the UK Treasury Department in 2002 recommended implementing a public register because it estimated (conservatively) that it would result in at least £30 million of gains across other areas of the government, far outweighing any additional costs.¹⁶ By publishing information that can be used across borders, beneficial ownership information can also save costs for investigators.

Public beneficial ownership registries further help companies and governments fulfill their due diligence and risk management obligations. For companies, beneficial ownership information is useful to avoid violating existing regulations and risking sanctions. EY's 2016 Global Fraud Survey found that 91% of senior executives believe it is important to know the ultimate beneficial owners of the entities with which they do business.¹⁷ As for governments, registries can help enforce existing policies (in addition to international obligations). For instance, in 2017, US agencies conducted 13 corporate enforcement actions, which led to the collection of US\$1.14 billion in the US (and nearly another US\$2.3 billion that was paid out to other countries).¹⁸ Public beneficial ownership data also allows banks and financial institutions to conduct stronger customer due diligence. Banks are required to identify their clients and their ultimate beneficial owners, but they are often not allowed to rely on countries' commercial registries. (See the box "Companies care about company ownership" on the next page for examples of private sector support of beneficial ownership information.)





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Companies care about company ownership

Many companies and related business and industry associations see it in their interest to support beneficial ownership registers. When the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) drew up guidelines¹⁹ to address beneficial ownership, the European Banking Federation and others actively supported them during the public consultation in 2010.²⁰ The European Commission in 2012 also organized a consultation during which leading banking associations generally supported beneficial ownership registers to help them do better due diligence.²¹

In the UK, the Institute of Directors,²² which represents over 38,000 business leaders, welcomed²³ the initial push in 2013 by the UK government to have the G8 act on beneficial ownership transparency. The National Association of Estate Agents (now renamed PropertyMark) was also actively supporting the measure and backing broader civil society coalition actions. Further, companies and various industry associations²⁴ were vocal as part of government consultations ahead of the decision to implement the register.

In the US, the National Association of Realtors and Clearing House Association (a banking association owned by the world's largest commercial banks)²⁵ have voiced their support for ownership disclosure for Limited Liability Companies (LLCs) as part of efforts to address money laundering.

Photo by Thomas Pajot, Adobe Stock

Beneficial ownership around the globe

Worldwide, there is increasing momentum on beneficial ownership reform. The G8,²⁶ G20,²⁷ and EU²⁸ member states agreed to establish registries in 2013, 2014, and 2015, respectively. In 2016, various countries at the Anti-Corruption Summit in London came forward to pledge to establish public registries of beneficial ownership (e.g., Britain, Afghanistan, Kenya, France, the Netherlands, and Nigeria).²⁹ In addition to these commitments, other global initiatives have developed recommendations and issued guidance regarding beneficial ownership, such as the 154 members of the OECD's Global Forum³⁰ and the 37 members of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF),³¹ though neither the Global Forum's Standard nor the FATF Standard require publishing registers. It is worth noting that 22 FATF members and 13 of the G20 members are also part of OGP.

The fifth EU Anti-Money Laundering Directive is a major step forward for beneficial ownership transparency. While G8 and G20 countries have not committed to publish their registers en bloc, the Directive requires that EU members³² provide public access to their registers by 2020. All registers must list the ultimate beneficial owner (UBO) and include the same basic information: name, month of birth, nationality, country of residence, and nature/size of the interest held.³³ Overall, several countries have centralized registers, but only a handful—including the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ukraine—have made their registers publicly available. (See the box on “Guidance and standards: Implementing beneficial ownership transparency in the extractives sector” for a sector-specific application , as well as the box, “Lessons from reformers: Nigeria’s push for beneficial ownership transparency in procurement and in the extractives sector,” later in the section.)



Implementing beneficial ownership transparency in the extractives sector



Photo by Aphotostudio, Adobe Stock

At the sector level, efforts are underway to expand the number of countries committing to public beneficial ownership registers. In the mining, oil, and gas sectors, this is taking place through the Extractives Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI). The fifty countries that are EITI members have outlined “beneficial ownership roadmaps.” These are plans that detail the reforms needed between now and 2020 to be compliant with EITI’s beneficial ownership requirement that all companies applying for or holding a participating interest in an oil, gas, or mining license or contract in an EITI member country disclose their beneficial owners.³⁴ This information will then be made publicly available through EITI country reports and/or national registries. This requirement, first included as part of the EITI Standard in

2016, is a first but important step for moving toward a full public registry of beneficial ownership across all sectors. EITI requirements have already helped to trigger 20 countries to set up public registers. A number of countries have used commitments in their OGP action plan to advance this requirement ahead of the timeframe for EITI.


Beneficial ownership disclosure can also be linked to the licensing process to fight corruption and conflicts of interest. The Natural Resources Governance Institute reviewed 100 real-world extractives licensing corruption cases and found that over half involved a hidden beneficial owner who was a politically-exposed person—either a government official or their close affiliate.³⁵

Beneficial ownership in OGP

Despite the increasing global momentum around beneficial ownership, few OGP members have made relevant commitments. To date, 22 OGP members have made a total of 32 commitments on beneficial

ownership.³⁶ As Figure 1 illustrates, the vast majority of OGP members have not made any commitments. Progress is still at an early stage as only four commitments are ambitious proposals with concrete results.

FIGURE 1. Most OGP members lack beneficial ownership commitments



Source: OGP commitments data, December 2018. (n=99)

Most beneficial ownership commitments in OGP have dealt with registers. In particular, current commitments have tended to focus on two issues:

- Establishing robust registers of beneficial ownership;³⁷ and
- Publishing registers of company beneficial ownership as open, machine-readable data.³⁸

In many cases, these registries³⁹ have existed, but have not been public or have lacked information on beneficial owners. Overall, a diverse coalition of reformers has made beneficial ownership commitments through OGP. For example, countries with such commitments include: Australia, Chile, France, Ghana, Kenya, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. Some commitments have focused on requiring the disclosure of beneficial ownership information for public contracts (as in Bulgaria)⁴⁰ or for license-holders in the extractives sector (as in Indonesia and Mongolia). In the case of Ghana, the government committed to both

1) publish information on the beneficial owners of any entity winning a government contract; and 2) expand an existing company register to develop a beneficial ownership database.

Despite the low numbers, the beneficial ownership commitments to date appear promising. Of the 12 beneficial ownership commitments that the Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) has assessed, five have had a “transformative potential impact” and four have received a “star” (for being verifiable, relevant to open government principles, ambitious, and mostly implemented—i.e., model commitments). Although this is a small sample size, the findings underscore the considerable potential of making beneficial ownership commitments through the OGP platform. Lastly, it is important to note that beneficial ownership reform is moving in the right direction, as the number of OGP members with relevant commitments has jumped from only one in 2013 (the UK) to 22 countries today.⁴¹



The frontiers of beneficial ownership transparency


If the clear message from the preceding section is that more beneficial ownership commitments are needed, this section looks at where work needs to be done. What follows is an analysis of current barriers to greater beneficial ownership transparency and opportunities for impactful reforms. Based on the findings, this section is grouped into four broad suggested areas for change:

- Strengthening the collection of beneficial ownership information
- Improving the interoperability of the data
- Building strong verification systems
- Engaging citizens in the use of the data for monitoring and accountability

Strengthening the collection of beneficial ownership information

Many OGP countries do not publish their company registers, much less the legal or beneficial owners of those companies. This occurs for several reasons, such as privacy concerns (see the box “Good to know: The relationship between privacy and beneficial ownership transparency”). Figure 2 below depicts the levels of company information transparency in OGP countries. These numbers are taken directly from the “Selected Dimensions of Open Government” data featured in the OGP member pages.⁴² On the left-hand side, 16 (or just over one in three)⁴³ OGP countries do not publish any form of company information. The average OGP country, on the other hand, publishes its company register, which includes basic information such as company names, unique identifiers, addresses, and registered activities. Only seven OGP countries publish comprehensive legal or beneficial ownership information. The following sections assess why this is the case.

FIGURE 2. Few OGP countries publish company ownership information



Sources: Open Data Barometer, 4th and Leaders Editions, 2017-2018; Tax Justice Network, Financial Secrecy Index, 2018, ID474-5.⁴⁴ (n=44)

The relationship between privacy and beneficial ownership transparency



Photo by Pimonpim, Adobe Stock

Ensuring that beneficial ownership data is publicly accessible while protecting an individual's right to privacy is an important concern. There are increasing worries about how personal data protections are respected and fulfilled, particularly as a result of EU regulations⁴⁵ and high profile data breaches.⁴⁶ However, beneficial ownership information is generally considered a different class of data because it is collected as a result of a company's desire to engage in or complete a financial activity in a specific market under the name of a specific legal entity. (These benefits differentiate ownership from holding assets under a private name.) Furthermore, based on an analysis⁴⁷ of legal cases in various countries

(e.g., Chile, Romania, the United States, and Germany), there is a balance to strike as the courts found that financial disclosures did not violate the right to privacy, as guaranteed by their constitutions. Still, there is a need to take a responsible data⁴⁸ approach to best assess concerns about consent, privacy, and security.

As a practical example, in the UK, the government addressed concerns about a company owner's privacy and security on a case-by-case basis. However, of the nearly 2 million companies⁴⁹ in the register, only about 30 owners⁵⁰ have been granted the right to remain anonymous, suggesting that this has not been a major concern.




Barriers to beneficial ownership transparency

The first barrier to publishing beneficial ownership information is having legislation that requires companies to disclose this information. Nonetheless, this is still the binding constraint for most OGP countries. Figure 3 shows that more than half of OGP countries do not yet have legislation in place requiring the registration of beneficial ownership information, although seven

EU countries are required to have laws by 2020 in accordance with the 5th EU AML Directive. Nonetheless, while the graph below seems to indicate that by 2020, most OGP countries will be well on their way to tracking beneficial owners (at least internally), this is not the case. As the following sections reveal, there are significant loopholes and challenges that OGP countries face in the collection of useful beneficial ownership information.

FIGURE 3. Most OGP countries currently lack beneficial ownership registration laws




Source: Tax Justice Network, *Financial Secrecy Index, 2018*, ID 471.⁵¹ (n=49)

The definition of a beneficial owner can be a key loophole for companies to avoid disclosing accurate beneficial ownership information. Laws set thresholds for who is considered a beneficial owner. For example, the UK requires disclosure for anyone having at least a 25% share or stake in the company. As illustrated by Figure 4 on the next page, this threshold is the most common in OGP countries (with beneficial ownership registration laws).⁵² However, civil society groups

have pushed for lower thresholds,⁵³ down to a single share,⁵⁴ given how easy it can be for criminals to adapt to legislation. For instance, in the case of the Kazakh banker mentioned previously, Abyazov used several entities that held 9.5 to 9.96% interests to avoid passing the 10% disclosure threshold. In addition, according to an analysis by Global Witness, nearly 1 in 10 companies in the UK claim to have no beneficial owner, which is possible because of the 25% threshold.⁵⁵

FIGURE 4. Most OGP countries (with registration laws) have a 25% ownership threshold to be considered a beneficial owner



Source: Tax Justice Network, *Financial Secrecy Index, 2018*, ID 471.⁵⁶ (n=16)

GOOD TO KNOW

The risk posed by bearer shares



Photo by Tupungato, Adobe Stock

Bearer shares⁵⁷ are physical documents that provide ownership rights to whoever holds them. They pose a unique challenge to tracking beneficial ownership because issuing firms do not track the owner or transfers in ownership. Whoever holds the physical document at any point in time is considered to be the owner. According to a study⁵⁸ in the Czech Republic, companies that issued bearer shares won


less competitive government contracts that resulted in lower savings for the government. Given the risk posed by these instruments, many countries have banned their use. However, bearer shares are still available, circulating, or are not registered by government authorities in about 2 in 5 OGP countries, highlighting that this is still an important area for improvement.



Updating and publishing registered beneficial ownership is another binding constraint. Figure 5 below shows the percentage of OGP countries that record, update, and publish beneficial ownership information, according to the Tax Justice Network’s Financial Secrecy Index (FSI). It is important to take into account that the FSI does not consider that governments are collecting comprehensive company ownership information if 1) bearer shares are available, circulating, or not registered by government authorities (see “The

risk posed by bearer shares”) or 2) mandatory beneficial ownership information disclosure does not cover all types of companies. As a result, the key message from the graph below is that even after closing several loopholes in the collection of beneficial ownership information, many OGP countries do not update this information. Fewer still release the information publicly. According to the 2018 edition of the FSI, only the UK published comprehensive and updated beneficial ownership information.

FIGURE 5. Updating and disclosing ownership information are key binding constraints in OGP countries



Source: Tax Justice Network, *Financial Secrecy Index, 2018*, ID 470-475. (n=49)

GOOD TO KNOW

The importance of disclosing legal ownership information



Photo by Marzky Ragsac Jr., Adobe Stock

While legal ownership information is less useful than beneficial ownership information because the former can be a legal entity and does not represent actual control, both types of data are essential for combating corruption. Given that legal owners are the immediate owners of an entity, they provide important information about corporate structures, particularly those that involve a chain of legal entities. In these cases, beneficial ownership information alone often cannot be verified, given that the owners


of the intermediate entities remain hidden.

Figure 5 on the previous page also illustrates how well OGP countries perform in the registration, updating, and disclosure of legal ownership information. As is evident from the graph, there is room for improvement in the collection and disclosure of this information. Although nearly 3 in 4 OGP countries collect comprehensive legal ownership information, far fewer update this information regularly and publish it.

Beneficial ownership transparency must not focus solely on companies. The data shown so far has looked at the transparency of company information. However, companies are just one of many types of legal vehicles that criminals can use to hide illicit funds and evade taxes. Figure 6 on the next page shows how well OGP countries perform in the collection and disclosure of comprehensive and updated beneficial

ownership information for five common types of legal vehicles. Unfortunately, although only about one in six OGP countries collect comprehensive and updated beneficial ownership information for companies, countries fare even worse on other types of legal vehicles. Certainly, future commitments aimed at improving beneficial ownership transparency must be wide-ranging in their approach.

FIGURE 6. Rates of beneficial ownership transparency across five types of legal entities in OGP countries are low



Source: Tax Justice Network, *The State of Play of Beneficial Ownership Registration: A Visual Overview*, June 2018.⁵⁹

Improving the interoperability of beneficial ownership information

Beneficial Ownership Data Standardization

There is a need for countries to set up registries using the same open data standard. The Beneficial Ownership Data Standard is a structured data format developed by a group of civil society organizations and hosted by OpenOwnership.⁶⁰ One of the key benefits of the Standard is that it helps to ensure interoperability across borders. Given the global nature of financial crimes, beneficial ownership information is only useful if it follows a common language that authorities from different jurisdictions can leverage. Implementing the Standard is also especially important in this nascent

phase of beneficial ownership transparency, as it can be costly to redevelop and rebuild data structures in the future to standardize data. At the moment, Ukraine (see box on the following page) and the Kyrgyz Republic are piloting the use of the Standard.

Open, standardized data enables the development of a global register of beneficial ownership information. As the world’s first global, open beneficial ownership register, the OpenOwnership Register⁶¹ compiles data from national registers. Both Ghana⁶² and Ukraine⁶³ are part of the Register and Standard. Moving forward, efforts to consolidate beneficial ownership data as a global, public good will further enhance the utility and accuracy of the information.

LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Ukraine's national beneficial ownership register goes global

The government of Ukraine committed to an open registry as part of its 2016–2018 OGP action plan (which also reflects country commitments made as part of the OGP Paris Declaration and the Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016). This built on the provisions set out by the State Anti-Corruption Policy of Ukraine (2014–2017),⁶⁴ which emphasized the importance of tackling anonymous owners as part of combating corruption.

The policy was enacted into a series of five laws, which included the creation of a free, open, and centralized company register: the Unified State Register.⁶⁵ According to the government, about 330,000 companies—or approximately 20% of all registered companies—disclosed information about their ultimate beneficial owners by the end of 2018. The register is under the authority of the Ministry of Justice, which is responsible for its governance and policy. The government is working with a local NGO, TI-Ukraine, to carry out these efforts.

Ukraine was also the first country to commit to integrating its national register with the global OpenOwnership Register.⁶⁶ Such coordination across registers is critical for being able to triangulate, verify, and act on data. The arrest in October 2018 of a former “high profile” Ukrainian in France was facilitated by using such data from other sources to track him back as the beneficial owner of a Luxembourg company that was used to purchase a French castle worth €3 million.⁶⁷ Ukraine’s Prosecutor General’s Office is also attempting to use beneficial ownership registers to trace back an estimated US\$5.5 billion in assets looted from the country’s largest bank when it was nationalized in November 2016.⁶⁸

Today, the government continues to make progress on beneficial ownership transparency. Since September 2018, companies are required to report the percentage of each beneficial owner’s interest, the type of ownership, information about intermediate companies (i.e., the ownership structure), and a reasoned explanation if no beneficial ownership is identified. In addition, the information must be updated each time a company changes its information on the register (as opposed to only at the time of company creation).⁶⁹ Ukraine is also the first OGP country to make a commitment explicitly focused on improving the verification of beneficial ownership information, and is currently addressing this issue as part of its 2018–2020 action plan.⁷⁰



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Nigeria's push for beneficial ownership transparency in procurement and in the extractives sector

The country has legal provisions⁷¹ dating back to 2004 that partly address beneficial ownership. There is also a closed register of companies. However, many of the names cited are not the real owners⁷² and there is no mechanism to verify them, or sanctions for falsifying information. As a resource-rich country that has been plagued by grand corruption, beneficial ownership transparency has emerged as an important tool. For example, Global Witness helped to uncover shell companies that have since been implicated in the alleged theft of US\$1.1 billion⁷³ in revenues from the awarding of an oil field to a Nigerian company, Malabu Oil & Gas, which was actually owned by a former oil minister. Currently, two global oil companies, ENI and Shell, are standing trial with others in Italy over allegations of corruption related to this deal, which is estimated to have cost Nigeria US\$6 billion in potential revenues. Overall, it has been estimated that US\$15.7 billion in illicit flows leave the country's financial system every year.⁷⁴

At the UK-hosted Anti-Corruption Summit in 2016, Nigeria committed to joining OGP and setting up a national public registry⁷⁵ of beneficial ownership, which it included in its first OGP action plan.⁷⁶ The body responsible for the register, the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC),⁷⁷ is reportedly attempting to change relevant national legislation to align with global good practice. At the same time, the country is pursuing a sectoral action plan on beneficial ownership through the EITI process by December 2019. It has produced a "road map"⁷⁸ to require the public disclosure of beneficial owners of oil, gas, and mining companies in the country, and has made progress on the implementation of the EITI Standard. The Nigerian government is also applying beneficial ownership requirements to any company holding a government contract as part of its implementation of the Open Contracting Data Standard⁷⁹ for its public procurement process.

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Linking beneficial ownership information across sectors

Beneficial ownership information, when structured as open data, can provide a critical input for linking up with other open data sets, such as on public contracting. The importance of open data and the interoperability of related data sets are clearly outlined in the OGP Declaration.⁸⁰ For example, having beneficial ownership data that is interoperable with public procurement data (through the Open Contracting Standard)⁸¹ can help to detect and investigate questionable public contracts, and to follow the money.

Similarly, in the area of extractive industries, collecting and screening beneficial ownership information during the extractive licensing process can help to reduce the risk of corruption. As OGP and natural resources-rich countries, both Nigeria⁸² and Mongolia⁸³ have included beneficial ownership transparency of extractive contracts as part of their national action plan commitments. Still, there is room for improvement, as only five of the 32 OGP commitments on beneficial ownership have focused on the extractive sector (eight have focused on open contracting). Future government reforms could therefore:

- Require companies to disclose beneficial ownership information during the process of applying for a license/agreement involving natural resources;
- Establish clear rules on what type of ownership structure is disqualifying, as well as the repercussions; and
- Scrutinize the ownership information provided during the selection of awardees.⁸⁴

The last recommendation requires proactive verification of beneficial ownership information, which remains a major gap in existing practice, and which is covered in more detail in the following section.

Verifying beneficial ownership information

Strong verification systems are essential for ensuring high-quality, accurate beneficial ownership information. An analysis⁸⁵ of the progress of G20 countries in advancing beneficial ownership reforms found that even in cases where there is a central register, no country requires that the provided information be automatically verified. Without strong verification systems, beneficial ownership information becomes significantly less useful. As developed in publications by the Tax Justice Network⁸⁶ and OpenOwnership,⁸⁷ the effective verification of beneficial ownership information consists of four important steps:

- **Authentication:** ensure that the person who registers beneficial ownership information is who they say they are. According to a study by the World Bank,⁸⁸ only 60% of company service providers conducted an authentication process to verify the identity of the person opening up a business. The remaining 40% only required the filling of an online form. To achieve authentication, the government could require digital or biometric signatures, signed declarations confirming the accuracy of the information submitted, or scanned identification documents, as is currently required by Denmark's beneficial ownership registry.
- **Authorization:** ensure that the person registering the company is authorized to do so. This would not only help to prevent cases of stolen or "bought" identities,⁸⁹ but would also pre-empt the common excuse that the beneficial owner was not aware that someone was registering a company for them.⁹⁰ To achieve authorization, governments could require that beneficial owners provide written or digital authorization, or be notified when their name is used to create a company.



- **Validation:** cross-check data to ensure that the information submitted is plausible. This could include making sure that names, addresses, nationalities, and other information are real and match other government databases. Costa Rica's beneficial ownership register, which comes into force in 2019, will incorporate a technology system that will run these types of checks to validate information using databases from the election high court, foreign ministry, and immigration office, among others.⁹¹
- **Red-flagging:** use advanced analytics to find patterns, identify anomalies, and create alerts. Open data, together with an engaged civil society, would facilitate this exercise. For example, Global Witness and DataKind UK analyzed the UK's beneficial ownership data and found several suspicious trends that would not have been possible without having access to the information in open format. These included companies disclosing an ineligible foreign company as the beneficial owner or using circular corporate structures.⁹²

Used together, these verification methods can make it easier for citizens to use the data effectively and harder for criminals to get away with lying. Ukraine is the first country to make an OGP commitment explicitly focused on the verification of beneficial ownership information (in both its 2016–2018⁹³ and 2018–2020⁹⁴ action plans). As the collection and disclosure of this data grows across the globe, ensuring the high quality of the information will be the next major step.



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Using Slovakia's beneficial ownership register for impact

Along with Denmark,⁹⁵ Slovakia was one of the first countries to publish beneficial ownership information. The Slovakian register⁹⁶ was established in 2015 for companies participating in public procurement processes. Companies can be banned for up to three years and face fines reaching one million euros if they participate in procurement without first registering.

Verifying the data provided by the 11,000 companies and 16,000 owners in the register, and enforcing non-compliance, has been a challenge. Two key obstacles were that 1) no official documentation was required when companies submitted their filings and 2) the register was not linked with the country's broader business registry. Still, one in four companies included a beneficial owner that was not previously listed in their filing with Slovakia's business register.

Civil society organizations⁹⁷ in Slovakia have used the register to analyze the available data, identifying networks of companies that have the same beneficial owner(s). This includes finding that 190 of the listed beneficial owners are actually public officials (who might have a conflict of interest when it comes to procurements). The register has also been used by local organizations⁹⁸ to verify whether companies were indeed providing information on their beneficial owners as part of winning public contracts. In March 2016, it was found that the public news agency TASR had signed a contract for a computer upgrade worth 110,000 euros with a company that had not provided its beneficial owner. The same was true for two contracts awarded by a local government. When the new register was launched in 2017, a state-run rail operator was forced to withdraw from a highly criticized⁹⁹ 50-year lease of the country's main train station when citizens discovered that the contractor did not provide information on its beneficial owner.

Civil society groups and the media have also used Slovakia's registry to reveal an allegedly serious conflict of interest involving the prime minister, who is listed as one of the beneficial owners of a company in the Czech Republic¹⁰⁰ that has received €75 million in EU subsidies¹⁰¹ for delivering various public works.



Engaging citizens in monitoring and accountability

Civil society plays a critical role in using beneficial ownership information for accountability. (See the box, “Lessons from reformers: Using Slovakia’s beneficial ownership register for impact,” on the previous page, for an example.) Beyond simply publishing a beneficial ownership register, the aim should be to enable channels that deepen accountability, both formally (such as through legal investigations) and informally (such as through citizen reporting):

- **Formal accountability:** low-threshold to be considered a beneficial owner, required government data validation, mandated regular updating of data by companies, right to investigate by institution, right to sanction and impose significant financial penalties by institution, refusal of registration or legal operation if all information is not shared, formalized and regular information-sharing across government agencies, required extension of beneficial ownership requirements to trusts and other legal arrangements, or creation of a register advisory group;¹⁰² and
- **Informal accountability:** citizen and media monitoring and reporting, regular verification and querying of data, reformatting and digitization of data, triangulation of data sets, cross-checking information (through physical and lifestyle checks), or reporting of errors and missing information to authorities

Companies House, the government body responsible for the UK beneficial ownership register, has been particularly successful at involving end users (including civil society) in the design of the register and even setting up a data users’ reference group. Moreover, given the easily accessible register based on open data, civil society groups in the UK are using the data to vet its quality, as well as to attempt to effectively triangulate information across different data sets (see the box, “Lessons from Reformers: Engaging activists for impact in the UK,” for more information).

Other anti-corruption initiatives reveal the power of open data in the hands of civil society. In particular, income and assets declarations offer lessons on how beneficial ownership data can be used effectively for accountability. More than 150 countries have requirements that public officials declare their assets and nearly all OECD countries require that asset declarations be published.¹⁰³ The World Bank concluded that public asset declarations have enabled civil society to verify the declarations and trigger the enforcement of infractions, making the system more credible and trusted.¹⁰⁴ For example, in the US, a civil society watchdog used publicly disclosed asset declarations to identify conflicts of interests for high-level judges that were hearing certain cases.¹⁰⁵ In Georgia, a civil society organization used asset declarations to calculate the amount of money that legislators were receiving in bonuses (since Parliament refused to provide such information).¹⁰⁶ The same group also tracked declarations for new public officials to find patterns of suspected illicit enrichment once they entered office. Overall, civil society in Georgia is cross-checking the information against other sources of publicly-available data, such as from licensing, land registers, and public procurements, highlighting the power of beneficial ownership data to further unveil criminal activity.¹⁰⁷

LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Engaging activists for impact in the UK

The UK has been a pioneering country¹⁰⁸ on the issue of public registers of beneficial ownership. It first pushed this agenda in 2013 as the host of the G8 and then later through the G20 in 2014. The government promoted the issue of beneficial ownership as an effective way to combat corruption and stop tax evasion, both of which undermine global development. In addition, according to the UK National Crime Agency, there is a “realistic possibility” that the impact of money laundering on the UK reaches hundreds of billions of pounds each year.¹⁰⁹

In 2016, the UK became one of the first countries to establish a public register that captured the beneficial owners of companies. It was made free of charge for the public to access. An open data standard was used to set up the register, called the register of Persons with Significant Control (PSC). As part of its OGP action plan, the UK is currently in the process of extending the requirement to register a company’s beneficial owners to all overseas companies that hold land in the UK.¹¹⁰ Beneficial ownership transparency requirements have also been extended to companies operating in the country’s overseas territories. Failure to comply with providing accurate ownership information or responding to requests for company information are both criminal offenses.

The UK’s Companies House, the government body responsible for the registry, noted that within the first six-months of publishing the registry, the public had flagged data inconsistencies¹¹¹ for multiple contacts in the register. For the year 2016–2017, more than two billion data searches¹¹² were conducted of the free and open register. The high use-up from only six million requests in 2014–2015 when access to the register was available at a charge–has helped to improve the quality of the data through the flagging of inconsistencies. This has made the data more useful for triangulating it with other sources to seek out illegal activities. For example, the register has been used by journalists and civil society organizations like Transparency International to uncover corruption networks used by governments, such as the Azerbaijani Laundromat,¹¹³ which involved four firms that were registered with Companies House in London to allegedly pay US\$2.9 billion to lobbyists and parliamentarians between 2012 and 2014.¹¹⁴

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OGP Global Report

Public Services

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene • Health • Education



Photo by Kletr, Adobe Stock

Public services

Since its beginning, OGP has encouraged governments to create safer, healthier communities.¹ Upon assuming the civil society chair of the Steering Committee in 2016, Mukelani Dimba, Head of Development at the International School for Transparency (South Africa) stated:

Public service delivery is where the rubber hits the road. In many countries -- particularly those on the lower end of the Human Development Index -- public services might be the only interaction a citizen ever has with the government. Their quality -- or lack thereof -- has a real and tangible impact: it determines whether children can get an education, whether people have access to lifesaving treatments, and whether communities can live in safe homes and enjoy clean and safe environments.²

Even for countries at the higher end of the Human Development Index, public services remain the primary point of interaction for most members of the public with their government. Improving public services requires more than open data. It requires coordination and collaboration between public institutions, private sector actors, religious organizations, and the nonprofit

sector. The role for open government in encouraging participation and accountability is expansive, as delivering better outcomes cannot be the role of markets or governments alone. This Public Services section explores these areas to understand where the frontiers of open government lie for OGP members.

Areas of focus

Specifically, this Public Services section focuses on three major service delivery areas in which government plays a significant or primary role in providing for the public. These areas are also where policy and government performance are often most obvious, and, importantly, where open government can make a meaningful and measurable difference. They include:

- **Water, sanitation, and hygiene;**
- **Health; and**
- **Education.**

These three areas were identified as strategic goals for the Open Government Partnership in its 2017 Strategic Plan, and are closely aligned with the targets and indicators in the Sustainable Development Goals.

Approach and Findings

For each of these issues, this report looks at what can be learned to better inform future OGP commitments and related policies. It draws on current research, data from the OGP Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM), and from other governance-related datasets.

To assist OGP members and the larger civil society community, this report presents its findings relative to three open government areas that are universally applicable to any policy process (including design, implementation, monitoring, and revision): **data on the policy area** (i.e., availability and usability of information); **information on the policy process** (including documentation and insight into decision-making); and **participation and accountability**. This approach examines the extent that policies and practices are open to public observation and scrutiny (transparency), input (participation), and review (accountability).

Additionally, where possible, the report provides findings related to inclusive approaches and policies, determining the success of reaching specific, often vulnerable, segments of the population.

Because data on governance of these areas does not cover all OGP countries and is not consistent across policy areas, the report must take a somewhat varying approach to data analysis, using datasets and literature from a wide variety of sources and methods. For example, some education data are widely disaggregated by sex, but the same data is unavailable for sanitation for OGP countries. Similarly, there is cross-national data on accountability mechanisms for water service delivery, but no equivalent in education. For that reason, the contents of each section vary in specific content.

Based on the findings of the three individual sections that follow, the report found a number of cross-cutting data points applicable to any approach to public service delivery. These findings include:

- **Data on the policy area:** Data on public services is generally collected at the national level or available from international organizations. It is not, however, regularly disaggregated either by affected groups or geography, limiting its usefulness for decision-making. In particular, there is often a lag in production and publication for sex-disaggregated data, which OGP countries can address.

- **Information on the policy process:** Major policy documents and budgets at the sectoral level are increasingly made public. Program-level budgets and expenditures as well as procurement are often not available. Contracting and procurement data remain a major gap for most OGP countries.
- **Participation and accountability:** In general, data on participation and accountability has low coverage for OGP countries. In addition, it is largely unavailable for the education and health sectors.
- **Inclusion:** Even where OGP countries have plans to address access for vulnerable populations, money and human resources are not yet aligned to ensure that funding, research, and services reach important communities. This is reflected in water finance and the low tracking rates of reproductive health.

Endnotes

¹ The 2012 OGP: *Articles of Governance* asked countries to align their action plans with five Grand Challenges, one of which was “Creating Healthier and Safer Communities.” While the Grand Challenges as an organizing principle of OGP have been all but retired in favor of national priorities, the inspiration to improve citizens’ lives on the ground remains constant. See http://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/attachments/OGP%20ArticlesGov%20March%2019%202014_1.pdf.

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OGP Global Report

Public Services

Water, Sanitation, and Hygiene


Key points

Improving open government yields significant dividends to water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). Healthy, engaged communities strengthen infrastructure, create stability, and drive growth that creates more inclusive and sustainable outcomes. To these important ends, OGP members have made progress in these areas.

However, despite their successes and the many larger benefits they represent, these elements of public services remain some of the least explored areas in OGP action plans, with only nine members currently implementing relevant commitments. Based on analysis of third-party data, OGP members can build on existing work and continue to improve access and quality of services with open government commitments reflecting the following:

- **Data on the policy area.** Most OGP members collect and publish point-of-service and household data. However, this data is not disaggregated for smaller geographic units, is not interoperable between locations, and licenses tend to not allow for re-use, creating a mosaic of data that is often difficult to integrate and act upon.
- **Information on the policy process.** While most OGP members have reporting plans in place for sanitation and drinking water, financial expenditure data is not accessible in a large number of countries and monitoring systems are often ineffective.
- **Participation and accountability.** While most OGP members have participation and institutions for accountability in place across WASH subsectors, very few have robust participation and less than half report having accessible complaint mechanisms for the subsectors.
- **Spending on vulnerable populations.** Most OGP members have plans to address access for vulnerable populations, but very little money is spent or tracked to reach these populations relative to their size.





The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is uniquely positioned to address some of the core issues surrounding water, sanitation, and hygiene. Resources alone cannot bridge the gap. Thirty percent of the world’s population lacks access to quality water. Six in ten live without safely managed sanitation.¹ Solutions will require both scientific innovation as well as public and private investments. (For an overview of the challenges and opportunities around water and sanitation, see “The generalist’s guide to water and sanitation” later in this section.)

However, equally as important, water and sanitation delivery can also be improved with better transparency, participation, and accountability.² Specifically, open government can address several root causes of these challenges:

- **Ensuring public oversight and prioritization:** WASH governance is often fragmented, with responsibilities typically split between ministries of water, finance, and health. This leaves space for duplication of efforts and limits holistic oversight. Public participation and greater transparency in the governance process can clarify decisions and administration both for the public and decision-makers across agencies.³
- **Reducing corruption risk:** Additionally, WASH projects are often large infrastructure contracts, creating large risks for corruption.⁴ Emphasizing WASH within OGP can help accelerate much-needed transparency, participation, and accountability in the sector.

“Toilets in Leh Ladakh City, India.” Photo by Zilcheqs, Adobe Stock



“Public water point, Yemen.” Photo by Foad Al Harazi, World Bank

- **Identifying drivers of poor quality and access:** Poor water quality and quantity can result from lack of information about its safety, what (or who) is causing the problem, or both. Open government can help ensure that the public has access to information on ambient and point-of-service water quality, as well as information on the parties behind decision-making and, in some cases, its pollution or overuse. For example, “pollutant release transfer registers,” which publish the release of toxins from private facilities, have been shown to result in diminished stock prices for bigger polluters.⁵
- **Official accountability for decisions and actions:** While many issues of poor access or poor-quality services are not the result of malfeasance, accountability can help drive performance. Ensuring officials have the duty to respond to public inquiry and follow up on disclosure has been shown to improve quality over time.
- **Improving equity:** In some cases, a participatory approach can augment scientific or majoritarian decision-making. Recent evidence from Burkina Faso suggests that, in a democratic country, augmenting majority-based voting processes with face-to-face input from underrepresented groups can foster more equitable results.⁶
- **Improving legitimacy of decision-making:** Recent evidence from Costa Rica shows that communities with stronger public water committees and clear rules for tariff collection have better performance in terms of both providing water to rural communities and recovering costs.⁷

Overall, meeting the needs of communities around the world will require a greater level of ambition than has been seen to date. Given the importance of WASH, as well as the unique role that OGP can play in supporting the development and achievement of more ambitious commitments, WASH has been identified as a priority theme within OGP.

Open government approaches to improve water and sanitation fall into a few categories. Ultimately, the goal is to improve the quality of service through greater accountability for results. This happens through improving the data that assist decisions, improving the openness of decision-making itself, and improving the mechanisms for participation and accountability of decisions.

1 Data for WASH decision-making: At a minimum, OGP countries should have open data on basic public services. This data provides transparent information on the level of service being provided, as well as the distribution of those services. Increasing the transparency of information on aspects of service such as equity (including rural versus urban, gender, and economic status), service quality and reliability, sustainability of systems, and change over time are all critical to understanding WASH services. Specific binding constraints within OGP countries are discussed later in the section, “Data for WASH decision-making.”

2 Information about the policy process: This focuses on opening the decisions that determine WASH services. Access to information can be improved for: (a) planning and investment decisions; (b) budgetary data (including tariffs, subsidies, and taxes); (c) publishing service levels and making them more transparent; and (d) procurement processes applications. A discussion of the state of access to information efforts is below.

3 Participation and accountability: Commitments here may range from participatory budgeting to the introduction of accountability measures, such as citizen monitoring. Importantly, these interventions can also evaluate how different populations, including men and women, access and use water and other municipal sanitation services. These may range from one-off interventions to incorporating the public into formal decision-making. Examples include:

- **Municipal water services:** Citizens and civil society can help hold service providers accountable.
 - **Regulatory bodies:** Larger urban areas will typically have some sort of oversight structure, whether from a regulator or water services board. In these cases, participation can include notifying the oversight body of any breaches of the service agreement and ensuring that proscribed action takes place. In many places, citizens have formal roles on the public utility commissions and commissions are required to hold public meetings and hearings. In this way, communities can support monitoring and decision-making, both on behalf of a service provider and in order to hold the service provider accountable. For example, the government of Honduras committed to establish local supervisory units and accountability as part of the Water Regulatory Authority.⁸

- **Report systems and citizen science:** Several water authorities, including in the UK and Kenya, have mobile-phone based leak reporting tools. These tools allow communities to report directly to a utility to accelerate response. In other cases, such as citizen science efforts in the United States, community monitoring is used to track regulatory compliance by utilities.

- **Rural contexts:** In these instances, the service provider is often a community water committee—a team of volunteers responsible for ensuring the operations of a hand-pump or small, piped scheme. Participation can include ensuring that the water committee holds regular meetings with the community with space to express grievances. Another option could be using regular water committee elections to incentivize management that responds to community needs.

- **National scale:** Participation at the national level is especially important in shaping policy and legislation, as well as influencing budgeting. National ministries (i.e., Ministry of Water, Ministry of Health, and Ministry of Finance) ultimately determine what laws guide water and sanitation services and, critically, how funding is allocated. Civil society can play a key role in helping design water and sanitation policies that meet the needs of communities and participatory budgeting can help move investment to places where it is most needed. (See the box title, “Lessons from reformers: Uruguay’s National Water Plan,” for an example of a government taking this approach with their National Water Plan, which was part of its OGP action plan.)



The generalist's guide to water and sanitation



"Public fountain in Marrakesh, Morocco." Photo by Martn, Adobe Stock

Few policy areas present the potential for wide-ranging impact as water access, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH). In 2015, 30 percent of humanity had no access to safely managed drinking water services. Sanitation was even more urgent, with more than 30 percent of the world lacking even basic services.⁹

Improved household access to safe water, dignified sanitation, and good hygiene habits improve health, and with important additional effects.

- **Disease burden:** Access to WASH can reduce diarrhea risk by between 19 and 50 percent, depending on estimates.¹⁰ Other health-related impacts include reduced stunting¹¹ and decreased incidence of neglected tropical diseases.¹² Collectively, improvements to WASH could reduce as much as 10 percent of the global disease burden.¹³
- **Economic growth and stability:** The impacts of improving WASH access go far beyond improving health outcomes. Clean water and healthy workers are key drivers of economic growth, and this effect is not limited to developing countries.
 - a In East Asia, every dollar invested in drinking water and sanitation yields a return of US\$5.30.¹⁴
 - b At the same time, in the United States, every job created in local water and wastewater industries creates nearly four jobs nationally.¹⁵
 - c There is growing evidence that improving WASH also improves education,¹⁶ aids peacebuilding,¹⁷ and improves watersheds and biodiversity.¹⁸
- **Gendered impact:** Every aspect of WASH disproportionality impacts women, in all stages of their lives.¹⁹ Women and girls are most often responsible for collecting water for their family, collectively spending over 200 million hours every single day carrying water.²⁰ Aside from losing productive time, long treks to collect water put women at significant risk of violence and injury.²¹ For young women at school, the insufficient hygiene and sanitation facilities force many girls to miss school during menstruation.²² In addition, because women most often are the primary caretakers, any improvement to WASH also benefits families. Consequently, there is a critical need in data collection and publication to monitor, assess, and address these issues.

The need for basic water and sanitation services goes beyond the household. In both developing and developed countries, the larger community faces critical gaps as well.

- **Schools:** Nearly one-third of schools worldwide lack basic drinking water access and roughly the same amount lack sufficient sanitation facilities.²³ This problem is not limited to developing countries, with major drinking water issues in public schools in the United States²⁴ and Canada.²⁵

- **Healthcare facilities:** Based on a survey of more than 50 low- and middle-income countries, nearly 40 percent of healthcare facilities lack even basic access to water services.²⁶
- **Workplaces and other non-household locations:** International data suggests that other non-household locations actually lag behind households in access to quality water and sanitation services. This is especially acute in temporary use settings, mass gatherings, and dislocated populations.²⁷

Universal goal: Not just for developing countries

International policy and research now clearly recognize that gaps in water and sanitation services are not solely the challenge of developing countries. Their reach is much more pervasive, impacting economies of all sizes.

- **Universal goal:** In a stark transition from the earlier Millennium Development Goals (MDG), the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) acknowledge the critical nature of clean water challenges and have created a dedicated water goal (Goal 6), reflecting both WASH and watershed management. As another departure from the MDG era, the SDGs are designed as a “call for action by all countries, poor, rich and middle-income.”²⁸
- **Sanitation in wealthy countries:** One particularly challenging area for more industrialized countries includes wastewater treatment. Many large cities around the world use combined sewage-stormwater systems, which pump untreated wastewater directly into rivers, streams, and ponds when stormwater overwhelms treatment capacity. In Canada, over 100 million cubic meters of untreated sewage and polluted stormwater flowed directly into waterways in 2016.²⁹

- **Equity:** Advanced economies must also address major challenges in terms of equity of WASH services, with lower income, indigenous, and otherwise marginalized communities facing unique challenges. In the United States, nearly 1.6 million people lack water and sanitation services, with African-American families twice as likely as white families to live without modern plumbing.³⁰ Flint, Michigan, where water quality challenges have made headlines around the world, has the highest poverty rate of any city in the United States. In Flint, in particular, these issues tie directly to concerns of access to information and accountability as insufficient water quality data and accountability of decision-makers have delayed restoring safe water to the community.³¹

A differentiated approach for sub-sectors

In framing the issue, it is important to distinguish between water, sanitation, and hygiene. Solutions must reflect the diversity of institutional and cultural norms across communities and borders.

For example, water enables all other rights; without water, one cannot vote, own property, or live.³² In addition, the right to water is also considered by some to be a right itself, affirmed through national law, such as in the South African constitution. And while it may be a public good in many places, people also continue to get their water from private providers or common pool resources.

While sanitation also enables other rights, both it and hygiene are more frequently treated as private, decentralized responsibilities, making governance even more fragmented. Nonetheless, governments play an important role in providing education, monitoring, regulatory guidance, and financial incentives. These different responsibilities shape the role that open government can play in each sub-sector.





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Uruguay's National Water Plan

Uruguay's 2004 constitutional reform reversed privatization of water and sanitation services. This reform signaled a significant public interest in water and sanitation governance. In 2010, the government initiated a "National Water Plan" (NWP) to enact the constitutional reform. By design, the NWP was required to include perspectives, concerns, and proposals from diverse sectors of society. To achieve its inclusive goals, the government took the following steps:

- Launched a dialogue process for the NWP;
- Held formal discussions about the NWP as required by the relevant laws;
- Created informal spaces for discussion with at least four public meetings and publication of the discussion findings online; and
- Raised awareness by introducing the NWP as part of World Water Day.

Uruguay's concerted approach to broader community engagement worked. The planning process has seen significant progress over the last several years:

- More than 1,500 people participated in formal discussions around the country, including officials, parliamentarians, departmental governments, academia, social organizations, trade unions, media, and citizens.
- The University of the Republic successfully led a dedicated citizen engagement project, leveraging pre-existing platforms such as regional water committees and watershed commissions.
- Following the broad stakeholder engagement, feedback was integrated into the final version of the NWP. Successfully approved at the highest levels of government, the final plan defined ten programs and 30 projects, and established the basis for the formulation of regional plans and premises at the basin level.

Importantly, Uruguay's approach strengthened public systems—reaffirming the value of greater community engagement in decision-making processes. Moving forward, OGP's IRM national researchers have recommended building on the success of the NWP by introducing a citizen monitoring system, and possibly expanding the engagement model to other sectors, such as housing, health, or education.



OGP peers can benefit as well. The Uruguay model provides several lessons to others looking to increase participation in sectoral planning:

- **Publicly document progress:** NWP progress was regularly captured through news updates online, ensuring full transparency in the development process. This helped develop momentum around the process.
- **Ensure institutional support:** Beyond simply responding to a legal requirement, this process had support from the Office of the President. This high-level prioritization can accelerate progress and help ensure success.
- **Leverage existing institutions:** Rather than create new structures to facilitate participation, the development of the NWP invited input from existing institutions like the Regional Water Committees. This approach can build legitimacy by working with well-connected stakeholders and also accelerate the process by avoiding the time-intensive work of developing new stakeholder platforms.

Photo by Matyas Rehak, Adobe Stock

The frontiers of WASH in OGP

OGP members have enacted a variety of reforms related to the accessibility, management transparency, and public accountability of water and sanitation. With commitments ranging from digital mapping of clean drinking water access points to increased collaboration between tenants and landlords in expanding sanitation systems, these reforms can offer opportunities for vast improvements to basic quality of life for all people.

However, despite these successes, WASH continues to be, relative to other public policy areas, greatly underexplored in OGP action plans:

- Twenty-five OGP members have included water commitments at some point in their action plans since 2012. (Nine are implementing relevant commitments as of 2019.) Contrast this with more than twice that number in education or extractives. Some of these commitments are related to environmental management of water, rather than water for drinking, cleaning and washing.

- The 25 members have made a total of 39 water commitments, of which 30 have been assessed by IRM and nine are actively being implemented in eight members.
- IRM has given a star to only one commitment (which is low relative to other policy areas; less than 3 percent compared to 9 percent among non-WASH commitments). (This is featured above in the box, “Uruguay’s National Water Plan”.)

To address the significant challenges presented by the urgency of improving WASH and gaps in current OGP commitments, this report takes a closer look at available data to identify where OGP countries might move next to address: 1) data on the policy area, 2) data on the policy process (with a closer look at spending for marginalized groups), and 3) participation and accountability in water and sanitation.



Data for WASH decision-making

Despite the small number of overall WASH-related commitments and the somewhat new policy focus they represent, OGP efforts were highly-targeted and effective. Eight commitments addressed transparency on water and sanitation services:

- Providing access to data on wastewater treatment facility performance (Chile);
- Developing a portal to share data on water quality being distributed by water treatment plants (Panama);
- Publishing data on the location and performance of water access points (Kigoma, Tanzania);
- Sharing data on publicly funded sanitation services (Peru); and
- Creating a water quality portal in La Libertad, Peru (see “Lessons from reformers: La Libertad” for a longer description of progress and challenges).

Third-party data shows significant room for growth around WASH data. Relative to other sectors (e.g., health and education), water and sanitation data is the most advanced in OGP. However, as the La Libertad example illustrates below, despite the richness of available data, significant problems with interoperability and sustainability continue to constrain this policy area.

The challenges for water data and sanitation data are nearly identical. Figures 1 and 2 show the availability of water data on the websites of national statistical organizations (NSOs) of OGP countries based on Open Data Watch’s Open Data Inventory (ODIN):³³

- Four in five OGP countries publish data on household access to drinking water (79 percent) and household access to sanitation (81 percent). (Column 1 of Figure 1 and 2 respectively.)
- Nearly two-thirds (68 percent for water and 70 percent for sanitation) have data covering three of the last five years, while only a quarter have data for all of the last five years (29 percent and 27 percent respectively). (Column 2.)


- Over the last ten years, more than a third (40 percent and 37 percent respectively) have at least six of those years. (Row 3.)
- Some data is widely available at the national level, and a third (33 percent and 37 percent) have the data at the provincial, state, or regional level, but few (5 percent and 6 percent) maintain municipal-level data. (Rows 4 and 5.) This may be due in a large part to the fragmented nature of such information or, in some cases, lower levels of data may not exist in a shareable format. This is an area for particular improvement in OGP countries.

Further analysis of the ODIN findings regarding open data is both encouraging yet evident of the need for additional commitment focus.

- The positive: Half (47 percent) of OGP countries publish water data in a machine-readable format, allowing for re-use. Two thirds (67 percent) publish the data in a non-proprietary format.
- The negative: Less than half (41 percent) make the data bulk downloadable across indicators, and only a quarter (26 percent) have licenses that allow for re-use.


Despite the relatively high coverage of water and sanitation data, the La Libertad example (later in this section) also shows that when national-level data is not reusable or open, this can lead to major delays and problems with rolling out local-level data initiatives.³⁴

FIGURE 1. Most OGP countries have data on drinking water access, but lack time series and localized data



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017, Access to drinking water data (n=79)

FIGURE 2. Most OGP countries have data on access to improved sanitation, but lack time series and localized data



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017, Access to improved sanitation (n=79)





LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

La Libertad, Peru: The importance of open data in water planning

In La Libertad, like much of Peru, local service providers often lack the technical and financial resources to ensure access to safe water. As a result, “uncertainty about water quality is constant among users.”³⁵ In response to these challenges, as part of its OGP action plan, the government of La Libertad planned to build a web platform with updated information on the “coverage and quality of water for human consumption,” as well as information on sanitation services. In addition, the site would allow the public the ability to share water and sanitation challenges and register suggestions and emergency requests.

To coordinate between agencies, levels of government, and sectors, the first step was to establish a committee to lead. The committee designed the information needed for the web portal, identified data sources, and supported development of the platform.

Even with its emphasis on coordination between sectors and levels of government, the committee faced challenges in opening this data. The original plan called for data to be provided by the Ministry of Housing, Construction and Sanitation. The committee was unable to share the data, however, due to a restrictive license. The committee ended up using different data from an existing platform developed by the Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation. Consequently, the platform had to be developed differently and may not be as easily updatable. At the time of the IRM review, the website was nearly complete, although it was not yet launched.

La Libertad demonstrates how, even when data is publicly available, restrictive licensing and formatting issues can be a major technical roadblock to improving services.

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Photo by Monica Tijero, World Bank

Information on the policy process

Twenty-one OGP commitments focus on transparent water and sanitation decision-making. This makes these commitments the most common at nearly two-thirds of all WASH commitments. Specific commitments have included:

- Increasing transparency in the application process for developing new water services (Albania);
- Developing a process for elaborating service-level standards for water access (Tanzania, when it was still a part of OGP);
- Publishing information related to water investment plans (Kenya);
- Implementing standards to share procurement data (Honduras); and
- Training external stakeholders to use open contracting data for monitoring procurement processes (Honduras).

Beyond commitments within OGP, we can look at where the broader strengths of governance are within the water and sanitation sectors, at least at the national level. This can be done using the Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS) database, the product of a UN-Water initiative implemented by the World Health Organization (WHO). The GLAAS database covers 36 of 79 OGP countries, primarily in the global south, as well as Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

GLAAS data is unique among the datasets used in preparing this report in that it shows, for most indicators, that OGP countries are not outperforming their peers.³⁶ Relative to three decision-making areas of focus, the data found:


- **Planning:** The majority of OGP countries report having plans in place for sanitation and drinking water in both settings. More of these plans remain unimplemented than implemented. Less than half have hygiene plans in place. (See Figure 3 on the next page for details.)
- **Finance:** The majority of OGP countries publish expenditure data on water and sanitation in rural and urban settings, although a significant majority do not publish domestic expenditures, official development assistance (ODA), and non-ODA expenditures. (See Figure 4 on the next page for details.) There is irregular data on water- and sanitation-system capacity for cost-recovery through tariffs, adequacy of revenue, and absorption of funds.³⁷
- **Monitoring:** Roughly a third of OGP countries have robust monitoring systems in place for planning, resource allocation, and quality of service delivery in the water sector. Sanitation tracking is significantly better with nearly half of OGP countries having monitoring systems in place. Specific measures taken to monitor service delivery to people living in poverty are roughly consistent with other figures. (See Figure 5 on the next page for details.)

In addition to general transparency, the data shows the degree to which planning integrates specific reference to vulnerable populations.

- **Planning for vulnerable populations:** More than two-thirds of plans have measures referencing people living in poverty, remote populations, people with disabilities, and informal settlements. Roughly half reference women, populations with high disease burden, and indigenous populations. (See Figure 6.)
- **Spending on vulnerable populations:** There is, however, a significant disconnect when connecting commitments and planning to actual specific measures and finance dedicated to these same population segments. Among the same group of countries, fewer than half have dedicated expenditures to target vulnerable populations. Less than a quarter followed through on their plans to address vulnerable populations. (See Figure 7.)




FIGURE 3. A minority of OGP countries surveyed publish and follow national water, sanitation, and hygiene plans




Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): National Plans

FIGURE 4. Over half of OGP countries surveyed publish some expenditures by WASH subsector, but less than a quarter publicize government and ODA reports



Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): Expenditures

FIGURE 5. Relevant data is published and used for decision-making in roughly half of OGP countries. Use of sanitation data lags behind water



Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): Sectoral data and decision-making

The financing gap is supported by additional GLAAS findings. The report shows that there is a significant disconnect between expenditures in relatively wealthy, urban areas and poor urban and rural areas. The gap between planning to address vulnerable groups and actually providing services creates several opportunities for OGP countries seeking to reach people living in poverty:


- Improve tracking systems and expenditures on a project-by-project basis. Specifically, improve the interoperability of data to enable greater focus on poorer areas. Improved data includes geo-coding plans and expenditures, creating unique identifiers for interventions, and creating special tags when interventions aim to help vulnerable populations. TrackFin is a globally accepted standard method for gathering this information.³⁸ (See the box later in the section.)

- Conduct accountability and audit measures to verify that revenue allocated for the poor reaches its intended target. The GLAAS survey looks at twelve indicators covering the categories of responsibility, answerability, and enforceability, but does not look at these directly through the lens of marginalized communities. It is an area of future development.³⁹
- Enable the public to carry out informal audits and reporting where plans, budgets, and expenditures do not align.

This latter set of considerations moves beyond concerns around process transparency, to specific interventions which can help improve public involvement in decision-making and accountability for official actions (and inactions).




FIGURE 6. Most OGP countries surveyed publish plans to reach vulnerable populations



Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): Planning for Vulnerable Groups

FIGURE 7. Most finance plans do not have specific means to target vulnerable populations



Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): Planning for Vulnerable Groups



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Municipal budget and spending data for water in the Netherlands

Starting in 2015, Dutch local governments began providing financial data through a web portal at www.openspending.nl. However, this data was initially only available at the aggregate level, making it difficult to access critical detailed and local information. In 2016, as part of its action plan, the Netherlands committed to improving the availability of more detailed data (such as budgets, annual reports, income, expenditure and revenue) in a machine-readable format. While the commitment extended beyond water, water management authorities were noted specifically in the action plan.

The focus of this commitment has been providing necessary support to local municipalities and regional authorities, including water authorities. The commitment called for three milestones:

1. Develop resources, including a handbook, an instruction video, and a promotional video;
2. Implement three pilots with local governments to add context to open data; and
3. Host two national workshops.

The Netherlands achieved substantial progress on these milestones and completed many on time. A comprehensive handbook that provides guidance to data providers on how to share data has been distributed to all stakeholders. Additionally, the videos were completed and the first national workshop was held as part of the Netherlands' "How Open Festival."

This commitment made significant progress increasing transparency of the governance process and publishing information about how water management authorities chose to invest their funds. This provides information that can increase accountability, enable advocacy, and create space for participation. The IRM recommended expanding this data





provision, stating that “the government should consider developing a participatory budgeting interface.”⁴⁰

This experience provided lessons that may be useful for other OGP countries looking to make similar commitments:

- **Prioritize data in response to demand:** The basis for this commitment was specific requests from data users (i.e. citizens, journalists, and others). Governments often have access to massive amounts of information about water and sanitation. By prioritizing data that has been specifically requested, the impact of investments in open data is assured.
- **Start small:** While the original commitment called for participation of 75 decentralized authorities in 2016 and 150 decentralized authorities in 2017, this aggressive approach turned out to be infeasible. In 2017, the relevant milestone was revised to focus on three targets in order “to gain experience on a smaller scale with improving the quality and the scale-up potential.”⁴¹ Sharing financial data, especially data around something as critical as water services, can be politically sensitive. Starting with a small pilot can build a strong case to demonstrate that data-sharing information can be a political opportunity, rather than a risk.
- **Prepare for accelerated progress:** The goal of this commitment was to improve public accountability and participation “because users know how money is spent in their government and they can participate and better use the right to challenge.”⁴² Recognizing that a key role of opening the data is to encourage participation, commitments to increase transparency should anticipate the corresponding increase in participation. Effective commitments at this level can be paired with commitments to increase platforms for participation at the same time.

Photo by Hansenn, Adobe Stock

Public involvement in policy and implementation

To date, there has been limited OGP investment in public participation and accountability in the WASH sector. This is supported by third-party data which shows that participation policies, while nearly universal, are not commonly implemented. As of 2018, 11 OGP commitments aimed to increase participation in water and sanitation services. Specific commitments include:

- Engaging citizens through a mobile application to report water leaks (Dominican Republic)
- Engaging communities in identifying and preparing for risks to water sources (Honduras)
- Collaborating with civil society to improve water efficiency in the Netherlands (see the previous box for an example)
- Creating platforms for landlords and residents to collaborate on improving household sanitation in slums (Sekondi-Takoradi, Ghana)
- Developing a national water plan with input from civil society and other stakeholders in Uruguay (see the earlier box on Uruguay for a longer discussion)

These commitments reflect new avenues for participation both in direct service provision as well as in helping shape policy. They do, however, demonstrate room for improvement. In preparing this report, the authors evaluated all of the OGP WASH commitments which allowed feedback from the public. While 11 did allow for the public to give input, none provided feedback from the government to the public about how inputs were used.

As OGP commitments are limited in this area, it is important to outline where room for future improvement may lie. The GLAAS report again has helpful data,⁴³ showing just how many of the 36 OGP countries reporting to UN-Water have public participation procedures in place and how many follow them.

Figure 8 on the next page shows that, of the countries reporting, nearly all have policies, regulations, or laws requiring participation in urban and rural sanitation, urban and rural water, hygiene, and water resources management. No fewer than three-quarters of OGP

countries have such policies in place. (The GLAAS database does not evaluate such procedures for their strength, legal force, or enforcement.)

Actual practice stands in stark contrast to stated policy. With the exception of rural water, less than 1 in 10 countries had high rates of participation in water and sanitation planning. Again, aside from rural water, fewer than half had any participation at all. (A subsector analysis is available in Figure 9 on the next page.) Given that this data is based on government-validated reporting from national stakeholder meetings, the stark contrast should be taken seriously. In addition, the survey does not explore the quality of public participation or whether the public had any influence on policy or discussion. Resources exist which can help to foster an environment for participation in water and sanitation.⁴⁴


The 2014 GLAAS survey looked at public access to enforcement mechanisms. (The most recent 2016 survey did not feature this question.) While the data is now more than five years old, less than half of the population had access to effective complaint mechanisms in the majority of subsectors and countries surveyed.⁴⁵ The survey did not define exactly what was meant by “effective complaint mechanisms.” How that is defined is almost certainly contextual. What is clear is that much progress can be made on improving access to and feedback from various complaint mechanisms where service providers or regulators do not carry out their services.

As a result, there is significant room for OGP countries to begin working:

- For the minority of countries without policies on public participation in sectors, there is room to improve general policy.
- For others, there is significant room to improve the quality of existing public participation policies, especially where such policies require the establishment of standing committees, open meetings of water commissions, and other regularized and institutionalized participation.




FIGURE 8. Almost all OGP countries surveyed have rules for public participation in planning and monitoring



Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): Public participation procedures

FIGURE 9. Very few OGP countries had high levels of participation in WASH decision-making processes



Source: WHO GLAAS database (2017): Public participation in practice

Standards for transparency and participation in WASH



“Woman washing clothes next to a latrine at the shore of the Itaya River, Iquitos City, Peru.” Photo by Monica Tijero / World Bank

For OGP countries looking to address WASH through their action plans, standards around water reporting build on the experience of other systems and allow for learning and comparison. Using existing standard reporting processes reduces conceptual work and makes systems compatible and comparable across service providers and countries. Following are some of the existing standards and how they might be applied.

- **Basic level and quality of service data:** These standards provide a clear and globally endorsed data standard, technical guidance, and a global data repository that enables all stakeholders to easily access and analyze data about water services. With relatively low barriers to entry, countries can commit to collecting and sharing data through these frameworks.
 - *Rural water:* The Water Point Data Exchange (WPDx)⁴⁶ sets a standard for mapping and collecting rural water data. (See footnote for a useful case study on the advantages and considerations of water point data.⁴⁷)
 - *Urban utilities:* Performance data can be shared through the International Benchmarking Network for Water and Sanitation Utilities (IBNET).⁴⁸
- *Sanitation tracking methods:* Outside of harmonized monitoring frameworks, countries can commit to piloting newer approaches to monitoring water and sanitation services, such as tracking safe management of fecal waste through the emerging “Excretia Flow Diagram” methodology (typically known by a more colorful acronym, “SFD”), and publishing the results.⁴⁹
- *Regional initiative:* Several regional efforts exist to encourage monitoring and transparency of water and sanitation services. Efforts such as the Africa Water Sector and Sanitation Monitoring and Reporting platform,⁵⁰ supported by the African Minister’s Council on Water, provide regional opportunities to share data transparently on water and sanitation. The Water and Sanitation Information System (“SIASAR” in Spanish) is a similar regional initiative for Central and South America.
- *Household use surveys:* Another approach to standardized data is to look at consumers rather than service providers. One example includes the Multiple Indicator Cluster Surveys

(MICS),⁵¹ an international household survey developed by UNICEF and Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS),⁵² and supported by USAID. These nationally representative surveys provide critical insights on water and sanitation coverage.

- **Improving governance oversight:** Several standard methods can provide clarity on how and why decisions are made.

- *The Open Contracting Data Standard*⁵³ may be utilized with a specific focus on water-related projects or programs that engage citizens in monitoring public contracting to provide timely feedback and fix problems.
- *The Global Analysis and Assessment of Sanitation and Drinking-Water (GLAAS)*⁵⁴ initiative, implemented by WHO, provides powerful information about the policy and enabling environment for water and sanitation. (A large portion of this section was based on GLAAS data.)

- **Involving the public in management:**

Diverse stakeholders can participate in the WASH sector through a Joint Sector Review (JSR). JSRs are “a periodic assessment of performance within [a specific sector like water and sanitation] by government, development partners, and civil society. The reviews are ideally an integral part of the country’s planning and reporting cycle.”⁵⁵ UN-Water and WHO have standardized tools and monitoring support for the development of the joint sector review. Committing to hold a JSR provides a strong starting point for participation by all stakeholders if properly conducted.⁵⁶

Endnotes

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OGP Global Report

Public Services

Health



Key points

OGP members have taken an extremely varied approach to dealing with health, from citizen monitoring of local expenditures to bringing members of the public into major regulatory and policy decisions. Major areas for future initiatives may include improving universal health coverage and primary care, reproductive health (including prenatal, maternal, and neonatal care), and improving the general budget and integrity. A general overview of key points is below:

- **Data on the policy area**

Health outcomes data and data on reproductive health lag far behind data on inputs. OGP members may consider commitments to centralize and make comparable data on health facilities, outcomes, and reproductive health, with special focus on disaggregation by gender and at local levels.


- **Information on the policy process**

- *Universal healthcare planning and tracking:* The majority of OGP members covered by the World Health Organization's Universal Health Coverage database have plans in place to achieve this goal, but a minority regularly publish data on progress. While methods vary on measurement, OGP members may consider publishing performance metrics and monitoring toward universal health coverage.
- *Health procurement:* According to in-country experts, most OGP members did not have fully open, competitive bidding processes. Notably, about one-third did have strong systems. OGP members may address this by expanding user-centered open-contracting systems for key elements of the health system.
- *Program-level budgeting:* Most OGP members had program-level budgeting, but fewer reported on expenditures and outcomes. Most reporting focused on inputs and outputs, rather than performance. OGP members wishing to focus on this area may work on disaggregating budget data and introducing output tracking into these systems.

- **Participation and accountability**

OGP members, where they do focus on improving participation and accountability in health, have largely focused on citizen input into policy and strategy. A smaller group has focused on budget and supply tracking. Four governments have focused on accountability for patient outcomes. Where OGP members wish to focus on improving systems of accountability, actions can focus on creating the institutions for social accountability within the context of other more formal systems of accountability such as ombudsman's offices and auditors.





There is a global consensus that tackling health issues is not only key to development, but also to ensuring inclusive, sustainable growth across all economies. An argument for the importance of universal coverage and access to quality healthcare is beyond the scope of this report. However, it is sufficient to say that improving health outcomes is a globally agreed-upon goal. (For beginners in this field see “Good to know: Health policy for generalists.”)

Opening government is one of many possible means of tackling the complexity of today’s health challenges, including achieving bold goals like universal access to care and successfully addressing the specific challenges of particular illnesses.

As with other public services, open government approaches to health, while broad, can fall roughly into three major categories:

1. Data on health inputs and outcomes: This includes data on major diseases, reproductive health outcomes, and facilities for decision-making.
2. Information on the policy process: This includes policy-making, budgetary decisions and prioritization, and procurement and implementation.
3. Participation and accountability: These approaches include improving public means of giving input, hearing feedback, and getting government response to concerns.

Newborn boy rests next his mother in the maternity ward at the Princess Christian Maternity Hospital, in Freetown Sierra Leone. (Photo byDominic Chavez/World Bank)



Families wait to see a nurse to vaccinate their children in Beirut, Lebanon. (Photo by Dominic Chavez, World Bank)

The majority of OGP members with action plans have included health as a focus area in their action plans (43 of 85), as of the time of writing. In total, of more than 3,000 commitments, 120 health-related commitments have been included in action plans since OGP's beginning, with 54 commitments active in 25 countries or localities. This means health-related commitments are relatively common within OGP. In comparison with other policy areas, health is the second-most common public service-related category after education.

Of the 120 commitments, OGP countries focus on the following (in non-exclusive categories):

- **Data:** Seventy-five commitments (63%) concern data publication on performance of the health sector (e.g., patient outcomes) and other digital services that improve health sector transparency and service delivery.

- **Participation:** Forty commitments (33%) involve citizens participating in decisions about health, such as clinic construction or policy design.
- **Accountability:** Fourteen commitments (12%) are about accountability (for example, Kigoma Ujiji implemented social audits of medicine delivery to the public hospital). This is lower than the overall average in other sectors, which is 24%.

A smaller subset of health data commitments have—sometimes unintentionally—dealt with privacy, a necessary companion to any discussion on openness, especially when it is affecting the release of patient or local data. For example, the UK commitment on National Health System data provided an important opportunity for discussion of privacy in healthcare. (See “Lessons from Reformers: UK” later this section.)

Findings by health policy area



Much of this section is structured around the types of contributions open government approaches can make to health policy and practice through transparency, participation, and accountability. Consequently, it is organized around open government values of access to information (data and non-data information), public participation, and accountability.

For health practitioners, it may be useful to look at the specific health areas featured in this section organized by topic. These were decided based on a combination of their universal applicability to OGP countries and the availability of data. The section includes data on the following topics (sources in parentheses):

1. Health facilities and inputs

- a Availability of open data on facilities and budgets (Open Data Watch)
- b Program based budgeting in middle and low income countries (International Budget Partnership and the Overseas Development Institute)
- c Public integrity of health procurement (World Justice Project)

2. Universal health coverage and primary care

- a Universal healthcare policy and monitoring data (World Health Organization)

3. Quality of care

- a Availability of open data on health outcomes (Open Data Watch)
- b A review of community scorecards and other social accountability interventions (various organizations)
- c Performance monitoring of health programs (International Budget Partnership)

4. Reproductive health

- a Availability of open data on reproductive health access and outcomes (Open Data Watch)
- b Budget transparency for reproductive health (Population Action International and International Planned Parenthood Foundation)



Health policy for generalists



Photo by Xixinxing, Adobe Stock

Ensuring that everyone has access to quality health services and results is a core responsibility of modern democracies. Achieving this requires efforts by multiple layers of government, private sector actors, academics, community and nonprofit organizations, and individual citizens.

The sheer breadth of the field can be overwhelming for non-health specialists, and while some challenges are universal, others are particular to individual countries. The final design of interventions, of course, will depend on the public priorities of each locale:

Healthcare interventions can address any of the following focus areas:

Health facilities and inputs

- Primary healthcare, including “patient-centered healthcare”
- Reproductive, maternal, newborn, child, and adolescent health (RMNCAH)
- Pandemics
- Nutrition
- Infectious diseases
- Non-communicable diseases

- Mental health
- Medical research

Within any of these focus areas, there are specific policy and implementation areas which can be addressed:

- Policy and rules
- Standards enforcement (accountability around behavior)
- Budget and resource management
- Procurement and pricing
- Human resource management (staffing, training, attitudes)
- Service delivery
- Health insurance, universal health coverage, and healthcare registration

Actors may include:

- Policy makers (including legislatures and independent commissions)
- State-run facilities
- Autonomous state-sponsored organizations (such as medical research agencies)
- Private sector (for-profit) actors

- Workers
- Patients and their families or communities
- Nonprofit actors (including secular, religious, community-based, or international organizations)

Given the multiplicity of goals, levels of decision-making, and actors, reforms in OGP will need to target opening up those decisions within the highest-impact focus areas. While

in one country, non-contagious diseases may be the greatest contributor to morbidity and mortality, another may deal with the acute problem of pandemics or ensuring universal access to primary care. It is beyond the scope of this report to carry out a problem assessment for each country, but only to offer a list of possible focus areas.

OGP and health

There is no comprehensive or systematic data on the existence or quality of healthcare participation or accountability in OGP countries. In the absence of such information, we can only suggest that the frontiers of participation and accountability exist at multiple levels, and in a number of types of decisions. Without third-party data, this report cannot assess the “revealed” need of OGP countries, but with OGP-Independent Reporting Mechanism data, this report can evaluate the “expressed” emphasis of OGP countries.

In preparation for this OGP Flagship Report, the authors reviewed dozens of commitments focusing on improving public voice and accountability in decision-making. The evidence suggests that there is a definite emphasis within action plans. The emphasis is largely at the national level and there is a strong emphasis on general monitoring, especially performance monitoring. The full list of commitments by category is available in “Civic participation and public accountability commitments in health” next page. The principal categories of commitments are:

- **Advisory councils and citizen policy-making:** The largest group of commitments (nine in total) deal with citizen policy-making or input into programming of healthcare delivery.

- **Public monitoring of performance:** Six commitments cover public monitoring of agency performance. Of which, three are local. The remaining three were in Brazil’s second action plan.
- **Budget and expenditure tracking:** Five commitments cover public monitoring of expenditures.
- **Conflicts of interest policies:** Two countries dealt with conflicts of interest in health policy (Argentina generally and Mexico for the specific issue of obesity).
- **Social accountability:** Two action plans focused on scaling up social accountability at the community level (Mongolia and Uruguay).
- **Public science:** The United States has had a number of commitments on public science.
- **Patient empowerment:** Beyond feedback mechanisms (in Buenos Aires), no action plans dealt with empowering patients (whether through a system of ombudsman’s offices or patient advocates), improving liability regimes, or patients’ rights.





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LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Civic participation and public accountability commitments in health

OGP commitments undertaken to improve public input and accountability in health are below. These can help inspire other countries to adapt similar commitments as appropriate.

- **Advisory councils and citizen input into policy:** These commitments deal with citizens giving input into regulation, policy, and programs around healthcare practice.
 - Colombia (2nd action plan) – Develop initiatives to deal with health and other issues, especially with marginalized communities through the “Bank of Initiatives,” a citizen proposal platform.
 - Denmark (1st action plan) – Create digital opportunities for public input to identify efficiencies in key welfare services, including health.
 - Indonesia (5th action plan) – Create citizen complaint tools and a framework for participation including in the health sector.
 - Paraguay (3rd action plan) – Improve citizen involvement in policy formation and resource allocation for the health sector.
 - South Korea (4th action plan) – Enhance the operation of the food safety inspection committee through a public petition system.
 - Spain (2nd action plan) – Create the multistakeholder Spanish Council on Drug Dependence.
 - Sri Lanka (1st action plan) – Form an advisory council to improve safe and affordable medicines for all.
 - Uruguay (2nd action plan) – Develop a Dialogue Table to advise on the use and distribution of health data nationally.
 - Uruguay (3rd action plan) – Public dialogue on the policy to provide personal assistance for people with disabilities.



- **Public monitoring of health agency performance:** These commitments would improve mechanisms for feedback to health clinics and agencies, ranging from complaint mechanisms to public advocates.
 - Bojonegoro, Indonesia (1st action plan) – Public evaluation of service at community health clinics.
 - Brazil (2nd action plan) – Foster public participation through digital involvement in health councils.
 - Brazil (2nd action plan) – Allow public input into the Health Surveillance Agency’s monitoring of data through a consultation system.
 - Brazil (2nd action plan) – Expand the National Ombudsman’s System to improve the system for public participation in health.
 - Buenos Aires, Argentina (1st action plan) – Create an integrated portal for citizens to report on sexual and reproductive health services.
 - Tbilisi, Georgia (1st action plan) – Create citizen feedback mechanisms on basic city services.
- **Budget and expenditure tracking:** These commitments involve the public in budgeting and ensuring that expenditures match delivery of goods and services.
 - Brazil (2nd action plan) – Establish a public budget monitoring system to track expenditures for food and nutrition security.
 - Burkina-Faso (1st action plan) – Establish citizen committees to monitor racketeering in health provision.
 - Guatemala (2nd action plan) – Empower multi-sectoral technical advisory committees to monitor corruption in the health sector.
 - Indonesia (3rd and 5th action plans) – Establish participatory mechanisms to monitor the allocation and use of public health subsidies (“Health Contribution Assistance”).
 - Peru (2nd action plan) – Involve the public in accountability efforts for allocation and spending on the school food program, “Qali Warma.”
- **Medicine tracking:** These commitments track the delivery of medicine to hospitals and clinics to ensure their arrival.
 - Elgeyo Marakwet, Kenya (1st and 2nd action plans) – Involve the public in tracking medical drug supply chains.





Photo by Nitro, Adobe Stock

- Honduras (2nd and 3rd action plans) – Involve the public in tracking spending on medicine and other medical supplies.
 - **Conflicts of interest policies:** These commitments seek to improve ethical guidance around the formation of health policy.
 - Argentina (3rd action plan) – Improve transparency and participation in health policy-making through guidance on conflicts of interest.
 - Mexico (3rd action plan) – Develop conflict of interest guidelines around policies dealing with obesity as a public health issue.
 - **Social accountability:** These commitments involve local citizens monitoring and advocating for improved health service delivery.
 - Mongolia (2nd action plan) – Local citizens can use social accountability tools to nurture dialogue at the local level for health and education services.
 - Uruguay (1st action plan) – Newly-trained social accountability activists are calling on the government to respond to their healthcare needs and improve service delivery. Trainees who evaluated medical procurements in their community identified potential savings equivalent to ten percent of the health budget.
 - **Public science:** These commitments aim to make publicly funded research and regulatory processes more transparent and publish the results of such processes.
 - United States (1st and 2nd action plans) – The Food and Drug Administration and other scientific regulatory bodies will encourage expert feedback through ExpertNet and other proactive participation tools.¹
 - United States (3rd action plan) – Members of the public and experts will be able to give input into the President’s Precision Medicine Initiative.
-



Little Gevorg at eye check-up, Kotayk region. Armenia. (Photo by Armine Grigoryan, World Bank)

The Frontiers of health governance in OGP

Using the typology of open government interventions listed previously, we can get a better sense of where the current binding constraints (or “pain points”) are for OGP members, based on third-party data. Data on health sector governance—especially open governance—is currently a patchwork and not as comprehensive as in other public service sectors. Nonetheless, this section aims to identify where the most effective interventions might be for the typical OGP member in data availability, information on decision-making, public participation, and accountability measures.

Data for decision-making

Open data advocates from a number of organizations have mapped the coverage, disaggregation, and openness of data for health. Open Data Watch’s Open

Data Inventory (ODIN) gives the most complete picture of the state of open data for health in all of OGP’s national-level membership.² ODIN aggregates all available statistics from each OGP member’s national statistical organization (NSO) around more than 20 policy areas, including health. The advantage to this data, in comparison with many other data sources, is that it is sourced entirely from national websites. The data does not speak to data quality beyond elements of coverage and availability. Making sure that data is trustworthy and accurate is beyond the scope of this report or the currently available data. Even so, the mere availability of data, however flawed, increases the likelihood of cross-comparison with other sources and audit opportunities by experts, practitioners, and the public. This section looks at the availability of public data on health facilities, health outcomes, and maternal and reproductive health.



Health facilities data


Data on health facilities tracks the inputs that make much of healthcare possible. It includes the number and type of facility, staffing, and beds or budget data. Most OGP countries collect and publish data on health facilities. (See Figure 1 for specific numbers.)

- Availability and disaggregation:** In three-fourths of OGP countries, the data covers public, private, and nonprofit facilities or disaggregates by types of facilities (e.g., hospitals and clinics). A few countries do not make this data available or do not disaggregate this data. (See Figure 1, top row.) For this subset of countries, collecting and publishing this data could be a useful contribution.
- Time series data:** As with many public services examined while preparing this report, while the data is available for the most recent year (2017), less data is available over the course of the last

several years, and there are many gaps. Few OGP countries (less than one in 20) provide data for most of the last decade. This makes tracking improvements and comparisons difficult. (See Figure 1, rows 2 and 3.) A significant portion of this is because data was published in different formats or publications (such as pages of larger government reports in .pdf format) or was not available at all for prior years. Hopefully, now that many governments are publishing in open formats, all future data will also be open.

- Geographic disaggregation:** A small minority of OGP countries have this data disaggregated at the provincial or “level one” administrations (municipal or county level). Most have no disaggregated data, while a few have patchworks of data for subnational territories. (See Figure 1, row 4 and 5.)

FIGURE 1. Most OGP countries’ NSOs publish recent health facilities data (hospital beds, budgets, personnel), but it is rarely disaggregated or available over longer time periods




Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017, Health facilities (n=79)

Health outcomes data

Most OGP countries collect and publish data on some health outcomes, but few publish data on immunization rates, disease prevention, and health maintenance.

- Availability and disaggregation:** In the majority of OGP countries, at least one dataset (immunization, disease prevention, and health maintenance) are available, although only 1 in 8 has all three datasets available. An equal number of countries do not make this data available at all. (See Figure 2, top row.)
- Time series data:** Before 2018, data is patchy. Almost all OGP countries have some of the data for three of the last five years or five of the last ten years, but very few have annual coverage. (See Figure 2, rows 2 and 3.)
- Geographic disaggregation:** One OGP country has data available for all provinces. Another 25% have partial coverage. The vast majority have no disaggregated data by geography. (See Figure 2, rows 4 and 5.)

FIGURE 2. Few OGP countries' NSOs publish comprehensive data on immunization, disease prevention and health maintenance



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017, Health outcomes (n=79)




Reproductive health data

Reproductive health data, at a minimum, covers maternal mortality, infant mortality, under-five mortality rates, fertility rates, contraceptive availability, and adolescent birth rates. Again, most OGP countries have some of this data, but most do not have all of this data.

- **Availability and disaggregation:** In the majority of OGP countries, this data is available in some form, although only 1 in 8 has all three datasets available. An equal number of countries do not make this data available at all. The remainder have some data (See Figure 3, row 1.)
- **Time series data:** Of the countries that had data for 2017, only one-in-four had available data covering the prior years. (See Figure 3, rows 2 and 3.)

- **Geographic disaggregation:** No OGP country has made all reproductive health data available at the provincial level. Nearly half have some datasets available at that level. The vast majority have no disaggregated data by geography, especially below the provincial level. (See Figure 3, rows 4 and 5.) This is likely in many cases because the data is decentralized, and may not be standardized, or does not exist.

FIGURE 3. Roughly a quarter of OGP countries' NSOs publish comprehensive data on reproductive, maternal, neonatal and child health. It is rarely disaggregated, nor is it available over time.



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017, Reproductive health (n=79)



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Trust, privacy, and openness in UK health reform

The National Health Service (NHS) remains an immensely popular part of the public welfare system in the UK, but most citizens also agree that it could be more effective and efficient. Citizens want to know their options for the best possible care and some budget-minded politicians seek to cut costs and identify a role for private providers.

Since OGP's founding, the UK has put improving health outcomes and efficiencies at the center of its OGP efforts. Indeed, making health outcome data usable by the public has been a major initiative between 2011 and 2016 in UK OGP action plans.

The first and second UK OGP action plans aimed to address these issues by publishing open data and seeking feedback from the public. The efforts, in some respects, have been clear successes. In other respects, the NHS stumbled upon a much more complex set of issues around the limits of transparency.³

The Reforms

Improving healthcare was a central part of the UK story in OGP. Indeed, at the initial launch of the Partnership, the UK touted the release and impact of clinical performance data in improving surgical outcomes. The first OGP action plan set up ministry-level "transparency councils" which had various stakeholders (providers, members of the public, and officials) to identify high-priority datasets to release. The second action plan, beginning in 2013, had two commitments that aimed to improve NHS performance. They covered:

- Publication of clinical and other performance indicators,
- Implementation of a patient recommendation tool, and
- A "Patient-Centred Outcome Measurement" (PCOM) tool on services available for rare and complex medical conditions.






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The Results

Many of the outcomes from each of the initiatives were significant. Others provide insight into future reforms. They include:


- **Clinical performance data:** Twelve core clinical datasets and data from general practice settings, adult social care, and patient-centered outcome measurements were published. Overall, more than 7,000 new datasets on health and clinical and performance data are now available on an easily searchable data platform. In March 2015, the NHS reported that it had achieved coverage of 97% of practices and clinics. NHS England was working toward “better open data.”⁴
- **Social care data:** Progress on the release of information about social care services was slower. The government “proposed to re-baseline the ambition to achieve 8,750 by April 2015 and 10,000 by April 2016,” through work with partners like home care providers.⁵
- **Public feedback:** The Friends and Family Test, piloted in 2013, was rolled out across all care settings. The published aggregate data included over five million pieces of feedback. The NHS Insight Team is using this data to feed into service improvement. NHS England claims the changes have helped drive up healthcare standards leading to “many improvements, large and small, across the country,” but there was no clear evidence for how these changes fed into broader improved standards.⁶

The Setback

Care.data was a cornerstone of this bundle of reforms. It aimed to centralize patient data through the General Practice Extraction Service which covers more than 9,000 primary care clinics in the UK.⁷ Patients would need to opt out of their data being shared, otherwise it would be shared with the public database.

Immediately, the program met with resistance, eventually leading to its closure. A broad range of concerns included:

- **Medical professionals concerns:** In 2014, 40% of general practices opted out of the scheme due to lack of confidence in the program’s ability to maintain their standard of “total confidentiality.”¹⁰
- **Civil society concerns:** Within OGP, the involved civil society organizations refused to engage with the commitment, as they shared



the privacy concerns of medical staff. Namely, members of the public were concerned about: (1) how researchers would access data; (2) whether data would or could stay anonymous; and (3) whether the public could properly consent to their data being used.¹¹

- **Review and concern:** In June 2015, the Major Projects Authority gave care.data the lowest possible rating, “red,” meaning the project seemed “unachievable.” This was, in part, due to administrative issues, but also due to the major outcry over privacy concerns.¹²
- **Report and closure:** In 2016, Dame Fiona Caldicott, the national data guardian, issued a report on the patient privacy in the scheme (referred to as “Caldicott 3” after its 1998 and 2013 predecessors), which confirmed privacy concerns,¹³ and the program closed immediately. The report confirmed that there had been sale of private data for years.¹⁴

Care.data lessons

For other countries looking into opening health data, the lessons of [care.data](#) are three-fold. It seems that, however controversial, there were adequate checks in place to ensure accountability in the end.

- **Protections of privacy:** There needed to be adequate protections ex-ante to ensure the protection of personal data, and assurances of appropriate re-use.
- **Deliberation and trust:** There was little involvement of the public or service providers in the discussion of how such data might be properly anonymized. The “Caldicott 3” report identified this as a major solution to restoring trust and seeing if this could go forward at all.
- **Public watchdogs:** The Major Projects Authority’s annual report as well as the National Data Guardian’s report both provided public opportunities for a reckoning with the considerable risks and costs of these major data initiatives.

Photo by Simone D. McCourtie, World Bank





Keeping accounts, Kegalle Provincial Health Services Department, Sri Lanka. (Photo by Simone D. McCourtie/World Bank)

Transparency in policy and budgets

Beyond data, opening decisions in the health sector requires the public to know about decisions—what they are, when they are made, who makes them, and whether they are implemented. When it comes to health, it is difficult to make system-wide conclusions about the state of openness in decision-making.

In short, there is not yet a global dataset (or sets) on health system governance and which decisions are public. There are, however, scattered indicators across a number of global assessments that begin to paint a picture of the level of transparency within the sector.¹⁵ Gathering data on national-level systems is difficult as stakeholders come from different parts of society, decision-making takes place at multiple levels, service delivery is carried out by for-profit, nonprofit, and government agencies, and issues can be complex and highly technical. Of course, that is not

unique to the issue of health. There are successful cross-national sectoral reviews in other fields, environment¹⁶ or press freedom¹⁷ for example, that also involve complex ecosystems with actors at multiple levels. Such cross-national comparisons do not exist in a comprehensive fashion for the governance of the health sector. Though tools have been developed and deployed to assess corruption risk¹⁸ or to track budgets and expenditures¹⁹ they have not been taken to scale as they have in the water sector.

At the risk of introducing some amount of “availability bias,” this report presents the data around decision-making in the health sector for OGP countries in three aspects of health of decision-making: (1) universal health coverage policies, (2) procurement data, and (3) budget transparency.


Universal health coverage policy transparency

One of the challenges for the majority of countries globally is achieving universal access to quality primary care. There is accessible data on the coverage and quality of healthcare at the national level available for many OGP countries (see prior section), but comprehensive health policy information is less available to the public. While there are many debates on the definition of quality care, a precursor to identifying different definitions could be to identify the different approaches to providing access and defining or measuring quality.

This basic policy of transparency is in place in some, but not all countries. The World Health Organization collects data on three basic governance indicators as part of its dataset on universal health coverage. The

first determines whether there is legislation to provide universal health coverage. The second two are of direct relevance to open government: the availability of public national planning documents and the availability of monitoring of their implementation. Figure 4 categorizes OGP countries by region with regard to the availability of these two decision-making tools. Globally, nearly three-quarters of OGP countries published a national plan between 2013 and 2017, but only a quarter published their monitoring data. Regionally, there is considerable variation, with much higher rates of monitoring data publication in Africa and Asia-Pacific. In general, few wealthy OECD member countries published monitoring data, even when there was a plan in place. In Europe, fewer than 1 in 10 countries published this data.²⁰

FIGURE 4. Africa and Asia-Pacific publish national health coverage planning and monitoring data more frequently than other regions⁵⁰⁵



Source: WHO Universal Health Coverage Planning Database 2018 (n=32)



Health procurement

One of the biggest obstacles to achieving the country health commitments made by OGP countries—including Universal Health Coverage (UHC) and improved primary, reproductive, and neonatal health care—is inefficient and ineffective public procurement. According to the WHO, of the 10 leading causes for health systems inefficiency, five are procurement related.²⁰


Poor procurement can mean that the right health commodities and infrastructure does not get to the right place at the right time, tenders may awarded to contractors that fail to demonstrate value for money or good past performance and following a contract right through to implementation is incredibly difficult. The impact on health provision includes paying higher than necessary prices for medicines, the use of substandard and counterfeit medicines, overuse or problems with supply of equipment, inadequate health service infrastructure, and corruption and waste.²¹

The health procurement value chain has an impact on many of the health commitments made by OGP countries, including public monitoring of performance,

budget and expenditure tracking, and citizen decision-making. With almost two-thirds of OGP countries lacking a fair and open bidding process in public health procurement,²² there is substantial room for improvement in awarding contracts.

There are several organizations working towards improving openness in the Health sector including Transparency International's Open Contracting for Health project, The Open Contracting Partnership, the WHO, and Management Sciences for Health. Governments can leverage on this existing work by using a number of tools and approaches including the Open Contracting Data Standard (OCDS), enabling disclosure of data and documents at all stages of the contracting process by defining a common data model.²³ By publishing more intact and consistent public health procurement information and promoting the use and analysis of it by government, the private sector, citizens, civil society, and journalists, there is a strong framework in place for better monitoring of service delivery, greater value for money for governments, reduced corruption, and a coherent, trace-able procurement process from budgeting right through to implementation.

FIGURE 5. In OGP countries, roughly a third of countries have no open bidding, a third have flawed bidding processes, and a third have fair bidding



Key

Experts chose the statement that was closest to their views on how public health procurement (i.e., money spent on medications, vaccines, medical equipment, buildings, etc.) works in their country:

(a) Most contracts are awarded through an open and competitive bidding procedure

(b) There is a formal bidding procedure, but it is flawed. Several contracts are awarded without competitive bidding, or through ineffective bidding processes, leaving open the possibility of corruption

(c) There is no formal bidding procedure or it is superficial and ineffective. Most contracts are awarded to firms which offer bribes; to firms owned by political supporters; or to firms in which a relevant government officer has a financial stake

Source: World Justice Project Rule of Law Initiative, QRQ150 (n=65)

Health budget transparency

There is no recent cross-country comparison data on budget and spending data in health globally. However, this report does highlight findings from four major studies comparing health budgets over the last decade, one on project-based budgeting in low- and middle income countries, one on reproductive health in Latin America, and another on health expenditure in African countries. The key findings for future budgeting considerations include:

- Budget transparency overall has been perhaps the most successful set of accomplishments of OGP action plans. The next generation of budget transparency reforms could be sector-specific (including health) and, in many cases would benefit from focusing on program-level expenditure.
- These problems can be especially acute in reproductive health, where a lot of government data can require freedom of information requests.

Program-level budgeting in low- and middle-income countries

Project-level budgeting and expenditure data for health reveals national priorities and follow-through on those priorities. A shift toward program-level budgeting aims to balance the emphasis on spending outputs and outcomes with the traditional focus on inputs.²⁴

Transparency in these areas allows for national and international actors to understand national emphasis on levels of care (often referred to as “horizontal” interventions such as primary or pre-natal care) and specific interventions (often referred to as “vertical” interventions such as pandemic prevention or smoking cessation). With this budgetary information, one can reconcile policy and political priorities with actual implementation of programs.

The Overseas Development Institute and the International Budget Partnership surveyed budget and spending data for health in seven African Countries in 2013.²⁵ In surveying documents between 2010 and 2012, the report found:

- **Top line numbers:** Macro-economic data and overall budget versus spending for health was available in all seven countries, although it was not available for all years.

- **Specific expenditures:** When focusing on specific measures such as expenditures on medicines, only two countries had the data (Liberia and Uganda, which is not an OGP member).
- **Subnational data:** Few countries regularly made the data available at a subnational level, although some provinces in South Africa published this data.

The presence of macro-level indicators and the absence of subnational spending data is, unfortunately, consistent with the findings of health facilities and outcomes data in the prior section. While more analysis is needed to identify whether change has been positive over time, it suggests that some health budget transparency problems are persistent for some OGP members. It further suggests that tracking finance at lower levels may be the current priority, if it is not already. The referenced study, however, did not track plans and expenditures to specific programs.

Before 2018, there was no cross-national comprehensive survey of how budgets and spending matched health priorities in a given country. This has changed. The International Budget Partnership carried out a survey of 30 low- and middle-income countries recently to examine whether there was project-level budgeting focused on health.²⁶ While examining the degree to which health budget transparency meets publicly stated policy aims is beyond the scope of this paper, one can make a furtive analysis of the degree to which budgets match priorities. (The survey did not include data on the timing of the information released or the level of public participation.)

- **Program level transparency:**
 - **Examples:** Programs range in level of specificity. For example, some are high level: (1) Access to Health Services; (2) Provision of Health Services; (3) Stewardship (“steering and support”) of MOH Services. Others are highly specific: (1) Protection against sanitary risks; (2) Regulation and monitoring of healthcare facilities and services; (3) Social assistance and patient protection; (4) Prevention and care for HIV/AIDS and other STIs; (5) 21st Century Medical Insurance.
 - **Line items:** The results show that all OGP countries have project line items in budgets. On average, OGP countries have nine projects



identified in national budgets, although some have as many as 31 (Mexico) or 27 (Argentina), and others have three (Afghanistan, Burkina-Faso, and Mongolia). All 20 countries have budgets allocated at the program level.

- **Results-orientation:** Not all countries have specific indicators and targets for programs. 80% of countries in the survey have clear objectives for each program. Most of those (75%) have specific indicators and targets for the program. Only 40% establish a current performance baseline for a program or health policy area. For most of the countries, indicators are based on actions or outputs. Some countries (e.g., Indonesia, Jordan, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, and Serbia) have outcome-based indicators such as reducing new cases of tuberculosis.
- **Enacted budgets:** 80% of countries surveyed publish the program-level in the enacted budget. This means that 20% of countries do not publish final spending plans at the program level.
- **Subprogram level transparency:**
 - **Examples:** This level of transparency breaks down into specific expense types, such as: staff, goods and services; transfers and grants; investment; and capital and facilities.
 - **Subprogram line items:** Some (60%) have sub-programs (nine on average). Where those sub-programs exist, all have budgets allocated.
 - **Results-orientation:** Subprogram results-orientation is weaker, with just over half (55%) having targets and indicators and a mere 20% having specific targets.
- **Disease-specific transparency:**
 - **Line items:** 30% of countries have disease-specific programs, and only South Africa has reporting on disease-specific sub-programs. Most budgeted programs are oriented around levels of care, such as primary or emergency care (30%) or units within a ministry (40%).
 - **Indicators:** Nonetheless, 90% of countries surveyed had indicators for diseases of particular interest.

- **Reconciliation and accountability:**
 - **Responsibility:** Just over half (55%) of the countries surveyed name the government unit responsible for implementation. 90% budgeted for administrative cost, but only 15% identified cross-ministerial responsibilities.
 - **Year-end reporting:** Just over half (55%) of countries report financial reconciliation at the end of each year. Only 40% of surveyed countries publish non-financial reporting for each program.

Reproductive health budget transparency in African and Latin American countries

Fiscal tracking of reproductive health budgets has been a major area for action over the last decade. Population Action International works with a large community of activists in developing countries, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa, to mobilize government revenue for family planning. They have recently developed a framework for measuring such expenditures and are tracking resources in order to advocate for resource levels that match the scale of family planning challenges, emphasizing access to information.²⁷ In addition, this network has been working to get commitments on budget transparency into OGP action plans in the region. They may be reflected in 2019 or 2020 action plans.

A similar effort looked at reproductive health specifically. A 2012 study by Malajovich, et al. surveyed five Latin American countries (El Salvador, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Panama, and Peru) to identify how information on budgets, treatments, and expenditures included reproductive health. (All of the countries are OGP members.) The report found:

- **Open access:** Only Peru had budgetary data available without request on government websites. This data included specific budget lines for integrated reproductive care, skilled attendance at delivery, and emergency obstetric care. In Guatemala, information on integrated reproductive care was publicly available but password protected.
- **Procurement plans:** For Costa Rica, some data was obtainable through procurement plans of the Social Security Department.



Attending midwife training, Tajikhan Village, Afghanistan. (Photo by Graham Crouch, World Bank)

- **Access to information act:** In Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Panama, some information existed, but was obtained only through Access to Information Act filings and specific meeting requests with departments.
- **Refusal:** In El Salvador, budget information was unobtainable or provided so unsystematically that it was not useful.²⁸

Despite the age of the research and the limited scope in terms of countries, we can still draw some conclusions about budget transparency around reproductive health data:

- **Systematization:** Budget and spending information, which gives a sense of prioritization and decision-making, is not systematically gathered. Given the piecemeal nature of collection, this makes cross-country comparison impossible.
- **Publication:** Where the data exists, it is often not systematically published with minimal restrictions (i.e., it may be password protected).
- **Information requests:** Where such data exists, advocates needed to either request meetings or file formal access to information requests. Access to information laws remain an important stopgap tool until governments begin proactively publishing such information systematically.

Participation and accountability in health

The absence of accountability and public oversight can limit the impact of transparency. This is especially true where markets are not functioning and patient choice

is limited.²⁹ Ensuring accountability and public input are particularly important in rural areas where there are fewer providers or in cases where there is only one service provider (such as food safety inspection or single-payer insurance).

Growing acceptance of the need for participation and accountability in health

Enabling public input, feedback, and accountability is necessary at a range of levels, from community-level service providers to national policy setting. The political demand and evidence for such interventions has grown in recent years.³⁰

The World Health Organization, in its Universal Health Coverage Action Plan, lays out good governance beyond access to information—specifically clear responsibility, public input and collaboration, and accountability—as core building blocks for healthcare:

- **Putting in place levers or tools for implementing policy, including:** design of health system organizational structures and their roles, powers, and responsibilities; design of regulation; standard-setting; incentives; and enforcement and sanctions
- **Collaboration and coalition-building** across sectors and with external partners
- **Ensuring accountability by implementing:** governance structures, rules and processes for health sector organizations; mechanisms for independent oversight, monitoring, review and audit; transparent availability and publication of policies, regulations, plans, reports, accounts; and openness to scrutiny by political representatives and civil society³¹



Internationally, there is an organization specifically working to empower community-level monitoring and accountability. Community of Practitioners of Social Action in Health (COPASAH) focuses on enabling communities facing inequities to assert their rights and to advocate for themselves based on monitoring and local advocacy. A number of OGP governments, such as Mongolia and Uruguay, have also been supporting communities to advocate for themselves, often in partnership with the Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA).

There is much literature dedicated to the role and design of social accountability at the local community level. Recent research has shown the importance of participation and accountability mechanisms in improving the effectiveness of transparency:

- **Transparency without participation:** Without adequate accountability infrastructure, it is likely that transparency-based interventions in health will be ineffective³² or inefficient and in a few cases, may even be counterproductive to building trust or improving services.³³
- **Public participation impact:** Research on the instrumental impact of public participation in health is underdeveloped relative to other fields.³⁴ Research is underway to better isolate and understand the relationship between health outcomes and public transparency and accountability actions.³⁵
- **Social accountability impacts:** Recent studies of health interventions showed improvements at the community level using social accountability tools:
 - **Community scorecard meta-evaluation:** CARE International recently carried out a meta-review of its “community scorecard” evaluations in health and found that they resulted in (in diminishing order of evidence): (1) increased citizen empowerment, accountability, and space for negotiation; (2) greater service availability, access, utilization, and quality; and (3) trust-building. The review showed that inclusion of marginalized groups remained a major challenge.³⁶
 - **Community scorecard randomized control trials:** A randomized control trial of CARE’s community scorecard approach for reproductive health found improvements in patient services. Women treated by a clinic that had gone through a community scorecard process were more likely to receive a home visit during and after pregnancy. Health workers were more likely to take action as a result of home visits and women were more likely to use modern contraceptives.³⁷
 - **Citizen voice and accountability review:** World Vision’s approach, “Citizen, Voice, and Accountability,” includes citizen education, community scorecards, and interface meetings between citizens and officials. A 2019 review showed that, for a number of countries, community-level interventions led to national policy-level scale interventions to institute social accountability measures at a larger level. Armenia adopted the approach for health systems across the country.³⁸ Given that achieving scale and sustainability has been one of the core challenges at the heart of social accountability’s broader success, this suggests room for a positive shift from small-scale interventions to enhance national systems.
 - **Null results and vertical approaches:** Forthcoming work shows that some social accountability interventions did not have statistically significant changes on citizen accountability.³⁹ There is some evidence of changed healthcare provider behavior.⁴⁰ What the evidence may be pointing to is that purely bottom-up approaches by themselves do not lead to major changes in health system performance. Instead, vertically integrated approaches, which involve political and technical actors as well as citizens, may show greater promise.⁴¹

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OGP Global Report

Public Services

Education



Key points

OGP countries have shown widespread interest in education. Based on analysis of third-party data and OGP commitments, there are many strong commitments that may serve as useful models for other countries. However, despite these successes, there are also significant gaps which must continue to be addressed. These efforts offer a number of important lessons, including:

- **Accountability** is key to improving access and quality in education.
- **Public engagement**, especially at the school-level, is one of the most promising means of achieving accountability. A number of OGP members have strengthened parent-teacher-administrator oversight at the local level to improve school performance and value for money in terms of inputs (personnel, facilities, nutrition programs). This accountability is stronger when there are institutions, rather than one-off interventions.
- **Public engagement** works better when there is adequate data on the quality of school performance. The data suffers from a few gaps:
 - *Emphasis on inputs without equal data on outputs;*
 - *Disaggregation of data at lower levels of administration (and aggregation from lower levels to higher levels); and*
 - *Disaggregation by gender, institution type, and level of education.*

Continuing teacher training, Romania.
(Photo by Flore de Préneuf, World Bank)



Transparency, participation, and accountability for learning

Reformers—such as the many government officials and civil society organizations (CSOs) using OGP to advance reforms in their countries—have a range of tools to choose from to improve learning and education. Among these tools are institutions to improve citizen engagement and education.

Much progress has been made on opening up school data, especially around access to education. However, achieving sustainable and equitable outcomes require going beyond transparency alone. It requires sustained investment in institutions that can hold decision-makers accountable and help education systems become more responsive to public needs. (See “The generalist’s guide to education policy” for a general overview of education policy.)

Research shows a strong correlation between the quality of educational outcomes, the level of public data on performance, and school-based, multistakeholder (parents, teachers, administrators) governance. Information on performance can feed discussions, and, when tied to incentives, can help reward teachers and administrators with better outcomes.¹

There is growing evidence that accountability for learning outcomes is one of the key drivers of different levels of educational attainment within and between countries. Improving accountability can involve many approaches,

including aligning pay incentives for teachers and administrators, measurement of learning, and ensuring adequate governance structures in schools and basic educator capacity that drives education quality.

Research shows that transparency without accountability has limited impact. In a number of countries with longstanding disclosure requirements on learning outcomes, data shows that these interventions work only where there is also a high level of literacy among parents or learners and additional support to teachers. In Chile, data has been collected since 1996; among poorer populations, there has been no significant effect (on school performance or parent choice), as poorer families are not aware of the data, nor are they acting on it.² Similarly, in Liberia, publication of school-based Early Grade Reading Assessment scores did not improve school performance without intensive follow-up and teacher training.³ This shows that transparency, by itself, cannot close the performance gap.

There is growing evidence that public engagement is one of the building blocks for improved educational outcomes. “The case for accountability in education: South Africa” [later in this section] shows how stronger accountability systems, especially at the school level, can explain differences in long-term learning outcomes. In particular, it points to the positive role that parent-administrator-teacher inter-

action can play. Moreover, it requires long-standing traditions of community engagement and ensuring that those communities have the data that they need for this discussion. This points to two areas where OGP countries can invest: greater community engagement opportunities and investing in improved local level data and systems to collect that data. The following sections look at progress made by OGP countries in

these areas, as well as where there continues to be room for growth.

While there are a number of such systems being promoted in OGP, they have not yet achieved widespread use. These sections aim to help open government advocates bridge the gap between accountability and greater transparency.

GOOD TO KNOW

The generalist's guide to education policy



Education is, fundamentally, an investment in people and their capabilities. This investment pays dividends to those societies which ensure that access and quality are widespread. South Korea, for example, made significant investments in universal literacy, then secondary, then post-secondary education. As a result, it was able to sustain very rapid growth without running into severe skill constraints. Finland, Chile, Poland, and Peru have followed similar trajectories, with nationally directed improvements in education, which while at times have been inconsistent, have resulted in significant growth in both learning and economic results.

The 2018 World Development Report outlined the many benefits of better education at the individual, family, community, and society-wide levels. It provides an extensive review of the evidence and is summarized in Figure 1 on the next page.

Vocational training, El Salvador (Photo by USAID El Salvador)

FIGURE 1. Investment in education accrues benefits to individuals, families, communities, and society

	INDIVIDUAL/FAMILY	COMMUNITY/SOCIETY
MONETARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher probability of employment • Greater productivity • Higher earnings • Reduced poverty 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Higher productivity • More rapid economic growth • Poverty reduction • Long-run development
NONMONETARY	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Better health • Improved education and health of children/family • Greater resilience and adaptability • More engaged citizenship • Better choices • Greater life satisfaction 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Increased social mobility • Better-functioning institutions/service delivery • Higher levels of civic engagement • Greater social cohesion • Reduced negative externalities

Source: WDR 2018

From universal access to learning and equality of opportunity

While the world has a significant distance to go in terms of access to education and basic literacy and numeracy, the direction of change over the last half-century has been positive.

- In Sub-Saharan Africa since 1970, the gap in the gross enrollment rate for primary education has essentially closed, as enrollments have climbed from 68% to nearly 100%. Over the same time period, South Asia has gone from 45% to near 100% as well.
- The rate of expansion of universal primary education has also accelerated, as developing countries are expanding access to basic education in less time. Zambia has expanded secondary enrollment faster than any industrialized country during an equivalent period of time.⁴
- In terms of gender equity, the share of girls in basic education is at an all-time high and, in developing countries, the ratio of girls to boys has gone from .86 to .96 since 1991.⁵ Gender parity remains elusive, however, with at least 130 million unenrolled girls worldwide.⁶

Despite strides in granting universal access to primary (ages 5-12) education, this has not been met equally with a rise in learning outcomes.⁷ For that reason, there is a need to expand education efforts from access to also include outcomes.

This global consensus is represented in a shift in language between the Millennium Development Goals, wherein Goal 2 emphasized, “Achieve Universal Primary Education,” and the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 4, which seeks to, “Ensure inclusive and equitable quality education and promote lifelong learning opportunities for all.”

This shift in emphasis is critical to understanding the scope of the challenge of the 21st century—addressing the severity of today’s achievement gaps must mean seeking solutions which ensure the long-term success of all people. With regard to education, there are a number of barriers to positive, more sustainable outcomes:

- **Inclusivity and equity:** Children from poorer backgrounds, girls, indigenous people, and people with disabilities have significantly lower access to quality education. The effects



of these exclusions are compounding.⁸ While many countries have pockets of effective education, poorer communities suffer from fewer resources, higher rates of teacher absenteeism, and management quality.⁹ This is a result of budgetary and public policy decisions, not only environmental factors.

- **Quality:** The goal of education is not only to ensure access, but to ensure learning and the development of knowledge, skills, and attitudes that allow for social mobility.
- **Lifelong learning:** The scope of education in the information age must go beyond primary education to cover not only secondary and university education, but to allow workers to attain new skills and knowledge following formal schooling.

SDG 4 includes the following targets:

- 1 Universal primary and secondary education
- 2 Early childhood development and universal pre-primary education
- 3 Equal success to technical/ vocational and higher education
- 4 Relevant skills for decent work

- 5 Gender equality and inclusion
- 6 Universal youth literacy
- 7 Education for sustainable development and global citizenship

This framing is a major step forward in that it does not just focus on developing countries, but rather the challenges of an increasingly globalized, interconnected, and dynamic world economy. The set of challenges and opportunities for reform, in that sense, are universal to OGP members.

There is global reference data for tracking progress on these education indicators. UNESCO's Global Education Monitoring Report (GEMR) has been designated as the lead UN agency for independently tracking progress against SDG 4 education goals. Its annual report includes a compilation of country-level education indicators and analysis as well as more in-depth research on current education issues. The GEMR provides a variety of open-access tools that can be helpful to policymakers, education officials, CSOs, and education activists who want to understand better the status of education in their countries.¹⁰

Education in OGP

OGP members have demonstrated a strong interest in education within action plans. Education is one of the most popular policy areas within OGP. At the end of 2018, 52 of 84 members with action plans have commitments on education. ("Environment and Climate" and "Health" follow with 45 members working on each respectively. "Infrastructure" and "Water" trail behind at 25 members with active commitments.)

There have been at least 160 education commitments in OGP. Between 2012 and 2017, OGP's Independent Reporting Mechanism (IRM) evaluated more than 100

education commitments from OGP action plans. (More than 55 new commitments are in the process of being reviewed.)

To date, OGP members have included a number of major education accomplishments in their action plans. The IRM findings provide insight into how well OGP commitments are meeting the promise of improving education systems. Rather than analyze all 150 commitments (which could be the focus of future analyses), it is helpful to focus on some of the commitments with stronger results. The IRM either gave these

commitments “stars”, or a designation of “Major” or “Outstanding” early results. These terms indicate that the commitment either changed the way governments did business in these areas or showed transformative potential impact. They fall into four categories:

- **Access to education:**
 - Enhancing basic access to digital services: Denmark 2012 action plan
 - Expanding basic education from 6th to 9th grade: Honduras 2012 action plan
- **Input monitoring:**
 - Budget monitoring: Dominican Republic 2014 action plan
 - Tracking of inputs and resources: Honduras 2014, Buenos Aires 2017 action plans
- **Digitization of online records:**
 - Putting exam and transcript material online: Albania’s online “e-Matura” system (2012 action plan) and Colombia’s online “Sí Virtual” system (2015 action plan)
- **Public monitoring of outcomes:**
 - Systematic dissemination of access to information on school performance and health services; implementation of accountability tracking: Mongolia 2015 action plan
 - National participatory mechanisms: Colombia (2015 action plan)

Limited commitments in public participation and accountability

Most OGP countries are using their action plans to focus on modernization (e-Government) and transparency reforms. A few commitments emphasize performance monitoring and public engagement, but when compared to the rest of OGP most are focused on publication of information.

- Of 130 commitments in education, roughly 40 (31%) aim to improve civic participation and accountability. Relatively speaking, this proportion is smaller than other sectors of OGP commitments. (Roughly half of all OGP commitments focus on either participation or accountability.)

- Of the 40 participation and public accountability commitments, the majority are primarily about the provision of data. These commitments contain language that implies that there will be additional public accountability and oversight, but do not specify mechanisms by which that accountability will take place. These are the most common category of commitments that have elements of public participation. Some were tied to specific expenditures or metrics of school performance, such as teacher qualification, facility construction, or subsidized school nutrition programs. (OGP action plans with these commitments include Albania, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Indonesia, Northern Macedonia, and Peru.) The release of data is laudable, but it will be stronger in cases where there is investment and cultivation of the means to activate that data.
 - Of the remaining 20 commitments, others are clearer in how they hope to promote greater civic participation, although they are not focused on elements of accountability.
 - a Digital, civic or citizenship education commitments that aim to improve public understanding of digital media and participation in civic life (Estonia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ireland, and Italy)
 - b Publicity of teacher qualification and training (Mexico (Jalisco), Panama, and Sri Lanka)
 - c Consumer rights education (Mongolia), especially for persons with disabilities (Peru)
 - d Open education resources and curriculum (Argentina, Brazil, Slovak Republic, and the United States) (See “Lessons from reformers: The case for open education and open science,” later in the section for a broader discussion of this issue.)

This shows that a handful of OGP members are investing in sustainable institutions for public participation and accountability in education. While there have been notable numbers of commitments to release data or modernize education systems, third-party data shows that there are a number of areas for growth, should governments continue to use their OGP action plans to improve education.





Students at Myangad Soum School in Khovd, Mongolia study in schools improved through social accountability measures. (Photo by Open Government Partnership)

Frontiers of Education and Open Government

A successful open government strategy to improving education requires a mix of approaches: (1) improving accountability on learning outcomes; (2) improving accountability on educational inputs; (3) and bolstering the data underpinning decisions, including disaggregation by gender. This section looks at the state of innovation within OGP commitments, which may point the way to stronger commitments going forward.

Community engagement and accountability for learning

Accountability for learning is complex given the range of actors involved in education. The 2017–18 global education monitoring report, *Accountability in Education: Meeting our Commitments*, lays out a framework for understanding the rights and responsibilities of these actors.¹¹ It includes the duty of governments to create mechanisms for people to

hold officials accountable, the role of school regulation in providing better results, teachers' responsibility for high-quality instruction, citizens' roles in monitoring teacher performance, parents' roles in ensuring student attendance and safe environments, and international organizations' roles in goal- and standard-setting and finance. Given this complexity, readers are referred to the report cited above for additional inspiration and ideas. The framework it provides is largely based on a synthesis of successful initiatives and innovations, rather than statistical analysis of current education accountability.

In fact, there is no internationally comparable data collected at a large scale on community engagement and accountability in education. This stands in contrast to other sectors, such as environment (which has the World Resources Institute's Environmental Democracy Index and the Yale Environmental Governance Index), water and sanitation (which has the GLAAS

database), budgets (which has the International Budget Partnership), and administrative law (which has the World Bank's Global Indicators of Regulatory Governance). This makes generalization about the state of community engagement and accountability in education difficult. What is clear, however, is that if this data is gathered, it is not systematized, public, or comparable.

In the absence of cross-regional data, there are promising hints within OGP countries. A number have used their action plans to advance public oversight, although the total number is small. Encouragingly, these members have invested in systems and institutions, rather than one-off tools to advance education accountability. Of the three commitments that received a star rating from the Independent Reporting Mechanism, two are still in process, while Mongolia's has been completed.

- **Armenia** (2014 action plan): This reform aimed to eliminate conflicts of interest for individuals serving on governing boards of secondary education institutions. "Parent" slots were often controlled or occupied by members of administration.¹² This reform is still underway. Although new rules have not yet been put into practice, the IRM finds significant progress on passage of applicable legislation.
- **Mongolia** (2015 action plan): This 2015 commitment aimed to ensure systematic dissemination of access to information on school performance and health services at the community level. In addition, the education system invested in training parents and community workers to begin tracking accountability. This is particularly remarkable in a country where a large percentage of students attend boarding schools and parents are semi-nomadic. In Khovd Province, which was part of a larger World Bank supported effort at improving social accountability, activities were particularly successful. Efforts sought to address insufficient information and access to decision-making on school governance, resource allocation, expenditure tracking, and operational planning for ten secondary schools in isolated low-income counties. Education officials and local CSOs drafted and sought approval for an action plan

that included budget allocation for the training of monitors, CSO and parental participation in the school budget-proposal-making process, public reporting of school performance, and making school audit reports available to school councils and the public.¹³

- **Tbilisi, Georgia** (2017 action plan): In 2017, the Tbilisi government proposed legislation to allow the public to oversee planning and budgeting processes through independent monitoring organizations. While websites were developed and legislation was drafted, it did not pass due to the change in administrations. Development is still underway.

At a minimum level, OGP members might begin taking inventory of where there are functioning accountability institutions within their communities. This might include: parent-teacher-administrator institutions that support school activities; citizen-involved school management committees, which provide an accountability and advisory function; and ombudsman and advocate roles, which provide a means of representing students and parents with administrations. At an intermediate level, commitments could create incentives for administrators, teachers, and parents to develop and sustain such institutions. At more advanced levels, ongoing performance monitoring and impact evaluation can help provide the basis for tracking progress on education outcomes. Based on this information, analysis can be carried out to identify factors for successful accountability. Additionally, policies and practices can be undertaken to improve performance of these accountability institutions.



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

The case for accountability in education: South Africa and Kenya

Education systems work better when the public has access to information, the opportunity to participate and influence decision-making, and the ability to seek answers and response from governments. To best understand this, it is helpful to look more closely at recent research from South Africa.

*The Politics of Governance of Basic Education*¹⁴ makes the case for better public involvement in decision-making and monitoring. Despite considerably higher education funding levels, classrooms in the Western Cape Province of South Africa had worse outcomes relative to schools with lower funding levels. In high performing schools, much of this was due to leadership of school principals. When those principals left, performance often fell. Yet, in some schools, change in leadership did not result in similar declines. Why? At a fundamental level, there was greater parent-educator participation and mutual accountability, with regular rewards for high performance and sanctions for weaker accountability. This contrast is further evident in comparing Kenya with South Africa. Kenya has a fraction of the school funding and facilities, yet has higher overall outcomes on internationally comparable tests. Again, this is due in part to the involvement of parents in educational outcomes, rewarding high-performing schools with parades and becoming concerned when schools struggle.¹⁵

It is worth dissecting the building blocks for improving learning outcomes, as well as where open government approaches can make the most difference. Individual elements include:

- **Collection of data outcomes and inputs:** Where possible, this data is standardized. Many countries are using the Programme for International Student Assessment, or PISA, which allows within- and cross-country comparison. While PISA has been accepted in many places, SDG4 calls for measuring learning at grades 2 and 3 which allows educators to address learning gaps earlier. This is an area still under development.
- **Timely, regular publication of that data:** This should be done in a way that the community can understand. Kenya, as an example, publishes and delivers all standardized data through its open data portal. In

2013, Code4Kenya re-used this data and now delivers it to schools.¹⁶ More recently, the Kenyan National Examinations Council adopted this system, and parents can now check school performance.¹⁷ (See below.)

- **Participatory governance and accountability:** It is important that this be done at the school level. Mongolia is in the process of adopting parent-teacher associations in collaboration with the Global Partnership for Social Development¹⁸ and Partnership for Transparency Fund.¹⁹
- **Measurement of participation in assessment, dissemination, and engagement systems.**²⁰ India maintains a regular accounting of parental awareness and participation in such organizations available on its PTA website. Of course, the functioning of these areas varies widely by location, but a future step might be comparing these different functions across localities. Such work is being carried out in India and other countries through bottom-up approaches pioneered by the People's Action Learning Network, where communities independently assess and disseminate the results of monitoring learning in poorer areas.²¹

These same elements can be carried out at the policy, budgetary, and administrative levels as well.

The Kenyan National Examinations Council provides school-by-school reporting on examination performance



Source: Kenya National Examinations Council, Examination Registration System, <https://www.knec-portal.ac.ke/>.

Community engagement and accountability for educational inputs

OGP countries have a number of successful commitments that give the public the ability to monitor budgets, spending, and delivery of services at the school level. This is an area to continue growing both in practice and among OGP commitments. And while there is increasing consensus that learning matters as much or more than educational inputs, inputs of course still matter. Governments still need to make critical investments: teachers need the right training and skills to do their jobs well; teachers need learning materials and ongoing support to continue to hone their craft; school systems need buildings constructed; and school food programs need to ensure students receive healthy, nourishing meals.

Importantly, these commitments will be more effective when they are accompanied by strengthened accountability mechanisms. Accountability is more sustainable when the rules establish and sustain public oversight institutions with strong mandates. The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Centre has helpfully outlined the major institutional factors which are necessary to improve the quality of administration in the sector. (See “Guidance and standards: Factors for accountability.”) While some of these are internal-to-government, many contain strong elements of open government. All reforms would make clear and public the “rules of the game” for education decision-making.

Within OGP, there have been a number of public input-tracking commitments in OGP worth noting and learning from:

- **Anti-corruption in Brazil** (2011 and 2013 action plans): Across its first two action plans, Brazil advanced four commitments to strengthen oversight of school management and resource allocation. These were the “Interactive school development plan,” the “Control Panel for the Integrated Monitoring and Oversight System,” the “National Program for Strengthening School Councils,” and the “Generation of knowledge

and capacity-building of managers and public resources operator’s partners and of councilors for social control.” Together, these four commitments comprised a suite of activities to strengthen the local management of schools, established in the 1996 law on education. This includes enhancing the oversight function of school councils which include community members. In particular, they would focus on budgeting and tracking school construction. According to the most recent IRM reports, these commitments were largely complete, although many of the budgets and contracts that these councils were supposed to monitor have not yet been made public and the rate of training parents and administrators to operate councils effectively has slowed. Nonetheless, this represents a laudable long-term effort in Brazil.

- **Educational Infrastructure in Buenos Aires** (2017 action plan): According to the IRM, the city of Buenos Aires made a major step forward with its commitments to increase accountability and transparency in public works for education. The commitment centralized all data on major educational public works, developed a centralized platform to present that data, and importantly, established a citizen reporting mechanism to allow the public to ask about progress, delays, and concerns.
- **Participation and citizen oversight in education in El Salvador** (2016 action plan): The El Salvadoran government has been receiving complaints about inefficiencies with the education system, such as problems with uniform delivery, school lunches, and low teacher quality. CSOs expressed concerns that the approach to these problems had been one-off and case-by-case. As an alternative, they proposed better structures to ensure longer-term monitoring. This commitment aimed to address this by establishing monitoring mechanisms at education centers in certain parts of the country.



Political Science Professor Evans Aggrey-Darkoh lectures at University of Ghana. (Photo by Dominic Chavez, World Bank)

To date, some of the basic legal infrastructure has been established, but the final mechanisms have not been established or, in many cases, lack active membership or training. The government has carried out basic surveys of the needs of the councils where they exist, but the allocation of resources and training is still underway. The IRM recommended beginning implementation with a number of pilots.²²

- **Teacher and administrator hiring in Honduras** (2014 action plan): Honduras committed to make the hiring of school personnel more transparent and participatory. This includes bringing in citizens to observe the performance of candidates for director-level positions and involvement of citizens in the search process. At the time of the IRM review (2016), the final hires were not yet in place due to timing challenges associated with hiring regulations. Nonetheless, the concept of involving the public for such hiring remains an important step forward.

These cases highlight the potential for greater public engagement. In the future, member countries may consider investment and future commitments in OGP action plans that focus on improving transparency and accountability around these core areas:

- **Infrastructure:** the supply of essential learning materials (textbooks and other learning resources);
- **Social supports:** e.g., nutrition, uniforms, conditional cash transfers, and scholarships;
- **Personnel:** the number and deployment of qualified teachers and other allied support staff;
- **Teacher attendance** and the level of ongoing support that teachers receive to do their jobs well; and
- **School performance** and learning outcomes measurement for all children.²³



Factors for accountability



The U4 Anti-Corruption Resource Center outlines steps that can be taken to improve accountability within education that go well beyond open data. The list provided gives a number of reforms that can be starting points in developing OGP commitments and actions. Necessary factors for strong accountability include:

- Politically independent administrations and clear-cut management rules and procedures
- Clear standards and rules for merit-based teacher recruitment and promotion
- Clear criteria for student admissions and examinations
- Codes of conduct for monitoring compliance with rules and applying punitive measures in case of non-compliance
- Rules on conflict of interest
- Autonomous examination agencies
- Involvement of parents, teachers, and civil society in planning and management
- Access to information complaint mechanisms available for all interested parties (including rights for whistleblowers)
- Internal and external control of accreditation boards for private institutions

Looking in on education, Kaski, Nepal. (Photo by Simone D. McCourtie, World Bank)



LESSONS FROM REFORMERS

Dominican Republic: Learning outcome transparency is the beginning of improvement

The Dominican Republic’s 2016 action plan focused its education efforts on developing a digital tool, the “Educational Center Management System (SIGERD),” by which parents and guardians could obtain data on performance and supervisory processes at the school level. The Ministry of Education piloted the tool in five schools before expanding to more than 120 education centers in 18 regions of the country.

The SIGERD system includes new functionalities, such as:

- Interconnection with other educational portals in education matters, such as EDUPLAN, the registry of statistics, including performance indicators
- Search tools that allow the comparison of information between different sites within and between school districts
- A system of alerts for educational staff and parents when new information becomes available
- Monitoring data at the school level, including student attendance, schedules, grades, personnel, infrastructure, and performance indicators

At the time of evaluation, this system was functional. However, it was also password-protected and required authorization from school authorities to access performance-level information, including otherwise publicly available data. While some data may need to be protected for privacy of student records or personnel issues, other information is already publicly available or required to be so. In that sense, the system is a promising start on the road to transparency and participation, but much can be done to strengthen parent and public oversight of these education centers.

Early childhood learning center, Santo Domingo. (Photo by Presidencia Republica Dominicana)





French class at Sogman primary school in Sejnane, Tunisia. (Photo by Arne Hoel, World Bank)

Transparency for accountability

Transparency fuels better accountability. Accountability institutions and incentives for better performance and efficiency are critical, but without adequate data to inform decisions, it is difficult to understand if, where, and how they are improving. This section looks at some examples of using comparable, school-level education data to improve accountability in education systems to demonstrate how future OGP action plans might contribute to service delivery improvements.

The overall state of the data for transparency can best be described as a “mosaic.”²⁴ There are often pockets of strong data at the local level, in pilot projects, or in one-off data collection efforts. In some cases, the national level has strong data, but it is not adequately disaggregated. This may be, in part, due to the sheer scope of the system or the number of stakeholders. In a number of countries, this may be an issue of federalism or decentralization—an issue of division of powers and responsibility between levels.

There are many commitments which deal with the collection and systematization of data. The box on the previous page discusses the experience of the country in developing a system to publish and publicize data to raise awareness among parents and administrators on how their schools are performing in serving children’s needs.

Beyond individual commitments, however, it may be

critical to look at the state of education data within OGP countries. This can identify areas of future commitments to improve the state of data for better accountability and meaningful public participation around education. Following the structure of the two prior sections, this section looks at the state of data first for educational outcomes and then for inputs.

Transparency of educational outcomes

Within the education community, there are a number of vital initiatives to gather, synthesize, and use data. These initiatives (particularly, the UNESCO Institute for Statistics’ Database²⁵) have strong credibility within the education community and provide a useful starting point for designing commitments. Seven such international initiatives are described in the “Guidance and Standards” information later on. The initiatives do not, however, have systematic analyses on the availability of education data across OGP countries and do not have data on subnational or time-series coverage available in national statistical systems.


To better understand educational outcomes data, this report offers a brief report on the state of data available on national statistical sites. It draws on primary-source reviews of national statistical and educational databases produced by the Web Foundation (Open

Data Barometer) and Open Data Watch (Open Data Inventory or ODIN). The value of ODIN data in particular is that it is linked to the primary source material on national statistical office (NSO) websites and covers every OGP country.²⁶ Notably, it shows that there are significant gaps in current national-level data.

- **Availability:** The Open Data Barometer carried out a survey in 2017 of 83% of OGP countries. The findings showed that 100% of OGP countries collected data on attendance, graduation, and student performance. This does not mean, however, that the same number published that data; only 85% of countries within OGP published this data. For the 15% of OGP countries which are not publishing this data, commitments to publish this data would be a major step forward. (By contrast, Open Data Watch’s “Open Data Inventory” looks at whether outcome data is available, including enrollment, completion rates, and performance on exams. This data covers 100% of OGP countries. 97% of OGP countries published some data on these three indicator sets. This finding is more optimistic than that found by Open Data Barometer.)

- **Disaggregation:** ODIN sees if available data is disaggregated by sex, school level, age of student, and school type (public, private, or religious). While over one-half disaggregated by sex, and some by school age, very few presented data disaggregated by age or type of school. Overall, less than 3% of OGP countries had disaggregated data on education outcomes (available at the national level) by all three indicators.
- **Time span:** Time series data is essential for tracking progress or declines in performance. Less than one-tenth of OGP countries had time-series data for most of a decade or even within the last five years.
- **Decentralization:** Not a single OGP country had a centralized data hub with provincial or municipal-level outcomes. This is not because the data does not exist. Rather, this is a result of the mosaic of data that is available on outcomes, sometimes available only to specific provinces or to specific localities.

FIGURE 2. Few OGP countries’ NSOs link to data on education outcomes (enrollment, graduation, and exam scores)



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017 Indicators 3.2,3.3 (n=79)




Transparency of educational inputs

Overall, ODIN data shows that educational input data follows national statistical systems in OGP countries in roughly the same pattern as the data on educational outcomes. The data tracks the availability and coverage of the number of schools, number of teaching staff, and the annual education budget available in national statistical systems, including ministries of education.

- Availability and disaggregation:** A small minority of OGP countries have all data available and disaggregated by student age groups, school levels (primary, secondary, and tertiary), and school types (public, private, and religious). Most OGP countries have some data available. For budgets, many OGP countries do not have a breakdown by type of expenditure, although most have basic top-line budgeting publicly available.
- Time span:** In comparison to school outcomes, most OGP countries with basic data on schools do have the data available over the course of several years (see Figure 3, rows 2 and 3).
- Decentralization:** Most national statistical systems surveyed do not have data available for provincial and local levels of administration (see Figure 3, rows 4 and 5 respectively).

FIGURE 3. Few OGP countries' NSOs link to data on education facilities (budgets, schools, number of teachers)



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017 Indicator 2.1-2.3 (n=79)

Elements of coverage


Disaggregation of data by sex and school type

Two areas are of particular interest when examining patterns of disaggregation: sex and school type. Sex is important from an equity perspective, useful in determining whether there is variation in educational outcomes. A closer look (see Figure 4) at ODIN data covering all 79 OGP countries shows that:

- Most OGP countries disaggregate enrollment figures by sex.
- Just about half of OGP countries do not publish graduation rates. Of those that do, most do disaggregate by sex. Consequently, the principle binding constraint seems to be publication overall.

- The overwhelming majority of country statistical offices do not post exam data in general. Of the minority (roughly 25%) that do, all publish sex-disaggregated data. As a consequence, for the many countries working to publish data on competency exams, it would be of great benefit to ensure that such data is sex-disaggregated from the start.

FIGURE 4. Absence of data overall is the biggest constraint to obtaining sex-disaggregated data on student outcomes




Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017 Indicators 3.1-3.3 (n=79)



Very few countries publish data on outcomes disaggregated by school type. School type is especially challenging in many countries, as private, charter, or religious schools may serve a significant portion of the school population, but may not report on outcomes in the same way as public schools. This may mean that parents are paying for private education that may or may not be a better value for children or that the government may be subsidizing low-performing schools (whether through vouchers, cash transfers, scholarships, grants, or subsidized educational lending). A review of ODIN data from national statistical offices shows that this is a major area for future action for many OGP governments wishing to improve educational open data. Major findings from this review include:

- Most governments publish enrollment data, but only about half track what type of school students are attending.
- Less than half publish graduation data, and of those, less than a third disaggregate graduation rates by school type.
- No OGP member currently has data on competency exams disaggregated by school type published on their national statistical organization's website.

FIGURE 5. Data on education outcomes disaggregated by school type (public, private, religious) is largely unavailable in OGP countries



Source: Open Data Watch Open Data Inventory 2017 Indicators 3.1-3.3 (n=79)

Again, OGP countries continue to show great interest in education-based reforms, and their efforts to date offer promise. Moving forward, these findings allow future commitments to be more strategic in terms of addressing the barriers to improved learning outcomes. Important takeaways when considering the focus of this work include:

- 1** While OGP countries outperform non-OGP countries, they still have a significant amount of work to do, beginning with publishing disaggregated data (gender, level, and type of institution) and making sure that data is released on a timely periodic basis.
- 2** Educational outcome data lags well behind facilities data. That being said, both could stand to see considerable improvement.
- 3** While data may be collected, it is not yet systematically archived and made downloadable. Furthermore, much of it may remain at state and local levels, or may not be published in an open format across ministries.




Seven essential resources to support open government approaches to education

This section of the OGP Global Report touches on a fraction of the potential interventions possible to strengthen transparency, accountability, and participation in education. Within the field itself, there are a number of resources from which reformers would benefit as they develop more effective education commitments.

- 1 The UNESCO Global Education Monitoring Report publishes themed reports biennially on important issues in global education.²⁷ The 2017–18 report focused on accountability across schools. While it does not have country-by-country analysis, it does have significant case studies and examples of successful interventions to strengthen accountability.²⁸
- 2 The UNESCO International Institute for Education Planning (IIEP) works extensively with Ministries of Education to help them identify corruption risks in the education sector, and design strategies to improve transparency and accountability. It has trained more than 2,200 people on related topics and also provides technical support to countries in the process of carrying out an integrity assessment of their education sector, launching a public expenditure tracking survey, or developing a teacher code of conduct. It also manages the ETICO online resource platform, which gathers a wide variety of resources related to the ethics and corruption in education, including at higher education level.²⁹ Finally it has recently launched a new research project dedicated to open government in education.
- 3 The UNESCO Institute for Statistics collects and consolidates educational data from governments and is responsible for reporting on SDG4 targets and indicators at the international level.³⁰
- 4 UNICEF Multi-Indicator Cluster Surveys (MICS) has a number of tools and modules to support governments in bringing parents into education monitoring and involving them in children’s education. Governments can seek support through MICS to better monitor the performance and governance of schools. In some cases, there is funding to support these efforts.³¹
- 5 UNICEF’s “Data Must Speak” program works in multiple countries and collaboratively with Ministries of Education, school leaders, teachers, and communities to use education data for decision-making. One goal of the program is to make the case for, and incentivize investments in, better quality and open data on education, and to support communities in using that data. OGP members might work with UNICEF through this program or learn from other countries that are already involved in Data Must Speak.³²
- 6 The Global Partnership for Education is a multistakeholder partnership that provides technical assistance, knowledge and innovation resources, and financial support for developing country partners to achieve their national education goals.³³ This can help OGP members better achieve their educational goals, including through open government reform and improved data.
- 7 The World Inequality Database on Education examines access to education and learning outcomes through an inequality lens. It provides user-friendly infographic tools that allow the user to select a variety of indicators and provides a visual display of the data.³⁴

The case for open education and open science



Open education includes tools, resources, and practices that can be shared freely without the financial, legal, and technical barriers common to traditional educational materials.

A number of OGP countries have worked on these issues through their OGP action plans. These include Argentina (through the University of Buenos Aires), Brazil, the Slovak Republic, and the United States. The arguments for public access to these common pool resources are threefold:

- **Cost:** In many countries, the cost of materials is a prohibitive barrier to education.
- **Currency:** Open source materials can be updated more quickly than traditionally prepared curricula. This allows for current developments within each respective field to be available to educators and learners more rapidly.

- **Quality:** A meta-review of studies analyzing the performance of students using open educational materials found that 93% of students using open source materials performed better than peers using traditional materials.³⁵ Others have argued that more research is still required and that current studies remain inconclusive.³⁶

Beyond access to educational resources, there are strong efforts within OGP countries to make government-funded research public. One such example is legislation in the United States, the Fair Access to Science and Technology Research Act (FASTR) or H.R. 3427/S. 1701, which required US agencies with over US\$100 million annual budget to provide the public with online access to publicly funded research no later than six months after publication in a peer-reviewed journal.

Endnotes

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- ²¹ The People's Action for Learning Network (PAL Network), <https://palnetwork.org/>.
- ²² Jaime David Ayala, *IRM El Salvador Mid-Term Report 2016-2018* (OGP), https://www.opengovpartnership.org/sites/default/files/El-Salvador_Mid-Term_Report_2016-2018.pdf.
- ²³ For additional analysis and recommendations for improving accountability in education, see UNESCO's Global Education Monitoring 2017-18 Thematic Report "Accountability in education: meeting our commitments, available in multiple languages: <https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/report/2017/accountability-education>.
- ²⁴ For additional resources on the education data landscape globally and by country, see the various resources available through UNESCO's Institute for Statistics: <http://uis.unesco.org/>.
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- ²⁷ Available at: <https://en.unesco.org/gem-report/>.
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- ²⁹ The ETICO online resource platform includes thematic pages on topics such as open school data, teacher codes of conduct, or academic fraud in higher education; a resource database with more than 600 references to publications and academic articles about corruption in education, a review of press articles, a blog, and a glossary. Available at <http://etico.iiep.unesco.org/>.
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- ³² Available at: <https://www.unicef.org/education/global-information-data-must-speak>.
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Funded by:

